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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates one of the crucial issues currently facing the European fmancial institutions, in 
particular, banks and insurance companies. Currently in Europe, the banks are engaging into insurance 
business, and, the insurance companies, to a lesser effect, are engaging into banking business. These cross-
business activities have broken down the long tradition of separation of these two fmancial industries, and 
have raised many questions. But there is little evidence on this issue, theoretically as well as empirically. 
This thesis is a kind of interdisciplinary approach and it has two parts. In the first part, the thesis examines 
various interfaces that exist between the European banks and insurance companies from two perspectives: 
banks' perspective as well as insurance companies' perspective. (Chapter two and three respectively). 
Based on industrial economic theory, organisation theory, the strategy & international business theory, and 
the regulation theory, a historical analysis is employed for the examination of these various interfaces. The 
thesis also examines the traditional relationships and traditional distribution channels of banks as well as 
insurance companies and the development of their current changing patterns. Driving forces for these 
changing interfaces and the regulation concerning changes of interface are also considered in the thesis 
(Chapter four). The EC Directives on banking and insurance are also given their due weight for this 
examination. One of the major contributions in the first part is to make a theoretical development of this 
new area, and the creation of 'bancassurance' and 'assurancebank' data that is scarce and can be invaluable 
for further research and development on this issue. Some of these data are used in the second part of the 
thesis. 
In the second part of the thesis, two sets of empirical tests are conducted. The first test is the test of return 
and risk effects on European bank holding companies diversification into various insurance business, 
namely life assurance underwriting, general insurance underwriting, and insurance broking business. The 
second test is opposite to the first one, i.e. the test of return and risk effects on European insurance holding 
companies diversification into banking business (Chapter five and six respectively). Based on fmance 
literature, econometric work is employed for these tests. The results of the first test shows that banks 
significantly increase their risk in underwriting of life as well as underwriting of general insurance business. 
Expansion in life underwriting significantly increases returns but the effect on return from expanding in 
general insurance underwriting is not significant. The most profitable expansion is into insurance broking 
business since our results indicate a significant positive effect on return with no adverse effects on risk. On 
the other hand, the results of the second test shows that the insurance companies bankruptcy risk although 
increases, two other risk measurements indicate significant risk reduction, and the return in this case does 
not have significant effect. This suggests that only the cross-business distribution activities should be 
permitted and the cross-business underwriting activities should be restricted in order to reduce the 
probability of bankruptcies. 
xi 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The research in this thesis deals with some of the most crucial issues currently facing 
the European insurance and the banking industries, the two most important players in 
the financial service world. Both playa key role in a country's economic system and 
their actions have public policy implications directly. That is why they are highly 
regulated and supervised. In the United Kingdom, the banking business is regulated 
and supervised under The Banking Act 1987, and the building societies under the 
Building Societies Act 1987. On the other hand, insurance business is regulated and 
supervised under The Insurance Companies Act 1982. In the case of Lloyds of 
London, The Lloyds Act 1984 is applied. Similarly, other European countries also 
regulate and supervise their banking and insurance industries through their national 
laws and regulations. 
Although the banking and the insurance businesses have different legislation and 
regulation, they have a very close relationship. They are some times referred to as 'the 
two sides of the same coin' [Manwaring (1977)]. More recently, especially after the 
late eighties, we notice a dramatic change in the relationship between the European 
banking and insurance sector. This is due to the various regulatory changes, the World 
Trade Organisation's liberalisation of trade in services following the Uruguay Round, 
and the gradual arrival of the single European market in financial services [Hardwick 
(1997), Hardwick and Dou (1998)]. For these, banks are diversifying into insurance 
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business, and to a lesser degree, insurance companies are making inroads into the 
banking business although the banks are more aggressive than the insurance 
companies. For banks and insurance companies such convergence has created a new 
phenomenon in the financial services world. This is known as 'Bancassurance " 
'Assurance bank' or 'Alljinanz'\. 
Before the 'big bang' in 1986, the banking and the insurance business were considered 
in a more traditional way. They hardly introduced each other's products although 
Barclays is a notable exception. The regulators have traditionally kept them separate 
for a long time for the safety and soundness of these two industries. However, this is 
changing rapidly in European countries, especially in Western Europe. For instance, if 
we look back to an article in the Financial Times in 22nd January 1975 by Gilling-
Smith regarding pension fund management, he showed that out of seventeen funds 
fourteen were managed by insurance companies, two by unit trusts companies, and 
only one by a bank2 . Today, almost all the banks manage pension funds through their 
pension fund management outlets. 
On the other side, under the then Insurance Companies Act 1974 in the UK, the DTI 
(Department of Trade and Industry) was given power to call for the appointment of an 
approved trustee, as a custodian of certain assets, in the event of a new insurance 
company being formed, even as a subsidiary of an established company, or of a 
change of a ownership. By the end of 1975, that is within less then two years, the DTI 
is reported to have called for the appointment of trustees for about fifty companies. 
I We will clarify these three technical tenns later on in Chapter two and three. 
2 Keyser Ullman, a merchant banks. 
2 
Banks traditionally conducted these trustee businesses. Today, in the nineties, this 
trusteeship is treated as if they are insurance companies' traditional products. 
But still in the rest of the world, including the US, Japan and other strong economies, 
these two industries are kept separate from each other. For instance, in the US the 
Glass-Steagal Act 1933 prohibits of such cross-business activities. Only exception is 
where there are no more than five thousands people in any US town. In these countries 
there is a burning question as to whether such cross-business activities should be 
allowed. 
However, even though for banks and insurance companies such changing interfaces 
have become widespread only from the late eighties in Europe, such relationships 
have long been established, especially in the UK. This was found in Crick and 
Wadsworth [1936] and was later reported by Maycock and Ravel [1976]. In 1836, a 
firm of Scottish solicitors was responsible for the formation of both the North of 
Scotland Bank and the Northern Insurance Company. Through mergers and 
absorptions, they are now part of the Midland Bank and Commercial Union Assurance 
Company. 
With the changes of time, the relationships among the services group are changing. 
Financial services are available twenty four hours a day. The electronic network has 
made possible that which was unthinkable two or three decades ago. These changing 
relationships can be drawn in three stages; up to mid seventies, from the mid-
seventies to the early eighties, and from the late eighties onwards especially early 
nineties [Saint-Goers (1991)]. 
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Until the mid seventies, banking, insurance and other financial markets could be 
understood in terms of a few basic activities. Enterprises managed their holdings in a 
simple way. The complexity began in the late seventies. In the eighties, we saw the 
introduction of different types of assets and liabilities management tools. Financial 
engineering then becomes the name of the game with standby communication among 
all the markets. The future and options became more than hedging instruments. The 
sophistication of instruments, the instant link arbitrage facilities and huge amounts of 
currency circulation among the markets has fundamentally changed both nature of risk 
and nature of the regulation. 
If we look at the EC level, we notice that the deregulation of financial services and 
liberalisation of international trade in the services industries is a joint global strategy 
of the EEC [Secretary General of the CEA, Paris (1996)]. For mutual recognition 
among the member states and for the single license system three principles were 
made. These are mutual recognition, minimum harmonisation and home country 
control. The minimum harmonisation has abandoned the different traditions and 
legislation of the different European countries. After producing this harmonisation 
mutual recognition of authorisation and supervision in the head office country was set 
up at a European level standard. Once the minimum recognition and minimum 
harmonisation had been achieved, that led to a system known as 'single license'. 
Banks, insurance, investment companies are then subject to one and the same 
supervisory system as that of its home country, also known as 'home country control' . 
So, the authorisation granted to an establishment by its home country will be its 
'European Passport' for other member countries under this umbrella to exercise its 
activities freely without further authorisation in countries other than its own. The new 
Community strategy based on these three principles is the guiding force behind the 
4 
implementation of the Internal Market in financial services: banking, insurance, and 
investment services. 
The Second Banking Directive gave the power on a single license system and 
integrated head office supervision for the banks and the credit institutions. The Third 
Life and Non-Life Insurance Directives gave the same power to set up the same single 
license system in insurance. There are also Investment Directive, Accounting Standard 
Directive, and, lately, Pension Fund Directive. All these Directives are making closer 
link among the financial institutions-banking, insurance, investment, and securities. 
The rest of this chapter is as follows: Section 2 outlines the motivation for undertaking 
this research; Section 3 determines the aims and objectives of this thesis and 
formulates hypotheses for empirical test; Section 4 outlines the methodologies to be 
used in this research and the sources of data; Section 5 define the terms 'interface', 
'banking' and 'insurance' for this research; Section 6, describe the structural summary 
of the thesis; and Section 7, concludes the introduction. 
1.2. MOTIVATION FOR THIS RESEARCH 
The thesis was motivated by the following reasons: 
1. The changing interface between the banks and insurance companies is a burning 
question to the financial services industry. But there is little evidence, theoretically 
as well as empirically, as to whether such cross-business strategic approach by 
banks and insurance companies is desirable or whether this will ultimately ruin the 
banking and insurance industries. Therefore, this is a very important as well as an 
interesting topic to be undertaken for research. 
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2. In the US, where the regulators deliberately prohibit such cross-business activities 
(The Glass-Steagal Act 1933), we find some hypothetical studies that are based on 
the US data. These studies are mixed and are not unambiguous. Whereas in the 
Europe, where such cross-business activities are permitted by the regulators, we 
find little evidence on this issue. What we have found here in Europe, especially in 
Western Europe, are some descriptive personal views or very few case studies in a 
very limited way. We believe this research will fill at least part of the gap in the 
new field of literature. 
3. Banks and insurance companies have begun their cross-business activities very 
recently due to the deregulation of financial markets and due to harmonisation of 
the financial business within the Member States of the EC. The concept of 
'bancassurance', 'assurancebank' or, 'allfinanz' is new. These words have not even 
been entered into the dictionary as yet. But this concept is currently an issue of 
intense concern in the financial services world. Therefore, it is worthy to undertake 
a research at least from academic purpose in order to gain an insight into this new 
area for its theoretical development. 
4. The cross-business activities between the banks and the insurance companies are 
permitted only in the Europe. In the rest of the world, including other very strong 
economies such as the US, Japan, Canada etc, such cross business activities are 
prohibited by the regulators. There is a burning question in the rest of the financial 
markets of the world as to whether such cross business strategic approach for banks 
3 In the UK Brown et ai., [1996] conducted a study on the UK bancassurance but not on the 
assurancebank firms in return and risks context. Their study was based on hypothetical mergers and 
they considered only UK life assurance companies. They did not consider the general insurance 
underwriting, and insurance broking activities conducted by banks. 
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and insurance companies should be allowed in order to generate a better 
competitive market or whether such interfaces will ultimately ruin the total 
financial system. Even the European regulators, who have permitted banks and 
insurance companies to conduct cross-business activities, do not have any 
empirical evidence of the potential threat and future impact of this radical change. 
So, we believe that the regulators, bankers, as well as the insurers of these countries 
will find this research useful for their further decision making process regarding 
this new phenomenon. 
5. Even in Europe, a significant number of banks and insurance companies have not 
adopted this strategy as yet, simply because of the lack of empirical evidence as to 
whether adoption of such strategy is beneficial or not for them to have a 
competitive gain and for survival in the market. This research will at least partly 
help them in further consideration of this issue. 
6. Not only that, bankers and insurers those who have already adopted this cross 
business strategy still are not sure whether they are doing the right thing due to any 
empirical evidence. They will also find this useful for further decision making 
process. 
7. This research is also important from the public policy perspective. As the banks 
and the insurance companies play key role for a country's economic system, and as 
the major banks and insurance companies in Europe have adopted this cross 
business strategy, it is essential to carry out research on this aspect as to whether 
7 
combination of these two risky industries increase the probability of their 
bankruptcy risk. If this happens, this will ruin the whole financial system by 
damaging individuals' paramount trust and faith of the banking and insurance 
sector, and a huge number of depositors and policyholders will lose their savings. 
1.3. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THIS THESIS 
The general objectives of this research are to examine the various interfaces that exist 
between the banks and the insurance companies in the European countries, and to 
develop a theoretical framework of this new area of business. Another objective is to 
create data from the European context that is scarce and invaluable for further research 
and development. Finally, the thesis examines empirically whether such interfaces are 
desirable or ultimately whether they will lead to ruin of the financial system. 
More specifically, the objective of this study is to investigate the strategic approach of 
cross business activities that have recently been adopted by the European banks and 
insurance companies, i.e. so called 'bancassurance' or 'assurancebank' strategy, and 
the implication of these strategies in terms of return and risks. 
Banks have countrywide branch network. They have huge number of employees with 
a vast customer base. Banks believe they can use these special facilities for selling 
insurance. Once they are successful in insurance selling they then can move one step 
further, i.e. underwriting of insurance in addition to their day to day banking activities. 
Insurance companies also believe, in addition to their insurance activities they, by 
using their traditional agency and distribution network, can conduct banking activities. 
For banks and insurance companies such cross-section strategies raise many issues. 
Among the issues the most important issue is its future survival, i.e. the bankruptcy 
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risk. In other words, the risk effect of banks as well as insurance companies if they 
engage into each other's business. 
Banking and insurance both are risky business. Both conduct their business with direct 
public moneys, the banks by taking money as deposits, and the insurance companies 
by taking money as premium, and thus, are highly regulated to safeguard the economy 
and to protect the public's savings. But little research has been done on what's the 
effects of amalgamation will be. Therefore, this is a crucial issue to be examined. 
1.3.1. MAIN HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED 
We propose two hypotheses to test the implication of the adoption of banking and 
insurance company cross-business strategic approach in our econometric analysis. 
Since diversification spread the risks and thus reduces risks, our first hypothesis is that 
1. The banks will decrease their risks and increase their return when banks 
engage into (i) life assurance underwriting, (ii) general insurance 
underwriting, and (iii) insurance broking businesses, compared to banks' stand 
alone basis; and, 
The second hypothesis is that 
2. The insurance companies will decrease their risks and increase their return when 
insurance companies engage into banking business, compared to insurance 
companies' stand- alone basis. We call the first one as bancassurance hypothesis 
and, the second one as assurance bank hypothesis. 
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1.3.2. MAIN QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED 
The main questions to be answered in this thesis are as follows: Should banks be in 
insurance business? If so, in what sector, life sector or non-life as well? And, in 
what capacity as a distributor only or underwriter as well? Again, should insurance 
companies be in banking business? If so, in what sector, investment banking only 
or commercial banking as well? To answer these questions we examine the 
interfaces from two viewpoints, one from the bankers' viewpoint and the other from 
the insurers' viewpoint. As the bankers are more aggressive than the insurers, we will 
place greater emphasis on the bankers' viewpoint. 
To examine from the bankers' viewpoint we examine interfaces from four angles. 
These are:- Banks in life assurance distribution, Banks in life assurance underwriting, 
Banks in general insurance distribution; and, Banks in general insurance underwriting. 
On the other side, to examine from insurers' view point we examine interfaces from 
three angles. These are:- insurance companies in commercial banking, insurance 
companies in investment banking, and insurance companies in Tele banking. 
The development of the changing relationships between the banks and the insurance 
companies in European countries, and the driving forces for these changes, and the 
changes of their regulatory framework are also considered in the thesis. 
1.4. RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 
1.4.1. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis is a kind of interdisciplinary approach. It has two parts. In the first part, the 
thesis examines various interfaces that exist between the European banks and 
insurance companies from two perspectives: banks' perspective as well as insurance 
10 
companies' perspective (Chapter two and three respectively). Driving forces for these 
changing interfaces and the regulation concerning changes of interface are also 
considered in the thesis (Chapter four). The EC Directives on banking and insurance 
are also given their due weight for this examination. Based on industrial economic 
theory, organisation theory, strategy & international business theory, and the 
regulation theory, a historical analysis is employed for the examination of these 
various interfaces and for the theoretical development of 'bancassurance' and 
'assurancebank' . 
In the second part of the thesis, two sets of empirical tests are conducted. The first test 
is the test of return and risk effects on European bank holding companies' 
diversification into various forms of insurance business, namely life assurance 
underwriting, general insurance underwriting, and insurance broking business. The 
second test is opposite to the first one, i.e. the test of return and risk effects on 
European insurance holding companies' diversification into banking business. 
(Chapter five and six respectively). Based on finance literature, econometric work is 
employed for these tests. Finally, the main findings are summarised and some policy 
recommendations are made and suggest some of the issues for further research. 
(Chapter seven). 
1.4.2. METHODOLOGY 
To examine the main issues and test the hypotheses formulated above, we have 
adopted a number of methodologies that include, historical analysis, econometric 
analysis, personal interviews, as well as manual search from press clippings etc, and 
correspondence to European banks and insurance companies and their regulators. One 
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may argue about employing a number of different methodologies in one research. But 
since this research area is new, and since there is little evidence on this new area of 
business, both theoretically as well as empirically, we have had to approach these 
methods to be familiar with this new area of business, and to collect data for the 
theoretical development as well as for the empirical tests. [Kandampully (1993) and 
Decker (1997) employed similar approach in their Ph.D. research]. 
The historical analysis is employed in conceptional way for the theoretical 
development of various interfaces between banks and insurance companies. This 
theoretical development is based on industrial economic theory, organisation theory, 
strategy & international business theory, and the regulation theory. Personal 
interviews are conducted to bank branches randomly to obtain an overall idea of how 
the 'bancassurance' work at branch level. Manual search and correspondence are 
made to collect the data. This is based on press clippings, industry reports, journal 
articles, companies annual reports and accounts as well as correspondence with both 
industries and the regulators. Since there is no readily available data, collecting data, 
which is scarce and invaluable for further research and development, is one of the 
main contributions in this thesis. Some of these data will be used in our empirical 
analysis. 
The econometric work, which is based on finance literature, is employed for our 
empirical analysis to test the proposed hypotheses formulated above to see the 
implications of these changing interfaces in terms of return and risk consideration. In 
the econometric work, we heavily rely on Boyd & Graham (1988) method, and Boyd, 
Graham & Hewitt (1993) method. We extend and develop these methods further, and 
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apply them to the European market. Details of methodological approaches are stated 
in each case before conducting our investigation. 
1.4.3. DATA COLLECTION 
Data is crucial in any kind of scientific research. The data can be original or secondary 
level. Whatever level the data may be, the main factors in considering data are (i) the 
availability of data, (ii) the sources of data, (iii) the validity of data and (iv) the 
accuracy of data. One of the main problems of this thesis is the unavailability of data 
either from commercial sources or other sources. 
Banks and insurance companies' cross-business activities have begun only very 
recently. Moreover, they conduct their business mainly through separate subsidiaries. 
Therefore, they do not report their subsidiary companies' data in details. In other 
words these subsidiaries' data are off balance sheet data. In selecting sample as well 
as the data, the problem we face here is that we do not know which banks have 
diversified into insurance business and what they are, and, on the other hand, which 
insurance companies have diversified into banking business and what they are. Diacon 
(1990b) reported some of the UK bancassurance companies' data. They were of 
course helpful in extending the sample size. 
When a research project is in the international context, availability of data is even 
scarcer. Much of our time was spent collecting data. Therefore, collecting data, which 
is scarce, can be invaluable for further research and development of this new area, and 
this could be one of our main contributions in the thesis. 
In order to select our sample for the econometric work as well as for supporting the 
theoretical arguments, we have to find the data from the whole banking as well as 
whole insurance industries in the European context. To test our proposed hypotheses, 
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we have initially taken The Banker's (1994) top 100 European banks out of top five 
hundred European banks, and the top 100 insurance companies from the 'Top 
European 15000'. 
For the bancassurance risk test (Hypothesis 1), the banks' sample has been collected 
from the FT EXTEL 1997, but to collect the banks' own insurance subsidiary data, we 
have faced a severe problem. To solve this problem, there is no other alternative 
available to us but to chose a manual search. We started manual search from press 
clippings, industry reports, companies' annual reports, different directories etc. in 
order to ascertain how many out of top 100 have adopted bancassurance strategy. We 
have found that all the banks have at least some sorts of direct involvement in 
insurance business. 
We then started searching the banks' involvement in life assurance underwriting, 
general insurance underwriting, and insurance broking. Here we faced some 
problems. There are some banks who have 100% wholly owned insurance 
subsidiaries, while some have just 10% to 15% equity holding of underwriting 
insurance subsidiaries or even just a tied agreement/strategic alliance for joint sales. 
At this stage, we decided a criterion that we will take as our sample only the 
underwriting insurance subsidiaries of banks that have over 50% equity holdings. 
Fortunately, the entire insurance sample has over 90% equity holding of banks. 
We have decided to take only banks' own insurance underwriting subsidiaries (life 
and/or general insurance), excluding those banks who just have a tied 
agreement/strategic alliance for joint sales of insurance. Because in a joint distribution 
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agreement, banks bear a very little risk4, and underwriting insurance companies bear 
the main risks since if claims arise underwriting companies will have to bear the 
claims, not the banks. If banks can sell insurance they will get commission/fees from 
the underwriting companies otherwise not. Therefore, the main risk ultimately falls in 
the insurance underwriters. 
We have excluded strategic groups for insurance distribution, but we included banks 
that have wholly owned insurance broking subsidiaries to see the impact of banks 
involvement in insurance broking business. 
One thing to note here that there are some banks within the top 100 lists which do not 
have any insurance underwriting subsidiaries. These banks have a tied relationships or 
strategic alliance agreement with traditional big insurers for insurance distribution. 
For instance, Dresdner Bank that is in 12th position by assets size have a strategic 
alliance with Allianz in Germany. On the other hand, we have found some in our 
manual search that there are some banks that are not in the top 100 list but have 
insurance underwriting subsidiaries. For example, Leeds Permanent Building society 
in the UK that has a life assurance underwriting subsidiary named Leeds Life. We 
have, therefore, included them in the sample and excluded the banks that have no 
underwriting or wholly owned insurance broking subsidiary in the top 100 list. 
We have also found that some banks have more than one life insurance underwriting 
subsidiaries (TSB in the UK, Credit Lynnoise in France) in addition to general 
4 For details please see universal banking in the United States, what could we win, what could we 
lose?, Walters & Saunders, (1994), Cambridge university Press, New York, 1994. 
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insurance underwriting subsidiaries and broking subsidiaries, while some have just 
one life underwriting or broking subsidiary. Anyway, we have included all. 
However, after a long time consuming manual search we have found 58 life assurance 
underwriting subsidiaries, 18 general insurance underwriting subsidiaries, and 22 
insurance broking subsidiaries5• This is reported in Appendix III. Most of the wholly 
owned insurance subsidiaries are domestic companies. Only two (Generali, and 
Bishopgate insurance) in our sample are cross-border mergers. 
Now, the next stage is to collect the data of the above sample. At this stage, we also 
faced severe problem. Accounting data have been collected from the period of 1991-
1996. Researchers always have to pay attention while collecting data, in particular the 
validity of data and the accuracy of data. Accounting data have been collected from 
the companies published annual reports and accounts. This is probably the most 
reliable source and is widely used in empirical analysis. 
To get the accounting data, we first searched in the commercial sources like FT 
EXTEL, Data Stream etc, but we did not succeed. We then wrote to the individual 
European countries insurance regulators, specifying the names of the insurance 
companies. We had a very little success in this process. We then wrote to individual 
parent banks, specifying their insurance subsidiary name, to supply us these 
subsidiaries data. This time we have got some effective response after a second 
reminder letter. 
S Country profile and cross border proportion are reported in Appendices III. 
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But still these samples are not sufficient to run a valid statistical test. We then wrote 
to the banks' insurance subsidiaries directly. Here also after a second reminder letter 
we have got some positive reply. But still we fail to get some companies data. This is 
because probably they do not want to disclose their data outside. 
In the final stage, we created a databank in spreadsheets from the annual accounts. 
This time we also face some potential problems. Our sample is international base 
sample. Therefore, different countries will have obviously different accounting system 
and different timing period of accounts. Moreover, different countries have different 
currency, and local companies produce accounts in local currency. We, therefore, can 
not combine all the different company's data together. To solve this problem, we 
converted the local currency data to the European Currency Unit (now Euro) year by 
year. 
All the insurance subsidiary data are 31 st of December in each final year in all the 
countries in our sample. Only in the UK two banks have 31 st of March timing period 
data. We believe this should not bias our results. Though different countries may have 
different accounting system, our sample is within the EC countries6• The EC Directive 
has harmonised the accounting system within the member countries. Moreover, our 
variables are too broad [like total assets, total net income etc] to have a potential bias. 
The UK life assurance companies, data have been collected from the DTI returns. We 
also face problem with the UK data. The UK life assurance companies have to submit 
their returns in a specific prescribed form, supplied by the DTI. The DTI forms do not 
indicate shareholders equity, and net income. We, therefore, have taken minimum 
required margin (form 9) as a proxy of shareholders equity. If a life assurance 
company become insolvent, this required minimum would be used as shareholders 
6 We have included Switzerland in our sample. Though this country is not within the EC but it is 
treated as if it is a member of the EC in case of the financial services. 
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equity. Net income is calculated as total income minus total expenditure including 
taxation7• 
There may be an argument in selecting accounting data verses economic data. Each 
has advantages and disadvantages. But there is not a totally satisfactory explanation as 
yet which data is most suitable for empirical analysis [e.g. Greenawalt and Sinkey 
(1988); Mehra and Prescott (1985); Franklin et al (1982)]. However, we did not have 
any choice in selecting data due to unavailability of economic data. 
We have selected our banks sample if and only if a bank has at least any of the wholly 
owned insurance subsidiaries, i.e. either life assurance underwriting subsidiary or 
general insurance underwriting subsidiary or insurance broking subsidiary. 44 banks, 
40 life assurance companies, 12 general insurance companies, and 11 msurance 
broking companies have been found by applying these criteria to our observations8• 
Details are discussed in Chapter five. 
On the other hand, for the assurancebank risk test (Hypothesis 2), we have initially 
taken top 100 European insurance companies from the 'Top European 15000'. Again, 
we do not know which insurance companies have engaged in banking business, and in 
which sector, i.e. investment banking or commercial banking business. We then 
started manual search as above and found some banks that are owned by insurance 
companies. These are reported in Chapter three. Since insurance companies began to 
engage into banking business very recently, i.e. from early and mid nineties, we can 
not get sufficient real data from them for a statistical analysis. We, therefore, adopt an 
7 Brown et aI., (1996) adopted similar proxy in their study of UK life companies return and risk 
characteristics. 
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alternative way for assurancebank companies. We conduct a simulation study for 
assurancebank for academic purpose. For the simulation study, the data is taken from 
FT EXTEL 1997. Details are discussed in Chapter six. 
Further details of data sources, method, suitability, and validity are reported In 
chapters where they are used. 
1.5. MEANING OF BANKING, INSURANCE, AND INTERFACE FOR THIS 
RESEARCH 
l.5.i. Meaning of banking: 
There is no universally acceptable definition of a bank or banking. Banking, though it 
is easy to understand is difficult to define. Even the regulators are unable to define it. 
In the UK the Banking Act 1987 it is just mentioned as 'doing banking business'. This 
act gives some characteristic of banking business stating , those are authorised under 
this act to conduct business'. As this is a complicated matter, we will define 'bank,' 
for our research purpose, as those who takes deposits from the common public, lends 
money, and have a country wide branch network. This will include building societies, 
investment banks, tele banks and savings banks unless otherwise stated. 
It is very difficult to define banks according to the products or nature of business. 
Bankers as well as insurers in Europe currently offer a variety of products, many of 
which are not of their origin. However, the core products of banks are:- (i) taking 
money as deposits from the public, (ii) lending of money, and (iii) money transmission 
services [Hanson (1987)]. Williams (1995) described five types of basic products 
function:- (i) providing media for customers' investment, i.e. offering customers 
8 The sample size decreases because we dropped out some samples due to the lack of availability of 
data for the whole sample period. 
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instruments for investment that provide an opportunity for customers to increase their 
capital; (ii) safe keeping; (iii) transaction execution, i.e. facilitating transfers of 
customers' funds to third parties; (iv) providing management, advice, and information 
concerning financial assets; and (v) extenuation of bank resources to third parties for 
commercial or investment purposes, e.g. making loans, guarantees, letters of credit, 
and acquiring obligations of their customers. There are different types of banks 
specialising in different banking activities. The most common are commercial banks; 
savings banks; investment banks; co-operative bank; postal bank and, foreign banks; 
other banks. 
1.5.ii. Meaning of 'insurance': 
As for banks, there is no legal definition of insurance. The Insurance Companies Acts 
or the EC Directives do not define insurance. They just mention 'doing insurance 
business' or 'undertaking insurance business'. Different authors define insurance in 
different ways. Some says it is 'a risk transfer mechanism'. Others, with special regard 
to the legal sense it is defined as a 'contract'. Insurance may be defined as a 'system 
science' where by individual risks are gathered and then spread in a scientific way 
over the sample taken, i.e. by using the law of large numbers. The core products of 
insurance are taking risks (risk transfer) against loss through making common pools 
and by charging equitable premiums [Dickson (1992)]. 
Insurance companies are classified in variety of ways. These are according to 
ownership structure, according to the nature of business, and according to the structure 
of business. According to ownership structure, insurance companies are classified as 
proprietary company, mutual company, and captive company. According to the nature 
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of business, they are classified as Life Assurance Company, general insurance 
company, Reinsurance Company, and industrial assurance company. According to 
structure of business, insurance companies are classified as composite insurance 
company, specialist insurance company, and the Lloyds of London9• For our research 
purpose, we will classify insurance companies into the life assurance companies and 
the general insurance companies, unless otherwise stated. 
1.5.iii. Meaning of 'interface': 
Interface is a term, which describes how two things interact or link [Collins English 
Dictionary (1991)]. Maycock & Revel [1976] described banking insurance interface in 
three dimensions as:- competitive, non-competitive and, administrative interface. 
Dickinson & Dinenis (1992) described banking insurance interface from the economic 
angle. They mentioned interface as:- supply- consumer relationships, agency role, and 
competitive poster. Interface does not only mean interdependencies, as commonly 
regarded, but also inter-competition and inter-eo-operation as well. Therefore, this 
study will expressly or implicitly divide the interface into three broad categories as: 
o Banking-insurance interdependencies; 
o Banking-insurance competitive inter/ace; and 
o Banking-insurance co-operative interface. 
When banks and insurance companies are dependent on each other for conducting 
their businesses, we describe these as interdependencies. In economic terms, we may 
describe a supply-consumer relationship. On the other hand, when banks invade 
insurer territory or vice versa, we describe it is a competitive interface. Banks can 
9 This is a special type of insurance marketplace that only exists in the UK. 
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acquire or establish their own insurance company as a manufacturer as well as a 
distributor of insurance products. Insurance companies, on the other hand, may 
establish banking firm and, by producing and distributing banking products can 
compete with traditional bankers directly. 
Co-operative interface is when banks and insurance companies co-operate with each 
other for both of their mutual business benefit. For instance, a bank may co-operate 
with an insurer, by selling that insurance companies insurance products through the 
banks branch network with the banking products line in exchange for commissions 
and fees and, on the other hand, a insurance company may co-operate with banks for 
selling that bank's banking products, (loan, mortgage etc) through its traditional 
channel of insurance distribution with insurance products line. In this way, both can 
increase their products selling and, thus can mutual benefit. The commercial interfaces 
between banks and insurance companies as to whether they are competitive or co-
operative will be examined later. In the following, in figure 1.1, we have drawn a 
picture of various interfaces between banking and insurance. 
Figure: 1.1. Interface of Insurance and Banking 
Competitive Co-operative Interdependencies 
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1.6. CONCLUSION 
This introduction chapter briefly outlines the rationale of this research. The 
importance of this research is discussed in motivation section and the aims and 
objectives are then determined for this research. Then the specific hypotheses are 
proposed to be tested, and the main questions are determined here to be answered. 
After deciding the aims and objectives, brief methodological approaches and data 
collection are described. Finally, the terms 'banking' 'insurance' and 'interface' are 
defined for this research purpose. In the next two chapters, we will examine the recent 
development in banking and recent development in insurance industries respectively. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN BANKING 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to critically examine recent developments in the 
European banking industry, particularly the phenomenon of bancassurance. To this 
end, we first review the European banking market place and then review the recent 
development in banking. We then investigate the various interfaces between the banks 
and insurance companies from the banks' viewpoint in order to develop a theoretical 
framework for the new phenomenon of 'bancassurance' as well as to create data 
sample for empirical analysis. 
The rest of this chapter is as follows: in Section 2, the European banking market place 
is outlined in order to provide a general view of the European banking market place. 
Section 3 reviews the recent development in European banking. Section 4 defines the 
term 'bancassurance'. Section 5 investigates the various interfaces from the banker's 
viewpoint in order to provide the theoretical development of 'bancassurance' and to 
create data for the proposed hypotheses. Finally in Section 6, the conclusions of the 
chapter are drawn. 
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2.2. THE EUROPEAN BANKING MARKET PLACE 
Europe is the third largest banking market in the world after North America and Asia 
(including Japan). In 1994, there were 2603 banks with 95960 branches and 1124658 
employees in the EU countries. The total assets of European commercial banks were 
6727.1 Euro billions. The UK and France account for nearly 50% of total assets. The 
breakdown statistics of the EU banking industry are shown country by country in 
Table 2.1 in order to overview the banking industry i.e. number of banks, branches, 
employees, and assets of the individual countries and their share in the EU. 
Table: 2.1 
o vervlew 0 fE uropean commercia , . 1 banks 1994 
Country No. Of No. of No. of Total European 
Banks Branch employees Assets (bn share by 
es Euro) assets(%) 
Belgium 147 7791 76270 594.8 8.84 
Denmark 120 2245 44685 126.2 1.87 
Germany 331 7571 219200 858.2 12.75 
Greece 40 1637 42985 51.8 0.77 
Spain 165 17469 150624 460.9 6.85 
France 427 10428 201209 1193.5 17.73 
Ireland 56 1002 22400 63.8 0.95 
Italy 315 20580 328167 1015.4 15.09 
Luxembourg 222 315 17638 449.7 6.68 
Netherlands 173 6648 105963 655.1 9.74 
Austria 56 732 16732 111.3 1.65 
Portugal 46 3378 61649 132.6 1.97 
Finland 15 911 24556 86.7 1.28 
Sweden 17 2329 39498 151.1 2.25 
UK 484 12400 367700 1989.5 29.57 
EURO 2603 95960 1124658 6727.1 100% 
Total 
Source: ECBFlPanorama '96 
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2.3. RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN BANKING 
There have been a number of changes in recent banking activities, especially in 
Europe. It is now widely accepted that the traditional 'current account' is no longer a 
profitable business. The common market theme, which was introduced in the Treaty 
of Rome (1957), has created heavy competition in the European financial markets. 
The First, Second and the Third Banking Directives have given a single licence to 
banks to conduct businesses within the Member Countries. Furthermore, allowing 
building societies and mortgage companies (For instance, the UK Building Societies 
Act 1988) to diversify into banking business has created a further threat for European 
banks. At the same time, customer habits are changing. People want everything from 
under one roof including banking products, securities products as well as insurance 
and investment products. Technology has been dramatically improved, especially after 
the seventies. Information can be sent more efficiently and faster than ever before. 
Laptop, mobile telephone, Internet, and modern telephone system have made it easier 
to transfer massages. The risk management tools have also been improved. 
Sophisticated high tech has allowed financial companies to asses risks efficiently and 
thus minimise risks 1• In addition to the traditional option and futures markets, more 
complex derivative instruments have been introduced in the financial markets. Trade 
and business have become more internationalised by the day. All these have forced 
banks to diversify into different areas of business to ensure their profitability, growth 
and competitive market position. Some of the major diversified areas of banks and 
building societies are reported in Table 2.2. 
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Table: 2,2 
Bank san UI mg dB 'ld' S oCIeties major Iversl Ie ] Jro uc S d' 'fi d d t 
Clearing Banks Building Societies 
Payment Services Yes Yes 
Consumer Loans Yes Yes 
Business Loans Yes Yes 
Life Assurance: manufacture Yes Yes 
Life Assurance: distribution Yes Yes 
General Insurance: manufacture Yes Yes 
General Insurance: distribution Yes Yes 
Estate AgencylProperty Services Yes Yes 
Fund Management via unit trusts (mutual funds) Yes Yes 
Personal Pensions Yes Yes 
Credit Cards Yes Yes 
Independent Financial Advice Yes Yes 
Mortgages Yes Yes 
Securities Market-making Yes N/a 
Securities Broking Yes Yes 
Securities Underwriting Yes N/a 
Investment Banking Services Yes N/a 
Factoring Yes Yes 
Leasing Yes Yes 
Derivatives Trading Yes N/a 
N/a = not available, Source: Denved from Llewellyn (1994) and own compIlation 
From Table 2.2, it is seen that European banks have diversified into a wider financial 
business area. From the chart (enclosed in appendix II), it is also seen that Credit 
Swiss, one of the largest European banks, has diversified into different non-bank 
financial services. Other big banks, like Credit Swiss, have also diversified into 
different non-bank financial services in Europe. 
Among the financial institutions, banks, investment banks, securities firms, insurance 
and pension fund companies are the major provider of financial services. From the 
graph below (Graph 2.1), it is seen that banking, insurance and pension account for 
two third of financial institutions earnings. The banks account for 31 % and insurance 
For instance, cards transactions and the introduction of PDQ terminal. 
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companies for 27% of total earnings in the UK. It is believed that other European 
countries have a more or less similar situation. We, therefore, concentrate on these 
three2 financial institutions' cross-business activities that cover nearly 70% of the total 
financial market in the EU. 
Graph: 2.1 
Earnings of UK Financial Institutions 1996 
02% 
.3% 
010% 
03% 
Source: ABI 1998 
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However, a number of researchers have already conducted research on bank 
diversification into different non-bank financial activities. For instance, Rajan (1994), 
Puri (1994) Gande et al., (1994), James and Wier (1990), Gardener (1990b), Brewer 
et al., (1988), Goodhart (1987), Giddy (1985), Edwards (1981) have examined the 
diversification of banks into securities. 
Similarly, teinherr (1995), Walter and Smith (1993), and Benston (1990) have 
studied the impact of diversification into investment banking activities. The majority 
of the studies support the diversification activities in terms of return, risks and cost 
2 In the EU countries, pension businesses are provided mainly by the insurance companies, therefore, 
we will broadly concentrate on two i.e. banks verses insurance companies' cross-diversification only. 
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efficiencies (Discussed further in Chapter five and six.). The historical data also 
support the benefit of bank diversification. For instance, from Table 2.3, it is seen that 
the EU banks, by providing non-bank financial services account for significant 
amount of earnings as a means of fees and commission. 
Table: 2.3 
F ees an de OtnmlSSlon R . bl b Bank 1996 ecelVa e)y S, 
Local currency (m) 
Austria 33887 
Belgium 71632 
Denmark 8361 
France 102548 
Gennany 31294 
Greece 230186 
Ireland 800 
Italy 10690 (bn) 
Portugal 118467 
Spain 832 (bn) 
Sweden 14547 
Switzerland 15407 
United Kingdom 12325 
Source: Denved from the OECD 1998 
But, there is little evidence on the banks' diversification into insurance activities i.e. 
bancassurance activities, especially in a European context. Due to the lack of 
theoretical as well as empirical evidence, we will only concentrate on bank 
diversification into different insurance activities to fill up some of the gaps in the 
literature. 
2.4. BANCASSURANCE - A NEW PHENOMENON 
The word 'bancassurance' is not yet defined in a dictionary. This is a French word 
and currently is being widely used in the financial services. 'Bancassurance' is a term 
where insurance products are sold through a bank countrywide branch networks to its 
existing client base. Some definitions ofbancassurance are given below. 
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Sigma, (02/1992) defined bancassurance as a strategy adopted by banks or insurance 
companies aiming to operate in the financial services market in a more or less 
integrated manner. Hielkema (1994) defined bancassurance as, 'a marketing strategy 
aimed at increasing sales for a bank or an insurance company by selling the product of 
the one through the distribution channels of the other, whereby the benefits also can 
be extended to various forms of cost sharing.' Leach (1996) defined 'bancassurance as 
insurance sales made by insurance companies in which banks have an equal or 
controlling stake of the equity.' Coopers and Lybrand (1993) mentioned 
bancassurance as 'strategies adopted by banks or insurance companies aiming to 
operate in the personal sector of financial services market in a more or less integrated 
manner'. In the view of Morgan (1994), 'bancassurance refers to a financial 
institution with a branch network, which in addition to its money transmission and 
lending services also sells its own insurance and investment products to its branch 
customers' . 
Papasawas & Prame (1992) defined 'bancassurance' as the provision of insurance and 
banking products or services through a common distribution channel or to a common 
client base. .... The word 'provision' embraces both manufacturer and distributor of 
the products or services. 
All the authors, mentioned above, define 'bancassurance' when banks engage into 
insurance business or insurance companies engage into banking business. We strongly 
disagree with this. When banks engage in insurance business we call it bancassurance, 
and when insurance companies engage in banking business we call it assurancebank 
rather than bancassurance. In other words, bancassurance is a situation when financial 
holding companies major activities are banking business rather than insurance 
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business, and assurancebank is a situation where financial holding companies major 
activities are insurance business rather than banking business. 
Some writers defined 'bancassurance' and 'alljinanz J as having the same meaning. But 
there is a significant difference between 'bancassurance J and 'alljinanz J. The 
'Alljinanz J is a German word, which includes securities business in addition to 
banking and insurance. Farny (1990) defined allfinanz in Germany as concerning the 
integration of the following set of activities in banking and insurance: (a.) Production, 
(b.) Distribution, (c.) Marketing, (d.) Consumer demand, and (e.) Consumption. 
Wager [1990] defined allfinanz as an integration or combination of the supply of 
services from three groups of financial organisations, namely: (i.) commercial banks, 
savings bank, and credit institutions, (ii.) Building societies, (iii.) Life and non-life 
insurance. These three terms, i.e. bancassurance, assurancebank and allfinanz, are 
discussed further in chapter three. 
2.S. ENTRY STRATEGIES INTO BANCASSURANCE 
Banks use various entry strategies in order to engage in insurance business. The OECD 
(1992) study mentioned the following entry strategies: (i.) complete integration; (ii.) 
bank parent- non-bank subsidiaries; (iii.) bank's participation in non-bank affiliates; 
(iv.) holding company; (v.) joint venture; and (vi.) sales & marketing agreement. 
Walter and Saunders (1994) identified three ways for banks to diversify into 
insurance business. These are: (i.) in house via a department of the group; (ii.) via a 
separately capitalised subsidiary; and (iii.) via a separately capitalised affiliate of the 
holding company. Kane (1995) described the banks' entry into insurance in slightly 
different ways such as: (i.) forming an insurance-agency subsidiary at a bank or bank 
holding company; (ii.) forming a bank subsidiary at an insurance or insurance-agency 
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firm; (iii.) negotiating a participating lease agreement, a joint employee or marketing 
program, or a joint venture contract between a bank and an insurance agency or 
underwriter. Hoschka (1994) discussed all the entry process in four categories. These 
are:- (i.) de novo entry; (ii.) mergers and/or acquisitions; (iii.) joint ventures; and (iv.) 
distribution alliance. Papasavvas and Parmee (1992) mentioned five ways of entry 
into bancassurance. These are- (i.) Opening the client base of one party to the 
distribution channels of the other; (ii.) General agency agreements, i.e. in the UK 
banks and building societies acting as IFA; (iii.) Tied agency agreements, i.e. in the 
UK the bank and building societies acting as an 'Appointed Representative'; (iv.) 
Ownership of one party by the other, or both parties owned by the same company or 
group; and (v.) Joint ventures. 
However, according to the level of integration and the degree of riskiness, all the entry 
strategies are classified into five groups. These are (i.) start-up approach; (ii.) mergers 
and acquisitions; (iii.) creation of a holding company; (iv.) joint venture; and (v.) 
strategic alliance. 
Some writers give mergers and acquisitions and strategic alliance, or strategic alliance 
and joint venture the same meaning in their research. But as far as the risks factor are 
concerned in bancassurance, which is one of the main objectives in this research, these 
entry strategies are fundamentally different from each other. We, therefore, discuss all 
of these entry strategies in order to clarify the level of integration and risks. 
(i.) Start-up Approach: 
The start-up approach (some times referred to as 'de novo entry) is one of the most 
important entry tools used by the banks in order to enter into insurance activities. In 
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this approach banks set up their own insurance subsidiary from scratch. All the rights 
and responsibilities of such a new venture then belong to the parent bank. 
The choice of this entry strategy has merits and demerits. As a start up approach into 
new areas of business, the key demerits are the difficulty of getting the team expertise 
and adjusting the two separate management bodies and more capital (compared to 
strategic alliance or joint venture) is required here. Further more, to learn the 'know 
how' of business and to get the benefits from this type of entry is lengthy, and a lot of 
advertisements and time is required for its publicity in order to build up a client base. 
However, the banks have already a client base in their banking area, which may be a 
prospective client base for insurance products too. But some customer may not be 
interested in doing business with such a new unknown insurance company or may not 
wish to put 'all his eggs in one basket'. Empirical results show that such strategy takes 
at least nine years to become a profitable enterprise [De Young and Hasan (1997)]. 
Rose and Savage (1984) found that the de novo banks had riskier assets, incurred 
higher operating expenses. Huyser (1986) found that the failure of de novo banks were 
more likely than established banks. 
The good side of this entry is that a bank can build up a subsidiary according to its 
own choice and need, and keep match with its banking products. Hoschka (1994) 
suggested this type of entry strategy for bancassurance companies. The Barclays, the 
largest UK bank, has adopted this strategy. It has set up its own life assurance 
company, the Barc1ays Life Assurance Company, in 1965. This life Insurance 
subsidiary is used as workshop of life and pension products, and marketed by the 
Barc1ays bank branch network. Some other big banks in the UK and in Europe have 
also adopted the same strategy. For example, the TSB, the fifth largest UK bank, has 
set up its own life and non-life as well as insurance broking subsidiaries. These are the 
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TSB Life Ltd, the TSB General Insurance Ltd, and the TSB General insurance 
services Ltd. In France, the Credit Agricole, the country's largest and Europe's 
number one bank has set up its own life and non-life insurance companies named the 
Predica and the Pacifica respectively. Predica is now the third largest life assurance 
company in France. The Deutsche Bank, Germany's largest and one of top five 
European banks, has set up its own life assurance company, the DB Leben. The DB 
Leben, later on in 1994, has merged with Deutsche Harold, a general insurance 
subsidiary . 
ii. Mergers and/or Acquisitions: 
This is another important entry strategy where banks merge with another insurer or 
acquire an existing insurance company. As mentioned earlier, some researchers 
believe mergers and acquisitions are the same as strategic alliance, which contradicts 
our assumptions with respect to risk effects. Therefore, for this research the merger is 
defined as a technique where two or more companies combining in such a way that 
remains, after the event, only one company, which is the universal successor to the 
former companies. All the rights and all the liabilities of these companies continue as 
rights and liabilities of the successor company. Sealy (1993) mentioned take-over as ' 
a technique for effecting a merger or amalgamation between the businesses of two or 
more companies. There may be two ways of doing this. One is cross-section and the 
other is cross-border. After the take over, the two companies remain in being but the 
Offeree Company becomes a subsidiary company of the other and controlled and 
monitored by the acquiring company. Vander Vennet (1996) found that domestic 
mergers among equal-sized partners significantly increase the performance of the 
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merged banks. Improvement of cost efficiency was also found In cross-boarder 
acquisitions . 
In the UK, the Lloyds bank, the fourth largest commercial bank in the country, has 
adopted this entry strategy. It has acquired the Abbey Life, which is now the tenth 
largest UK life assurance company in terms of premium income. The Banco Central 
Hispano of Spain has acquired the Generali of Italy through this entry strategy. 
Similarly, the Rabobank in the Netherlands has also adopted this strategy to acquire 
the Interpolis. 
iii. Joint Venture: 
This is also an important entry strategy. Harrigan (1988) defined joint venture as 
'business agreements where two or more owners create a separate entity'. In this 
strategy, one bank and one insurance company set up a new insurance company, 
which is jointly own by them. This may be on a fifty-fifty share holding basis or fifty 
one forty nine-share bases. The balance of ownership will depend on the strengths of 
each company and their respective contributions to the new joint venture company. 
But the insurance companies are likely to be minority shareholders as banks have the 
upperhand through its ownership of the strong distribution channel. The parent 
insurance company provides technical support such as underwriting and sales training 
administration and investment management services while the parent bank provides 
support of distribution through its countrywide branch network to its banking client 
base. For example, the Credit Commercial de France (CCF) and the Elysees Sante 
have created a joint venture insurance company, the ERISA, where the CCF and 
Elysees both hold 50% equity each. McConnell and Nantell (1985) found significant 
wealth gain from joint ventures. 
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iv. Equity Holding: 
While in equity holding banks (or insurance companies in assurance bank strategy) do 
not generally involve themselves in operating business activities directly, they rather 
simply acquire equity from insurance companies and receive dividends as a 
shareholder. But some companies acquire a significant share of the equity of insurance 
companies and use their bank branches for distribution of insurance. For instance, the 
Bank of Scotland has 34% of equity holding of the Standard life. 
In the case of the formation of holding companies, a common management body is set 
up for the holding company to see the overall affairs of the entire holding with 
separate management for banking and insurance. ING has adopted this type of entry 
strategy. In a holding company merger analysis, Cornett and Tehranian (1992) found 
that the profitability improved significantly after the merger while in a study by Pilloff 
(1996) it was found that the mergers were not associated with any significant change 
in performance. 
v. Strategic Alliance: 
A strategic alliance IS a long-term business agreement between two or more 
companies to pool exchange and/or integrate specified company resources for 
achieving some agreed objectives [Hung (1992)]. Dawson and Shaw (1992) 
described alliance as ' co-operation between two or more retail companies whereby 
each parmer seeks to add to its competencies by combining some resources with those 
of its parmers.' Sheth and Parvatiyar (1992) described alliance such that 'an alliance is 
an on going formal business relationship between two or more independent 
organisations to achieve common goals.' In case of bancassurance, a bank makes a 
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strategic alliance with an established insurance company to conduct joint sales of 
business in return for fees or commissions. Through such a strategic alliance, the 
banks sell insurance products with its banking products to its existing banking 
customers, and on the other hand, the insurance companies sell banking products with 
its insurance products to its existing insurance customer base. But they do not bear the 
underwriting risks for such cross-business distribution activities. In Germany, 
Dresdner Bank, the country's second largest bank, has such a strategic alliance with 
the country's largest insurer, Allianz, for joint sales of business. Chan et al,. (1997) 
found significant positive wealth effects on non-equity strategic alliance and no 
evidence of wealth transfers between partners. These results support the conjecture in 
Jensen and Meckling (1991) that strategic alliances provide a cost effective way to 
place decision-making authority in the hands of individuals who possess the 
knowledge to make the best decisions. 
From the entry strategies discussed above, we can see that the banks' risks vary 
according to the choice of entry mode. In the de novo entry, mergers and acquisitions 
and formation of holding company, the banks bear all the risks (and benefits) as they 
own the whole company through these entry form. On the other hand, in the strategic 
alliance and the joint ventures entry, the banks bear lower risks since they share risks 
(benefit) with the insurance companies. The strategic alliance has even lower risks 
than the joint venture strategy because the strategic alliance bears distribution risks 
only, whereas in the joint venture strategy the banks, in addition to bearing 
distribution risks, share underwriting risks with the insurance companies. 
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Figure: 2.1. Entry Strategies and Level of Integration 
Figure 
Competition vs. Co-operation 
De Novo 
Mergers & Acquisitions 
Holding Company 
Joint Ventures 
Strategic Alliance 
More Competitive 
Manner 
More Co-operative 
Manner 
From Figure 2.1, it is seen that at the bottom the strategic alliance indicates the least 
risky (co-operative interface) entry mode, and at the top, the de novo (competitive 
interface) indicates the most risky entry mode while the holding fonn indicates some 
neutral position. Therefore, it is seen that the choice of entry strategy has a strong 
impact on diversification risk. For our empirical tests, we excluded strategic alliance 
as well as joint venture companies since banks have relatively lower risks in these 
types of relationships. 
As there is little evidence of the effect of each of these entry strategies from a 
bancassurance perspective, it is, therefore, crucial to test these entry strategies 
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separately in order to assess the impact of these entry strategies. However, due to the 
limitation of the scope of this thesis and the time constraint, we will not investigate 
the entry strategies any further. 
2.6. THE FIELD STUDY ON THE EUROPEAN BANCASSURANCE 
For our investigation, we initially took the top 100 European banks (Appendix I) 
published by the Bankers (September, 94). We then searched through press clippings, 
industry reports, company annual reports, different directory etc. in order to discover 
how many of the top 100 banks are involved in insurance business. We have found 
that the majority of the banks have at least some direct involvement in insurance 
operation. The results of the banks' involvement in insurance business are reported in 
Table 2.4. 
Table: 2.4 
M' E aJor uropean s rrec mvo vemen m msurance actIvities bank d' t' I t' . 
Major European Life Assurance Cienerallnsurance 
Banks Country Brokin Under Broking Underwri 
g writin-.& tiIlg 
1 Abbey National (24) UK Yes Yes Yes No 
2 Barclays Bank (8) UK Yes Yes Yes No 
3 NatWest Bank (11) UK Yes Yes Yes No 
4 Lloyds Bank (25) UK Yes Yes Yes Yes 
5 Midland Bank (3)* UK Yes Yes Yes Yes 
6 TSB Cirouj>s (67) UK Yes Yes Yes Yes 
7 RBS (55) UK Yes Yes Yes Yes 
8 Bank of Scotland (68) UK Yes Yes Yes No 
9 Standard Chartered Bank (65) UK No No No No 
10 SCi Warburg(78) UK Yes Yes Yes No 
II Leeds Permanent B.S. UK Yes No Yes No 
12 Co-operative Bank UK Yes No Yes No 
13 Halifax UK Yes Yes Yes No 
14 Nationwide UK Yes Yes Yes No 
15 Woolwich UK Yes Yes Yes No 
16 Banque Bruxells Lambart (46) Belgium Yes Yes Yes Yes 
17 Credit Communal de Belgium (37) Be!gium Yes No Yes No 
18 Cienerale Bank (28) Belgium Yes Yes Yes Yes 
19 Kreditbank (48) Belgium Yes Yes Yes Yes 
20 CERA (92) Belgium Na** Na Na Na 
21 ASLK·CCiER (53) Belgium Yes Yes Yes No 
22 Credit Aaricole (4) France Yes Yes Yes Yes 
23 Credit Lyonnais (1) France Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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24 Banque National de Paris (7) France Yes Yes Yes No 
25 Societe Generale (5) France Yes Yes Yes Yes 
26 Credit Commercial de france (56) France Yes Yes Yes Yes 
27 Credit Populaire (42) France Yes Yes Yes Yes 
28 Groupe Paribas (10) France Yes No Yes No 
29 Groupe indosuez (49) France Yes Yes Yes No 
30 Cassie Depargna (17) France Na Na Na Na 
31 CIC (35) France Na Na Na Na 
32 CLF (51) France Na Na Na Na 
33 Credit National (91 ) France Na Na Na Na 
34 Deutsch Bank (2) Germany··· Yes Yes Yes Yes 
35 Commrzbank (16) Germany Yes No Yes No 
36 Dresdner Bank (12) Germany Yes No Yes No 
37 DG BankJ23) Germany Yes Na Yes Na 
38 Banca de Roma (32) Italy Yes No Yes No 
39 San Paolo Italy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
40 Banca Commerciale Italiana (39) Italy Yes Na Yes Na 
41 CARIPLO J33) Italy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
42 Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (30) Italy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
43 IMI (69) Italy Yes Yes Yes No 
44 Monte de Paschi (36) Italy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
45 Banco de Napoli (43) Italy Na Na Na Na 
46 Credito italiano (47) Italy Yes Yes Yes No 
47 Banco di Sicilia (74) Italy Na Na Na Na 
48 BPM(99~ Italy Na Na Na Na 
49 BPN «971 Italy Na Na Na Na 
50 BAV (90) Italy Na Na Na Na 
51 ABN-AMRO (6) Nethland Yes Yes Yes No 
52 ING Group (27) Nethland Yes Yes Yes Yes 
53 Rabobank J22) Nethland Yes Yes Yes Yes 
54 BNG(66) Nethland Na Na Na Na 
55 Banca Argentaria (40) Spain Yes Yes Yes Yes 
56 BBV (38) Spain Yes Yes Yes Yes 
57 BCH (31) Spain Yes Yes Yes Yes 
58 Banco Santander (44) Spain Yes Yes Yes Yes 
59 Caia de Madrid (84) Spain Yes Yes Yes Yes 
60 Caja de Ahorros (54) Spain Yes Yes Yes Yes 
61 Credit Suisse (9) Switzerland Yes Yes Yes No 
62 Union Bank of Switzerland (13) Switzerland Yes Yes Yes No 
63 Swiss Bank Corporation (2) Switzerland Yes No Yes No 
64 S Handelsbanken (64) Denmark Yes Yes Yes No 
65 Banque Commercial de Portugees Portugees Yes Yes Yes Yes 
66 Swedbank (52) Sweden Yes No Yes No 
67 S-E Banken (57) Sweden Yes No Yes No 
68 Nordbanken (61) Sweden Na Na Na Na 
• HSBC;·· not available; • .. .In Germany banks have mamly strategic alliance for distribution 
instead of underwriting. Market position of the big banks in Europe is shown in brakets (). 
Source: own compilation 
From Table 2.4, it is seen that the major European banks are engaged in insurance 
businesses both as an underwriter and as a distributor in life as well as in non-life 
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business. But the above results do not provide any evidence as to which European 
banks have diversified into which insurance businesses and what they are. Therefore, 
we need further investigation in order to create our data sample for econometric 
analysis. We, therefore, went into an in depth investigation amongst the banks which 
engage in insurance business in order to find out which category they fall into. We 
investigated these banks from four angles in the light of classification and activities. 
These are-
I. Banks diversification into life assurance distribution activities; 
2. Banks diversification into life assurance underwriting activities; 
3. Banks diversification into generae insurance distribution activities; and, 
4. Banks diversification into general insurance underwriting activities. 
At this stage it is seen that some banks (from our initial sample) have just tied 
relationships with the traditional insurance companies. On the other hand, some banks 
have life assurance underwriting subsidiary, general insurance underwriting subsidiary 
as well as wholey owned broking subsidiary. Some banks even have more than one 
life-underwriting subsidiary, like Credit Lynnoise in France and the TSB in the UK. 
We exclude all the 'tied insurance' companies' from the sample but include all those 
are owned by banks. 
One thing to note here that there are some banks not in the top 100 list which do have 
insurance underwriting subsidiaries while some big banks in the top 100 do not have 
any insurance underwriting subsidiary. For instance, the Dresdner Bank in Germany 
has tied relationship with the Allianz for joint distribution. We have excluded from 
41 
the list those banks that do not have any insurance underwriting subsidiary or wholey 
owned broking subsidiary. And we have included those who have insurance 
underwriting subsidiary though they are not in our top 100 list. The results are 
reported in the appendix III. 
2.6.1 BANKS DIVERSIFICATION INTO LIFE ASSURANCE DISTRIBUTION 
Commercial banks can set up their own life assurance subsidiaries through a De novo 
entry or by mergers and acquisitions or as a joint venture basis with traditional 
insurers. Or they can simply tie up with one or more traditional life insurer in a 
strategic alliance [Hoschka (1994); OECD (1992); Saunder & Walter (1994)]. Banks 
also can set up insurance broking companies with a PLC status in addition to their 
own life assurance company which can act as Independent Financial Advisers [IFA] 
supplying the various products of different traditional insurance companies according 
to customers need and requirements. 
2.6.1.1. MODELING OF BANCASSURANCE DISTRIBUTION 
This section is based on personal interviews with the branch staff of the banks as well 
as some previous case studies. For the interviews, which were conducted during 
October to November in 1995, six different commercial bank branches were chosen in 
the Greater London Area in order to understand how the bancassurance works at bank 
branch level. In our interview, we found that there are mainly three channels in the 
branch network: (i) Branch staff; (ii) Specialist Sales Force; and (iii) Direct Sales 
Force. In addition to these, there are also two other channels of life assurance 
3 In the UK and most of the Europe short term insurance is known as general insurance while in the US 
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distribution which the banks use. These two are (iv). Independent Financial Adviser 
[IFA], and (v.) Direct Marketing. We now analyse how these channels work in the 
process of bancassurance. 
Figure: 2.2. Bancassurance distribution model 
r----------------.::lo._-II~ Trad itional 
(i.) Branch Staff: 
Own B anks t----__ ~ Insurance 
Company 
Branch IFA 
Bancassurance Distribution Model 
Insurance 
In bank branches, there are branch staffs who conduct day to day banking activities to 
meet the customers' needs. These branch staffs are trained to sell life assurance at least 
at a basic level. In legal term, they can act as the agent of banks' own life assurance 
companies or as the agent of a company with which the bank has a link for insurance 
distribution. In the case of long-term insurance distribution process, branch staffs do 
this is known as Property and Casualty Insurance. 
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mainly three tasks: (a) create a special database for identifying potential life insurance 
customer from the bank accounts. They consider various factors in creating such a 
database, such as age, occupation, income etc; (b) pass these data bases to the banks 
insurance sales force as 'warm leads' or, make links between the sales force and the 
potential customer; and (c) sell simple life insurance, if this is allowed, or just pass the 
customer to sales personnel. Individual branches have certain quotas for insurance 
selling to be filled up by that branch. These branch staffs continuously make links 
with the other channels within the parent banking group and co-ordinate the 
bancassurance process. 
(ii.) Specialist Sales Force: 
Banks sometimes employ specialist sales forces, especially for complex long-term 
insurance selling. These specialist sales force posses special insurance knowledge and 
expertise, and are employed either from amongst branch staffs or from outside. Such 
specialists are allocated two to three branches each. They give comprehensive advice 
to the customers and perform selling if possible. Some of the banks' specialist sales 
forces are shown in Table 2.5. A specialist sales force makes appointment at a mutual 
time and place, mostly at the branch, after referral by branch staffs, or branch staff 
may make the appointment on their behalf. 
Table: 2.5 
S b . r S 1 F orne ancassurance spec1a 1St a es orce 1994 
Bancassurance Specialist Sales Force 
companies 
Abbey Life 260 
Barclays Life 182 
Black Horse Life 163 
Midland Life 123 
Natwest Life 200 
Source: Mintel '96 
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(iii.) Direct Sales Force: 
The Direct Sales Force (DSF) is other channel of life insurance distribution. They 
mainly work from home but have strong links with the allocated branch from where 
they can acquire prospective customer or potential customer information by referral by 
branch staff. The banks' own insurance arm i.e. own life insurance companies mainly 
employs these DSFs. These sales forces cover those customers who do not frequently 
visit the branch with whom they try to make contact at the customer's home. Some of 
the banks' DSF is shown in Table 2.6. 
Table: 2.6 
Th DSF ti b e or ancassurance companies, 1997 
Direct Sales Force 
Abbey National Life 2500 
Alliance & Leicester Life 200 
Barclays Life 877 
Black Horse Life 1400 
Britannia Life 200 
Halifax Life 725 
National Australia Life 500 
NatWest Life 1100 
Midland Life 1500 
Nationwide Life 336 
Royal Scottish Assurance 220 
TSB LifelPension l300 
Woolwich Life 380 
Source: Cazalet & Co 1998 
(iv.) Direct Marketing: 
Direct Marketing is a marketing process where products are distributed directly from 
the manufacturer to the consumers without any intermediaries. Though this has long 
been established in non-financial companies, the financial services companies such as 
banks and insurance companies have taken on this marketing strategy quite recently. 
Banks and insurance products are complex in nature. They are invisible as well. 
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Therefore, it is very difficult to market these products without face-to-face discussion. 
However, banks and insurance companies in Europe have begun to adopt this strategy 
due to technological improvement, thus to cutting at the middleman cost. In Europe, 
the UK first started this strategy which then began in other European countries. In the 
UK, the Direct Line, a motor insurance company, started this method in 1984 and has 
shown great success in the motor insurance market. For instance, the total expense 
ratio of Direct Line is 13% to 18%, while the industry ratio is 37% to 40%. Similarly, 
the First Direct, a Tele banking company started this method in 1988 for distributing 
banking products. This Tele banking is open 24 hours a day and 365 days a year, thus, 
the customers can do banking any time without visiting the bank branch. Some of the 
direct marketing companies of banks are shown in Table 2.7. 
Table: 2.7 
Banks Direct Marketin~ (DM) companies 
Bank Country Direct Marketing Arms Entry 
Abbey National UK Abbey National Direct 1989 
Alliance & Leicester UK A & L Personal Finance Ltd. 1989 
Barclays UK Barclay Call 1995 
Barclay loan Direct 1993 
Britannia Building Society UK Care Line 1994 
Britannia Mort~a~e Direct 1994 
Chelthem & Gloucester UK Mortgage Direct 1994 
Clydesdale Bank UK Clydesdale Telebank 1994 
Co-operative Bank UK Coop-Armchair Banking 1993 
Bank of Scotland UK Direct Line 1993 
Midland Bank UK First Direct 1988 
Halifax Building Society UK Halifax Direct 1995 
Lloyds Bank UK Lloyds Line 1995 
National & Provincial B. S. UK N & P Direct 1991 
Nationwide Building Society UK Nationwide Direct 1995 
NatWest Bank UK NatWest Prime Line 1991 
TSBGroup UK TSB Phone Bank 1994 
Woolwich Building Society UK Woolwich Direct 1994 
Deutsche Bank Germany Bank 24 1995 
Groupe Paribas France Banque Direct 1994 
Commerzbank Germany Comdirect 1995 
Banco Santander Spain Genesis 1995 
Banca Commercial de Portugal Ocidental 1994 
Portugees 
Bank of Ireland Ireland Premier Direct 1994 
Source: Own Compilation from various sources. 
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v. IF A Channel: 
The IF A (Independent Financial Adviser) is a traditional insurance distribution 
channel. Although the main purpose of the banks involvement in insurance business 
was to maximise the use of the bank branch network in order to minimise unit costs, 
the banks use the IF A channel in a similar manner to the traditional insurance 
companies, which may increase banks unit costs. A bank sets up an insurance broking 
subsidiary that has separate legal identity (shown in Table 2.11 in section 2.6.3 of this 
chapter). These broking companies, like other traditional insurance broking 
companies, gather different insurance underwriting companies' various insurance 
products. They, in addition to these products, gather their parent banks' underwriting 
(life and non-life both) insurance companies (if any) products and make sales. The 
special advantage of these broking companies' is that they have a very close link with 
their parent banks. If any bank customer inquires for independent insurance advice in 
the branch, he/she is then referred to that broking subsidiary or, in some cases, branch 
staff can do the job on their behalf. As major banking products are related to insurance 
products (discussed in Chapter four), these broking companies receive the majority of 
businesses from their parent banks. Before establishing these banks' broking 
subsidiaries, these insurance businesses were conducted by the traditional insurance 
intermediaries. 
Some times these IF As are provided with all the customer data from their respective 
parent banks and they then select a database for specific customers and select products 
according to the gender, age, profession etc. of the customers. From the selective 
database they then post application forms stating premium, cover, benefits etc. to the 
customer directly or via banks marketing department. If anyone is interested they then 
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just sign and post it by the pre-paid envelope to the bank's own IF A broker directly. 
Such products are designed such a simple way that no advice is required for them. 
One thing to mention here is that in the UK, after the implementation of the Financial 
Services Act 1986, anyone who wants to engage into long-term insurance business 
must follow either of two following routes. One is called 'Independent Financial 
Adviser' (IF A), and the other is called 'Tied Agent'. The former is a person or a body 
corporate who can give advice and sell insurance on behalf of more than one, but 
maximum of six, insurance companies. They offer different types of products to the 
common client base and select according to which best suits the clients on a 
commission or fee basis. Tied Agent, on the other hand, is a person or body who can 
give advice and sell insurance on behalf of only one insurance company's products. 
All the banks insurance broking subsidiaries enjoy the IF A status, and the branch 
staffs, the DSFs, and the SSFs have the tied status. Banks are mainly tied with their 
own/controlling life insurance companies or in case of non-existing own life 
companies they make strategic alliance with traditional insurance companies for a 
joint sale. Most of the banks have their own life assurance subsidiaries as well as 
insurance broking subsidiaries. Therefore a bank can enjoy 'tied status' through their 
own life insurance companies and at the same time 'IF A status' through their own 
insurance broking firm. Such a technical loophole gives banks the opportunity to 
enjoy tied status as well as independent status which is beyond the regulatory control 
until new regulations come into force. For instance, a customer can take insurance 
advice from the bank counter as tied today, while tomorrow the same counter staff can 
become independent to the same customer. 
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From the above analysis, it is seen that the banks use all the available channels in 
distributing life assurance. In order to compare the bank success in life assurance 
distribution, we show the ratio of premium income of bancassurance channel with the 
traditional channels (Table 2.8). This premium variable is chosen because the 
insurance companies main source of income is premium income, thus their survival or 
death mainly depends on this premium income. Most of these premium incomes are 
invested in order to have an another income to meet future claims and thus to enable 
companies to make a profit. 
In 1995, the life market share by channel of distribution were as follows: the banks in 
France 56%, Germany 15%, Italy 19%, Spain 35%, and the Netherlands 15% (Sigma 
1996). These figures and Table 2.8 show that the European banks have a significant 
market share in life assurance distribution. The French banks have more than half of 
the country's life assurance distribution market share. Spanish banks have 35% of 
total market share. This is a serious threat to traditional distributors like agents, 
brokers etc. 
Table: 2.8 
Individual life and pension distribution in European market, 1994 
(% of New premium income) 
Country BrokerslM Tied Agents Banks Company Direct Total 
u1ti tied Employees 
Belgium 57 9 19 15 0 100 
France 7 13 55 20 5 100 
Germany 30 61 7 2 0 100 
Italy 11 43 20 26 0 100 
Netherlands 45 7 18 14 16 100 
Spain 12 48 23 16 1 100 
Sweden 26 2 22 40 10 100 
Switzerland 9 2 1 87 1 100 
UK 39 7 15 36 2 100 
Note: Figures do not necessarily add up to 100, due to rounding up and down decimal places. 
Source: Financial Times and others 
49 
From Table 2.9, it is seen that a number of banks life companies are within the top 
five domestic league table, which indicates that the life companies owned by the 
banks are growing rapidly. 
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Table: 2.9 
. d k 
Bancassurance Co Parent Bank Country Life 
Premium 
(local 
currency 
million) 
Alpha Life Generale Bank Belgium 1775 
Ornniver Vie Kreditbank Belgium 1395 
Vida Caixa LaCaixa Spain 65971 
Euroseguros BBV Spain 106388 
Predica Credit Agricole France 30405 
Irish Life Allied Ir. Bank Ireland 572 
Life Time Anglo Ir. Bank Ireland 130 
Fideuram Vita IMI Italy 620 
Mottepaschi Vida Montedeipschi Italy 521 
Interpolis Rabobank Netherlands 1183 
Ocidental Vida BCP Portugal 19746 
Scottish Widow RBS UK 1600 
Source: From Eurostate (1995) and varIous sources 
1993 
Domestic Position 
market share in top 5 
(%) in the 
Country 
1.27 2Dd 
1.00 3rd 
6.43 1st 
3.77 2Dd 
9.16 2nd 
32.06 lit 
7.28 3111 
14.10 2nd 
3.10 4th 
4.63 5th 
11.92 lit 
2.88 401 
2.6.2. BANKS DIVERSIFICATION INTO LIFE ASSURANCE 
UNDERWRITING 
In our investigation, on the banks' life assurance underwriting activities, we have 
found that most of the European big commercial banks are engaged in life assurance 
underwriting business. We have found in our investigation that 74 life assurance 
companies are owned/controlled by banks4 (Appendix III). However, due to the lack 
of available data, we have reported data on 52 banks' life assurance underwriting 
subsidiaries with their premium income in Table 2.10. This sample data of life 
4 There might be more. But we did not search all the banks as well as all the European countries. Our basis of investigation was 
within top 100 European banks. But we have added more that we found somewhere else. 
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assurance underwriting companies will be used for our empirical analysis in Chapter 
five. 
B k' ans 
Life Subsidiaries 
1 Abbey Life 
2 Abbey National Life 
3 Ambassador Life 
4 Barclays Life 
5 Barclays Pension 
6 Black Horse Life 
7 Britannia Life 
7 First National Life 
9 Fleming Life 
10 Gisbome Life 
11 Halifax Life 
12 Hambro Assured 
13 Hamilton Life 
14 Hill Samuel Life 
15 Leeds Life 
16 Midland Life 
17 N &PLife 
18 Natwest Life 
19 Royal Scott Assuranc 
20 TSB Life 
21 TSB Pension 
22 Woolwich Life 
23 Predica 
24 Assurances Federales 
25 UAF 
26 Sogicap 
27 La Henin Vie 
28 ERISA Vie 
29 Euroseguros 
30 Vidacaixa 
31 Cenit 
32 Caja de Madrid Vida 
33 La Estrella 
34 Postal Vida 
35 BBL Life 
36 Alpha Life 
37 Ornniver Vie 
38 BNL Vita 
39 Montepaschi Vita 
40 Sanpaolo Vita 
41 Cari Vita 
42 Fideuram Vita 
43 CS Life 
44 Ocidental Vida 
45 Interpolis 
46 Handel Sbanken Liv 
own I e assurance un erwntm rfi 
Table: 2.10 
d 
Parent Banks 
Lloysls Bank 
Abbey National 
TSB 
Barclays Group 
Barclays Group 
Lloyds Bank 
Britannia B. S. 
First National Fin. Corp. 
Robert Fleming 
Robert Fleming 
HalifaxPLC 
Hambros 
HFC Bank 
Hill Samuel Bank 
Leeds Permanent B.S 
Midland Bank 
N &PB.S. 
Natwest Bank 
RBS 
TSB 
TSB 
Woolwich PLC 
Credit Agricole 
Credit Lynnoise 
Credit Lynnoise 
Societe Generale 
Group Indosuez 
CCF 
BBV 
LaCaixa 
Banco Santander 
Caja de Madrid 
Central Hispano 
Caja de Madrid 
BBL 
Banque Generale 
Kreditbank 
BNL 
Monte de Paschi 
Sanpaolo 
Cari~aolo 
IMI 
Credit Swiss 
BCP 
RaboBank 
Handel Sbanken 
Source: own compIlatIOn 
. 1995 companIes 
Country Premium Income 
(local currencies) 
UK 871282 
UK 327276 
UK 3960 
UK 313760 
UK 505738 
UK 555397 
UK 323877 
UK 3826 
UK 80 
UK 43000 
UK 56080 
UK 45382 
UK 21802 
UK 94142 
UK 6075 
UK 345591 
UK 29052 
UK 167035 
UK 130446 
UK 429835 
UK 164960 
UK 88654 
France 51261451601,61 
France 16410537 
France 16.45bn* 
France 14414604107,00 
France 3751989971 
France 4.1bn 
Spain 109064653 
Spain 117879528 
Spain 6908088 
Spain 4528096 
Spain 56000m 94 
Spain 9239757 
Belgium 2499 
Belgium 6705 
Belgium 6246 
Italy 398096671,187 
Italy 752009 
Italy 363529 
Italy 419083 
Italy 1211267 
Switzerland 817165 
Portugal 44661 
Netherlands 3398 (million) 
Sweden 1158275 
It should be noted here that no bank, in our investigation in the EU countries, is allowed to 
underwrite long-term (life) assurance directly. They have to underwrite life assurance 
51 
business, if they so wish, via separate life assurance companies. These companies may 
be the banks' own or controlling life assurance subsidiaries or a joint venture with a 
traditional insurer. Banks underwrite mainly simple long-tenn products, so the 
underwriting process is also very simple for them. Nonnally banks do not require any 
medical examination or medical reports. Necessary infonnation data are already 
available to life underwriters from the customer accounts at bank branch and based on 
these infonnations, i.e. age, occupation etc, underwriters can assess the risk and can 
set premiums. All the life assurance underwriters consider three factors in 
underwriting process. These are (i.) mortality; (ii.) investment; and (iii.) loading i.e. 
expenses. We are not going to analyse bank insurance underwriting in detail as it is 
same as the traditional life assurance underwriting process. From the underwriting 
workshop, products come to the bank's marketing department and its IF A broking 
companies. From there products are distributed to branches and customers (see Figure 
2.2). 
2.6.3. BANKS DIVERSIFICATION INTO GENERAL INSURANCE 
DISTRIBUTION 
The European banks have distributed general insurance for a number of years. 
Therefore, in our investigation, we have found a number of insurance broking 
subsidiaries owned by banks. We have reported banks' wholey owned insurance 
broking subsidiaries in appendix III. However, we have reported here (Table 2.11) 
only those companies whose data we managed to acquire. These broking companies 
gather various insurance products [both life (discussed earlier) as well as non-life 
insurance products] from various traditional insurers as a distribution agreement and 
sell them via banks or their own sales forces. After the implementation of the 
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Financial Services Act 1986 in the UK, these brokers can not be tied to more than six 
traditional insurers. 
Table: 2.11 
an s own genera Insurance Istrl utlOn companIes B k I· d··b . . 199 6 
Broking Company Bank Holding Company Country Premium income 
Barclays Insurance Services Ltd. Barclays UK 107618 
National Westminster Insurance Services Ltd. NatWest Gro~ UK 114796 
Lloyds Bank Insurance Services Ltd. LloydsBank UK 150363 
Midland Bank Insurance Services Ltd. Midland UK 
RBS Insurance Services Ltd. Royal Bank of Scotland UK 11822 
Bank of Scotland Insurance Consultant Ltd. Bank of Scotland UK 19.437* 
TSB Insurance Services Ltd. TSB Group UK 
Halifax Mortgage Services (lnsu. Brokers) Ltd. Halifax UK 2.101* 
Hambro Legal Protection Ltd. Hambros UK 15.301* 
Clydesdale Bank Insurance Brokers Ltd. Clydesdale Bank 11975 
Co-operative Bank Financial AdvisersLtd Co-operative Bank UK 12503 
Yorkshire Bank financial Services Ltd Yorkshire Bank UK 16.097· 
Robert Fleming Insurance brokers (UK) Ltd. Robert Fleming UK 14.223** 
BBV Brokers Banco Bilbao Vizeaya Spain 
BCP Brokers Banco Commercial Portuguese Portugal 210.56 
AgenCaixa LaCaixa Spain 660.79 
• '" 1994 figure; •• - 1995 figure. 
Source: own compilation 
It is accepted that most of the banking products are related to general insurance 
products, such as credit related banking products and the credit insurance or overseas 
trade and the marine insurance etc (discussed further in chapter four). The banks, 
therefore, have an extra advantage in distributing general insurance products. The 
banks, before entering into general insurance distribution business. used to take out 
insurance cover against their banking products directly from traditional insurance 
brokers as assignee or via its customer. When banks realised that this is a good source 
of income they then established their own insurance broking subsidiaries and referred 
all insurance coverage to that broking company. 
From Table 2.12, it is seen that the insurance broking subsidiaries, owned by banks, 
account for a significant amount of premium income. In some cases, for instance in 
the UK, these broking subsidiaries are in the top league table of the brokerage market. 
In a recent study by the ICC (1996), it is seen that in terms of premium income, nearly 
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a half of the top ten insurance broking companies (except the Lloyds Brokers) are 
owned by banks. 
However, from Table 2.12, it is seen that the traditional distribution channels are still 
dominant in general insurance distribution. This is because the banks have still not 
entered into the distribution of large risk exposure insurance products such as marine, 
aviation etc, which require very special technical knowledge and skill and the banks 
have not acquired such expertise yet. Therefore, the traditional brokers still dominate 
these markets. From Table 2.12, it is seen that in France banks have only 4% market 
share in general insurance distribution, while in the life insurance sector (Table 2.8) it 
has 56% market share. The Netherlands have relatively better market share in general 
insurance business, i.e. 15%, while in Germany and Spain have only 2% and 3% 
respectively. 
B ank' s mar et s are m genera msurance k h 
Table: 2.12 
I . d· ·b· 1995 lstn utton, 
France (1) % Germany (2) % 
Agents 40 Agents 75 
MSI 29 Direct writers 2 
Brokers 20 Brokers 15 
Insurance 4 Banks 2 
employees 
Banks 4 Branch offices 6 
Direct & Others 3 
italY (3) % Spain (4) % 
Agents 78.6 Agents 64 
Brokers 15.8 Brokers 17 
Direct Sales 5.1 Direct Sales 15 
Others 0.5 Banks 3 
Others 1 
UK*(5) % Netherlands (6) 0/. 
Brokers 53 Brokers 55 
Company Sales 16 Direct writers 20 
People 
Tied Agents 5 Banks 15 
Banks 1 Sales Forces 5 
Direct Telesales 23 General agents 5 
Others 2 
• = ABI figure 
Source: SigmaIFinancial Times 
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2.6.4. BANKS DIVERSIFICATION INTO GENERAL INSURANCE 
UNDERWRITING 
Although the law of European countries allows (Table 2.4) the banks and building 
societies to own or to control general insurance subsidiaries, the banks are not very 
interested in the general insurance underwriting business. In our investigation, we 
have found not many general insurance underwriting subsidiaries owned/controlled by 
banks (appendix III). Some of the general insurance underwriting subsidiaries that are 
owned by banks is reported with their premium income in Table 2.l3. 
Table: 2.13 
G enera msurance un erwntmg companIes owne I . d db ,y banks, 1995 
General Insurance Underwriting Banks Premium 
income (m) in 
Local currency 
TSB General Insurance Ltd TSB Group UK 237966 
Midland General Ltd. Midland Bank UK N/a 
Direct Line Insurance Ltd RBS UK 663726 
Hamilton Insurance Company HFC Bank UK 36215 
Ocidental Seguros BCP Portugal 13036 
Omniver lard Kreditbank Belgium 2.370 
BBL Insurance Banque Bruxels Lambart Belgium 124.00 
Pacifica Non-Life Credit Agricole France 416431 
Medical de France-Vie Credit Lyonnais France 
Mega Non-Life Credit Commercial de Belgium 209288 
Belgium 
Ahorora Seguros BBV Spain 59777 
Generali (Italy) BCH (Spain) 10846661 
Fideruam Assicurazioni Istituto Mobiliare Italy 24533.12 
Italiano 
Ticino Monta del Paschi de Italy 24553.86 
Siena 
CIDA, SIPEA San Paolo Italy N/A 
Bishopgate Insurance (UK) AMEVNSB (N.lands) 203884 
Source: own compIlatIon from vanous sources 
The banks general insurance underwriting process is the same as the traditional 
general insurance underwriting companies. Therefore, we are not going to analyse 
here the general insurance underwriting process of banks. The banks, like life 
assurance underwriting business (discussed earlier in this chapter), can not underwrite 
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general insurance directly. They can underwrite general insurance business through 
separately owned general insurance underwriting subsidiaries. In those banks that 
underwrite general insurance business, their products are produced in the workshop 
i.e. underwriting office. These products then are supplied to banks marketing 
department but mainly to banks own insurance broking companies. The products are 
then sold from bank branch or broking companies or even through direct marketing 
channel. 
In our investigation, we found that the general insurance underwriting companies that 
are owned by banks underwrite very simple general insurance products, such as 
household, accident and health insurance products. The banks are not doing well even 
in distributing these products. For instance, a recent survey by the KPMG (1997) 
shows that the banks and building societies household insurance penetration rates are 
falling. Banks have less than half the success of building societies in selling household 
insurance. Building societies have almost no success in selling household insurance to 
non-mortgage customers, whilst banks enjoy moderate success. Details are shown in 
the Table 2.14. 
Table: 2.14 
Penetration rate of household insurance to banks & building societies 
rt dd rt d mo (gage an non-mo [gage customers 
1994 1996 
Mortgage Non-mortgage Mortgage Non-mortgage 
customers customers customers customers 
Banks 27.15% 7.80% 22.16% 6.87% 
Building Societies 66.46% 0.16% 65.32% 0.17% 
Source: Derived from Bancassurance Survey 1997, KPMG 
No single company, in our investigation, has been found that underwrites large 
exposure of risks like marine, aviation, or even property insurance underwriting. This 
is because the banks may believe that underwriting these products is a very risky 
and/or less profitable area of business. Or the bank management may think that since 
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general insurance underwriting resultsS are almost always negative (Table 2.15), it is 
not worthy to expand into general insurance underwriting business, and therefore, they 
mainly concentrate on the general insurance distribution (and life) activities only. 
Table: 2.15 
Non-Life Underwriting Results 1996 Euro (m) 
Country Underwriting Share in earned 
results premium 
Austria -209.23 -3.81% 
Belgium 394.72 6.07% 
Denmark -83.17 -2.27% 
Spain -649.93 -5.48% 
Finland -314.12 -17.53% 
France 1630.94 4.69% 
UK -569.02 -1.49% 
Italy -2224.36 -11.63% 
Luxembourg 50.13 10.39% 
Netherlands 536.31 4.67% 
Source: CEA 1997 
Table 2.16 shows that the share in earned premium in the underwriting performance is 
mostly negative, therefore, underwriting general insurance by banks may increase the 
banks bankruptcy risks. However, we will test this empirically in chapter five. 
2.7. THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF DIVERSIFICATION INTO 
BANCASSURANCE ACTIVITIES 
From the above investigation it is seen that the European banks have diversified into 
all insurance activities to some extent. Banks by utilising their resources (branch 
network, customer information etc) can provide various insurance products to the 
bank customers. It appears that the bank will benefit by diversifying into insurance, 
, General insurance underwriting profit is almost always negative. But they have investment income 
from where they have to make profit. 
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l.e. scale and scope economIes [Diacon (1990); Dickinson and Dinenis (1992); 
Dinenis and Jung (1998)]. Although the original idea of entering into bancassurance 
was to sell insurance products through branch staff, with a view to adding new 
products lines to the same distribution outlets in order to minimise the cost 
(opportunities for scale and scope economies), banks have not yet been successful in 
this respect. This is because banks are still heavily reliant on traditional distribution 
channels like tied agent, direct sales force etc as branch staffs have not yet acquired 
the necessary skills to approach these products. They have not learnt about the 
technical knowledge of life assurance products and that's why they can not give 
standby answers to a customer's query with regard to life assurance. Therefore, they 
are heavily reliant on traditional insurance distributors who have now access to the 
branch with office space and other necessary secretarial facilities. In this case, they 
merely introduce traditional intennediaries rather than distribute. However, they can 
supply customers' data to the banks insurance personnel specialists as a prospective 
buyer. Therefore, there may be opportunities for the existence of scale and scope 
economies. Anyway, this is an empirical issue which needs to be tested separately. 
On the other hand, by diversifying into insurance businesses, banks may increase their 
risks. Because banking business itself is regarded as a risky business. Insurance 
business, too, is regarded as a risky business. Therefore, diversifying into insurance 
business may increase banks' risk. On the other hand, by allowing asset 
diversification, banks may decrease their risks. We will test this empirically in 
Chapter five. 
However, the risks depend on the level of business activities in insurance because the 
diversification into distribution activities and the diversification into underwriting 
activities are fundamentally different from each other in tenns of risks. In distribution 
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activities as there is little risk as in distribution activities banks face 'selling risk' only, 
i.e. as long as they can sell they will get commission. But in underwriting activities, 
banks will have to bear the claims (if they arise) which is the main cost of insurance 
and this cost is much higher than the premium taken from the claimant. One may 
argue that not all the policyholders will claim and even not at the same time. 
Therefore, by pooling premiums as well as from the investment income (since 
significant part of the premiums is invested for further income) the claims can be met. 
But again, there may be on unexpected rise of mortality risk (for life assurance) or 
unexpected increase natural disasters, cyclone etc (for general insurance) or 
unexpected rise of loading risk i.e. expense risk or even unexpected rise of interest 
rate risk (as this directly effect the investment income). In all these cases, the banks 
total risk will increase or in the opposite case the total risks may decrease. 
The underwriting of life assurance and the underwriting of general insurance are 
fundamentally different from each other because they bear different risk characters. 
Therefore, the risk effect of diversification into life assurance underwriting and the 
risk effect of diversification into general insurance underwriting should be treated 
separately. 
In distribution activities, both life and general insurance distribution, the banks will 
not have to face these underwriting risks as the underwriting insurance companies will 
have to bear these risks. Therefore, we will test three categories of risks in chapter five 
namely, insurance distribution risks, life assurance underwriting risks and general 
insurance underwriting risks. 
As it is mentioned earlier, the risks of the banks depend not only on the choice of 
underwriting activities but also on the choice of entry strategies. Entry via strategic 
alliance, where there is only distribution risks, or entry via creating own subsidiary, 
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where there is also underwriting risk, or other form of entries such as joint ventures or 
mergers and acquisitions will bear different degrees of risks (discussed in an earlier 
section). 
2.S. CONCLUSION 
This chapter attempts to describe the theoretical development of the new phenomenon 
of bancassurance and has investigated the diversification of banks into different 
insurance activities and has created bancassurance data sample. The data sample that 
has been created in this chapter will be used for the empiricalaftalysis in chapter five. 
From the above discussion and investigation, it is seen that the diversification risks 
depend on (i.) the choice of entry strategy, and (ii) the choice of entry field, i.e. 
underwriting or distribution, and life or general insurance. Since it is seen (Figure 2.1) 
that the start-up approach and the mergers and acquisitions (and holding form) are 
likely to bear highest risks, we took these samples for our risks and return test in 
chapter five. These samples are grouped into three according to the choice of entry 
field of banks, i.e. life assurance underwriting, general insurance underwriting and 
insurance broking. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN INSURANCE 
INDUSTRY 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to critically examine the recent development of 
European insurance companies, particularly the development of 'assurancebank'. To 
achieve this objective, we firstly outline the European insurance market place and its 
traditional distribution system and the development of new distribution channels in 
insurance. Secondly, we examine the recent development in insurance industries, 
particularly their diversification into banking business. We also create a data bank on 
assurancebank in this section. Finally, we develop a strategic model of assurancebank 
as a counter response to banks and test its validity. 
The rest of this chapter is as follows: in section 2, we highlight the European 
insurance market. In section 3, discuss the traditional insurance distribution system 
and their new developments. In section 4, we define the term 'assurancebank' and 
draw a comparable model among bancassurance, assurancebank and allfinanz. In 
section S, we discuss the recent development in insurance industry and create 
assurancebank databank. In section 6, we develop a strategic model of assurancebank 
as a counter response to banks, and finally in section 7 we conclude. 
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3.2. EUROPEAN INSURANCE MARKET PLACE 
In 1996, the global premium income was $2106 billion which is more than triple the 
1985 value (Table 3.1). In the global market, Europe holds second position after the 
US and is slightly above Asia (including Japan). Currently Europe earns about 30% of 
world total premium income (Graph 3.1). 
Table: 3.1 
Global insurance premIUm income 1996-1985 
Year US$bn 
1996 2106 
1995 2148 
1994 1967 
1993 1803 
1985 632 
Source: Sigma 1997/0ECD 1997 
Graph: 3.1 
Insurance premium income 1985-1996 
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The five European countries- Germany, UK, France, Italy, and Switzerland, account 
for more than 75% of total business in terms of premium income. The UK is top in 
life market, with about 25%, and in the non-life market Germany is top, with more 
than 27%. If we add Spain and Netherlands with them the total figure reaches nearly 
90%. Hardwick and Dou (1998), through their 'revealed comparative advantage' 
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measurement, found that the UK has the most competitive life and non-life insurance 
in the EU, with France and the Netherlands in second and third places. They also 
found that Germany, which has the largest non-life industry and the second largest life 
industry in the EU (Table 3.2), was placed only sixth in the non-life category and 
eighth in the life category. In the following table (Table 3.2), we have shown the total 
premium income of each European country with market share and breakdown with 
life and non-life premium income including life and non-life market share. We have 
also reported the total number of insurance companies and the number of their 
employees' country by country in order to provide an overall idea of the European 
insurance market. The aggregation of the CEA (26 countries), EU (15) countries, and 
the EEA (17 countries) are also reported with market share of business. 
Table: 3.2 
Overview of European insurance industries, 1996 (ECU million) 
Country No of No of Total % Life % Non-Life % 
Insuran Employees Premium premium premium 
ceCo 
Austria 78 30269 10584 (2.0) 4403 (1.5) 6180 (2.5) 
Belgium 258 25070 11837 (2.2) 5261 (1.8) 6577 (2.7) 
Switzerland 163 47510 24137 (4.5) 16075 (5.6) 8062 (3.3) 
Cyprus 38 2300 285 (0.1) 149 (0.05) 136 (0.1) 
Ck Republic 35 15000 1179 (0.2) 318 (0.1) 861 (.03) 
Germaney 719 241700 116391 (21.8) 47790 (16. 7) 68602 (27.8) 
Denmark N/a 17000 8662 (1.6) 5141 (1.8) 3520 (J.4) 
Estonia 23 1500 60 (0.01) 4 (00) 56 (0. iff 
Spain 372 48385 23161 (4.3) 10080 (3.5) 13080 (jj) 
Finland 57 10750 8155 (1.5) 6303 72.2) 1851 (0.7) 
France 570 135400 117029 (22.0) 70979 (24.8) 46050 (18.6) 
UK 818 200500 113164 (21.2) 72985 (25.5) 40179 (16.3) 
Greece 139 9600 1659 (0.3) 801 (0.3) 858 (0.35 
Hungary N/a 18943 740 (0.1) 233 (0.1) 507 (0.2) 
Ireland 149 10231 4590 (0.9) 2750 (Uii 1840 (0.7) 
Iseland N/a 600 159 (0.0) 6 (Oiii 154 (0.1) 
Italy 271 45250 35419 (6.6) 13633 (4.8] 21786 (8.8) 
Luxembourg 94 1428 3029 (0.6) 2383 (0.8) 646 (0.3) 
Netherlands 506 40770 27771 (5.2) 14610 (5.fl 13160 (5.3) 
Norway N/a 10000 5520 (1.0) 2452 (0.9) 3068 (1.2) 
Poland N/a 26000 2291 "(0.4) 776 (0.3) 1515 70.6) 
Portugal N/a 14171 4725 (0.9) 2243 (0.8) 2483 (1. iii 
SE Sveri&.e N/a 18500 10340 (1.9) 6069 (2.1) 4271 (1.75 
SI Slovenia N/a 3780 688 (0.1) 114 (0.04) 574 (oji 
SK Siovenska N/a 5079 346 (0.1) 89 (O.oJi 257 (0.]) 
Turkey N/a 7500 947 (0.2) 140 70.055 806 (0.3) 
CEA 987236 532868 (100.0) 285788 (100.0) 147080 (100.0) 
EU 849014 496516 (93.2) 165431 (92.9) 131083 f93.5i 
EEA 859614 502195 (94.2) 267890 (93.7) 234305 (94.8) 
Source: Compilation from the CEA 1997 
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3.3. INSURANCE DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL 
The success of an insurance company mainly depends on its effective distribution. 
Different writers classify insurance distribution channels in different ways. Whitaker 
(1995) conducted an in depth analysis of the insurance distribution channel from 
different angles. Proudfoot (1981) classified distribution channels into three categories 
i.e. full time, part time, others (direct mail). The Chartered Insurance Institute [Study 
Text of Contract Law and Insurance (1991)] classified five types of intermediaries. 
These are brokers, Lloyd's brokers, agents, consultants, home service representatives. 
Mercantile & General (1990) classified the channel into two broad categories i.e. 
direct channel, indirect channel. Traditionally the insurance products were distributed 
in the following simple way -
Insurers > Agents > Consumers (policy holders); or 
Insurers> Consumers (policyholders). 
The insurance companies used to employ agents on a part-time basis in order to sell 
their various insurance products to the customers in return for commission. Later on, 
amongst this group, a number of people have taken this as a full-time job and started 
to set up their own high street offices to offer to the customers different insurance 
companies' products. These are now known as brokers. Due to the internalisation of 
business, changes of public attitude and greater competition in the market, this 
situation is rapidly changing. Now there are a number of different types of 
intermediaries involved in insurance distribution, which makes the distribution 
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channel more complex than ever before. The distribution of insurance differs from 
company to company within the country. Even different countries have different 
distribution system for insurance according to the countries legislation (if any) for 
intermediaries, business tradition and culture. It is, therefore, justifiable to analyse 
each country's traditional channel of distribution country wise. We start from the UK, 
which is believed to have the most complex distribution system of insurance. 
The UK: 
In the UK, the following traditional distribution channels are found: 
1. Registered Brokers: - A broker is an individual or firm whose full time occupation 
is the placing of insurance with the insurance companies. This type of broker is 
registered or enrolled with the Insurance Brokers Regulation Council (IBRC) under 
the Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act 1977. Only those who are registered in the 
IBRC can use the title as 'Broker'. No person or body corporate can use the title 
'insurance broker' without the registration. It is a criminal offence. There are 15716 
names on the IBRC on which 2118 are sole traders or in partnerships, and 2628 are 
body corporate brokers. 
2. Lloyd's Brokers: - Only these types of brokers can place insurance to the Lloyd's. 
They are subject to the Lloyd's Acts (1871-1982), and the Lloyd's by laws. It is a 
condition of registration as a Lloyd's broker that the broker is also registered or 
enrolled with the Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act 1977. 
3. Non-Registered Intermediaries: - For insurance intermediaries who are not 
registered brokers, there are two voluntary code of practice for them issued by the 
Association of British Insurers (ABI). The first code relates to general Insurance 
business and the second to the life insurance of non-investment type. 
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First Code [General Insurance Business Code of Practice for All Intermediaries 
(including Employees of Insurance Companies) other than Registered Insurance 
Brokers)] recognises two types of intermediary: 
i. Independent intermediary - who act independently on behalf of the client, and, 
ii. Company agent - who are employed by one company or may represent a maximum 
of six companies. 
The Second Code, which is known as Life Insurance (Non-Investment Selling) Code 
of Practice, recognises two further types of intermediary: 
i. Intermediaries - all persons including the employees of a life office, selling life 
assurance and who are not registered brokers. 
ii. Introducers - person who merely introduces a prospective policyholder to a life 
office but take no part in the subsequent selling process. 
4. Investment Type Insurance Intermediaries: - Some long term insurance is 
recognised as of investment product under the Financial Services Act 1986. Under this 
act all person who wish to carry out 'investment business' must follow one of these 
two types: 
i. Independent intermediary - who acts on behalf of the client. They must secure a 
separate authorisation and are responsible for compliance of the requirements of the 
Financial Services Act 1986. 
ii. Appointed Representatives - who act as tied agents of an insurance company. They 
are not required to have separate authorisation under the Act. 
An insurance intermediary who wishes to carry on investment business may secure an 
authorisation in the UK to do so from a number of sources: 
a. By applying directly to the Securities and Investment Board (SIB) 
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b. Through membership of a Self-Regulatory Organisation (SRO). There are a number 
of SRO's, each with their own rules regulating their members. They are FIMBRA (now 
PIA), IMRO, LAUTRO, SF A. Major clearing banks are members of the IMRO, 
LAUTRO. 
c. Through certification by a Representative Professional Body. For example, the Law 
Society, the Chartered Institute of Accountants in England and Wales etc. 
An agent in law is one who acts for another. In insurance the term 'agent' usually 
referred to the individual or firm whose main occupation is in another field. Estate 
agents, building societies, solicitors, accountants, garage proprietors, are often 
appointed as agents since their clients may require insurance cover which these 
intermediaries arrange. 
Consultants - Intermediaries not registered in the Insurance Brokers (Registration) 
Council but who wish to mediate in insurance can use this title. They are also refereed 
to as 'Insurance Adviser', 'Assurance Professional', and 'Financial Consultant'. They 
can work independently or as a tied. 
Germany: 
According to domestic law and commercial practice there are two basic classes of 
insurance intermediaries in Germany: the Ascents and the Brokers. Agents deal with 
and are instructed by one or more insurance companies on a permanent contractual 
basis. Whereas brokers do not intermediate on a permanent basis instead intermediate 
periodically. Brokers in Germany works independently. The agents represent the 
insurers but brokers may be the agents of insurer or policyholder depending on from 
where he/she has received commission. 
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There is no restriction on intermediaries placing any types of insurance. Unlike other 
intermediaries in other European jurisdictions, there is no specific requirement of 
authorisation for insurance intermediaries in Germany. But they have to notify the 
local agency for trade registration like other traders. In case of company status, they 
have to register with the local commercial register, and have to follow the ordinary 
rules of German Company Law like any other company formation. Once 
intermediaries are registered as agents or brokers, they can then intermediate all kinds 
of i.e. life as well as non-life insurance business. German intermediaries are not 
obliged to submit annual accounts to any authority and there is not even a legal 
requirement for them to keep a bank. account. Different types of insurance 
intermediaries are reported in Table 3.3. 
Table: 3.3 
Gennan Insurance Intennediaries 
Channel Number 
Full-time Tied Agents 50000 
Part-time Tied Agents 270000 
Salaried Sales Force 25000 
Independent Agents 5000 
Brokers 4000 
CAP A ConseIl, PariS, 1993 
France: 
There are four types of intermediaries found in France for insurance distribution. 
These are:- (i.) General agents, (ii.) Independent brokers and brokerage firms, (iii.) 
Salaried employees of insurance companies, and (iv.) Salaried employees and agents 
ofinsurance agents (sub-agents) of individual brokers and of brokerage firms. General 
agents are individuals who act as an agent for insurance companies and they represent 
the insurers. Brokers on the other side, may be individuals or a firm with company 
status who acts for the insured. Unlike Germany, the French intermediaries are not 
free from authorisation. They are regulated under the French Law. They need 
authorisation and registration for doing insurance intermediary business. But they do 
not need separate authorisation and registration for conducting life and non-life 
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insurance businesses. Different types of French insurance intermediaries are reported 
in Table 3.4. 
Table: 3.4 
French Insurance Intermediaries 
Channel Number 
Tied Agents 19700 
Agency Employees 51000 
Brokers 2400 
Employees of Brokers 16000 
Employed Salesman (life) 25000 
CAP A Conseil, Paris, 1993 
Italy: 
Under the Italian law, there are two types of insurance intermediaries. These are:- (i). 
Tied agents, and (ii). Independent insurance brokers. Agents are defined as those who 
permanently undertake, for a remuneration, to promote the execution of contracts on 
behalf of a principal within a specified territory. [Article 1742, Civil Code]. On the 
other hand a broker is one who professionally places two or more parties in contract 
for the purpose of entering into a contract without being connected with either of such 
parties by way of collaboration, employment or representation. [Article 2754, Civil 
Code]. Different types ofItalian insurance intermediaries are reported in Table 3.5. 
Table: 3. 5 
Italian Insurance Intermediaries 
Channel Number 
Tied Agents 18200 
Independent Agenta 3800 
SubAgents 20000 
Employed Salesman 3600 
Independent Producers 40000 
Brokers 1260 (individual) & 
695 (or~anisations) 
CAP A Conseil, Paris, 1993 
Spain: 
In Spain, the intermediaries are classified in the following ways according to their 
domestic law. It classifies agents in the following way: (i). Private individuals and legal 
persons; (ii.) Agents; (iii.) Brokers; (iv.) Employees, and (v.) Sub agents. Agents may 
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be tied agents with no power of representation and tied agents with powers of 
representation of the insurance company. Different types of Spanish insurance 
intermediaries are reported in Table 3.6. 
Table: 3.6 
S . h I I d" spams nsurance nterme lanes 
Channel Number 
Tied Agents 19000 
Agency Employees 
& Sub Agents 70000 
Brokers 4700 
CAP A Conseil, Paris, 1993 
The Netherlands: 
Netherlands was the first country in Europe, which introduced legislation in 1952 for 
the insurance intermediaries. This law was replaced with amendments in 1991 as the 
Insurance Intermediaries Act 1991. In Dutch law, there are two types of intermediaries 
for distributing insurance. These are (i). Independent intermediaries, and (ii). Tied 
agents, acting pursuant to an agency agreement with particular insurance company. 
There are few tied agents, and most of the intermediaries are independent. One 
unusual thing for the Dutch intermediaries is that, in Netherlands, the intermediaries 
with the highest professional qualifications are sworn in by the district court, and they 
are then entitled to use the title 'makelaar'. Another interesting thing is that the 
Netherlands has 'Insurance Exchange Market' like a stock exchange market. In 
Amsterdam and Rotterdam the 'Makelaars', underwriting agents and/or companies 
meet there to conduct insurance business. Different types of Dutch insurance 
intermediaries are reported in Table 3.7. 
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Table: 3.7 
Dutch insurance Intermediaries 
Channel Number 
Tied Agents 18998 
Agency Employees 5684 
Trainee Agents 878 
Brokers 4268 
CAP A Consell, Pans, 1993 
Belgium: 
According to domestic law, there are two types of intermediaries in Belgium. These 
are (i.) Agents; and (ii.) Insurance writers. Insurance companies and insurance 
investigators employ agents. Insurance writers are not appointed as agents or 
investigators, They are independent and manage their own portfolios. These insurance 
writers are of two types. This two are (ii.a.) Brokers; and (ii.b.) Agents. Different 
types of Belgian insurance intermediaries are reported in Table 3.8. 
Table: 3.8 
B I' I d' . elglum nsurance mterme lanes 
Channel Number 
Full time Independent 12000 
Intermediaries of which 6000 
brokers (app) 
Part time Intermediaries 12000 
Employed Salesman 2500 
Staff Working for Brokers 10000 
CAP A CODsed, Pans, 1993 
Denmark: 
There is no specific legislation for insurance intermediaries in Denmark. Just the 
general Danish law about marketing practices, accounts and companies etc. which 
applies equally to insurance intermediaries. But the professional Danish brokers 
association, which is a member of the BIPAR, which works on a voluntary 
membership basis, has laid down some rules for professional development. In 
domestic law and commercial practice in Denmark the following types insurance 
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intennediaries exist. (i.) Insurance Brokers on Commercial line, (ii.) Insurance 
Brokers on Non-commercial line, (iii.) Lloyds Brokers, (iv.) Insurance Advisers, (v.) 
Insurance Agents, (vi.) Sub-agents, and (vii.) General Insurance Agents. 
Brokers on commercial line business are mostly members of the Danish Association 
of Insurance Brokers. These brokers are independent and act for the insured. They 
chose freely among the insurance companies in arranging cover for various risks for 
their clients. But they receive commission from the insurance companies. Brokers on 
non-commercial line business are often lawyers or accountants who acts on behalf of 
their clients in order to arrange insurance coverage. Section 220(2) of the Act on 
Insurance Business allows certain numbers of Lloyds Brokers to assist in placing 
Danish non-life risks outside Denmark. Insurance Advisers advice their clients to 
cover the risks according to their clients need. They receive payment from their clients 
and maintain their independence from the insurance companies. Insurance agents on 
the other hand are employed by insurance companies or have an agency agreement 
with an insurance company. These agents are dominant in Denmark for insurance 
distribution. They some times employ other persons to act as sub agents on their 
behalf who are authorised by their insurance company. These agents are called Direct 
Sales Force. 
Table: 3.9 
Danish Insurance intermediaries 
Channel Number 
Direct Sales Force 2500 
Brokers 200 
CAP A Consell, Pans, 1993 
In the above sections, different types of insurance intennediaries have been discussed 
from the different European countries' context. In the following section, we will 
discuss different insurance intennediaries on the basis of the EC Directives. 
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3.3.1. THE EC DIRECTIVES ON INSURANCE INTERMEDIARIES 
The EC has a directive with regard to insurance agents and brokers. This is The 
Council Directive on Insurance Agents and Brokers (77/92IEEC). It offers another 
recommendation on msurance intermediaries. This IS The Commission 
Recommendation on Insurance intermediaries (92/48IEEC). Before this some member 
states had no legislation for intermediaries and some members had legislation for 
intermediaries. The Netherlands was the first to introduce legislation on 
intermediaries in 1952. France started to regulate from 1966 and later on Belgium. On 
the other hand, the UK, Denmark, Germany did not have any legislation for 
intermediaries. The UK introduced legislation in 1977 named the Insurance Brokers 
(Registration) Act 1977. 
The Directive (77/92IEEC) notified three types of insurance intermediaries. This is in 
Article 2.1 a to c. The three types of intermediaries are (i.) Insurance and reinsurance 
brokers; (ii.) Insurance agents; (iii.) Sub-agents. The article also defmed all of these 
intermediaries. 
(i.) Insurance and reinsurance brokers: 
These types of intermediaries are defined as 'professional activities of persons who, 
acting with complete freedom as to their choice of undertaking, bringing together, 
with a view to the insurance or reinsurance of risks, persons seeking insurance or 
reinsurance and insurance or reinsurance undertakings, carry out work preparatory to 
the conclusion of contracts of insurance or reinsurance and, where appropriate, assist 
in the administration and performance of such contracts, in particular in the event of a 
claim' [Article 2.1 (a)]. 
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(ii.) Insurance agents: 
These types of intermediaries are defined as 'professional activities of persons 
instructed under one or more contracts or empowered to act in the name of or on 
behalf of, or solely on behalf of, one or more insurance undertakings in introducing, 
proposing and carrying out work preparatory to the conclusion of, or in concluding 
contracts of insurance, or in assisting in the administration and performance of such 
contracts, in particular in the event of a claim' [Article 2.1 (b)]. 
(iii.) Sub-Agents: 
These types of intermediaries are defined as ' activities of persons other than those 
referred to in (a) and (b) who, acting on behalf of such persons, among other things 
carry out introductory work, introduce insurance contracts or collect premiums, 
provided that no insurance commitments towards or on the part of the public are given 
as part of these operations' [Article 2.1 (c)]. The article 2.2 (a) (b) (c) gave the likely 
domestic member countries comparisons of titles of the above-classified insurance 
intermediaries. 
There is a special condition in addition to the general for all to be fulfilled by the 
intermediaries categorised in 2.1 (a) in Netherlands [Article 5.2. 77/92IEEC]. These 
conditions are-
o where the beneficiary wishes to work as a 'makelaar', he must have carried on the 
activities concerned in a business where he was in charge of at least ten employees; 
o where the beneficiary wishes to work as an 'assurantiebezorger', he must have 
carried on the activities concerned in a business where he was in charge of at least 
five employees; 
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o Where the beneficiary wishes to work as an 'erkend assurantieagent', he must have 
carried on the activities concerned in a business where he was in charge of at least 
two employees. 
In the 1977 Directive, insurance brokers are defined as persons 'acting with complete 
freedom as to their choice of undertaking [Article 2.1 (a)]. Although the directive did 
not suggest any method by which brokers' independence can be assessed, the 
Recommendation imposes a duty on brokers to disclose their connection with 
insurance companies. 'The person defined in Article 2.1.(a) of the Directive 
77/921EEC shall disclose: 
o To persons seeking insurance or reinsurance of risks, any direct legal or economic 
ties to an insurance undertaking or any shareholdings in or by such undertakings 
which could affect the complete freedom of choice of insurance undertaking, and 
o To a competent body, as determined by the Member State, the spread of business 
with different insurance undertakings over the previous year.' 
The recommendation provides that all intermediaries should secure and maintain a 
minimum level of professional competence. It may pose problems for part-time 
agents. It also causes a problem for banks, building societies and other retail financial 
outlets whose involvement are increasing day by day. This problem is compounded by 
virtue of the broad range of persons mediating in insurance, all of them are now 
covered by the recommendation. The titles of different intermediaries in different 
European countries are reported in Table 3.10. 
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Table: 3.10 
Title of intermediaries in different EC Member States 
Country Insurance and Reinsurance Agents 
Brokers Sub-Agents 
Belgium -Courtier d'assurance -Agent d'assurance, -So us-agent, 
Verzekeringsmakelaar , -Verzekeringsagent; -Sub-agent; 
-Courtier de reassurance 
Herverzekeringsmakelaar 
Denmark -Juridiske og fysiske personer, som -F orsikringsagent; -Underagent; 
driver selvstaendig virksomhed som 
formidler ved afsaetning af 
forsikringskontrakter 
Germany -V ersicherungsmakler, -Versicherungsvertreter; -
-Ruckversicherungsmakler; Gelegenheitsv 
ermittler, 
-Inkassant; 
France -Courtier d' assurance, -Agent general -Mandataire, 
-Courtier d'assurance maritime, d'assurance; 
-
-Courtier de reassurance; Intermediaire, 
-Sous-agent; 
Ireland -insurance broker, -Agent; -Sub-agent; 
-Reinsurance broker; 
Italy -Mediatore di assicurizioni, -Agente di assicurazioni; -Subagente; 
-Mediatore di riassicurazioni; 
Netherlands -Makelaar, --Gevolmachtig agent, -Sub-agent; 
-Assuratiebezorger, -Verzekeringsagent; 
-Erkend assurantieagent, 
-Verzekeringsagent; 
U8K -Insurance broker; -Agent; -Sub-agent; 
Spain -Agentes libres de seguros, -Agentes afectos de -Subagentes 
-Corredores de reaseguro; seguros; de seguros; 
Portugal -Corretor de seguros, -Agente de seguros; 
-
-Corretor de resseguros; Submediador; 
Source: Insurance IntermedIaries m the EEC, Lloyds of London Press 1992 
3.3.2. DEVELOPMENT OF NEW DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS IN EUROPE 
The distribution network for insurance companies and banks are continuously 
changing. In addition to traditional channels, the insurance companies currently rely 
on banks' channels for insurance distribution, and banks, to a lesser extent, rely on 
insurance distribution channel for banks' products. One is called 'bancassurance 
channel' and the other is called 'assurancebank channel'. Due to the rise of these two 
channels, the traditional channels of insurance distribution, like the brokers, agents 
etc, are declining rapidly (discussed in Chapter four). On the other hand, traditional 
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banks channel like the bank branch network, is also declining. In both cases, the 
reduction of distribution costs is a prime objective. For this reason, the traditional 
insurance distributors are facing a serious threat due to the banks' rapid expansion to 
insurance distribution, and the banks' employees are losing their jobs due to the rapid 
closure of bank branches. Some banks and insurance companies have gone one step 
further. Sophisticated IT has made life easier, and they, therefore, have introduced 
another new channel of distribution, which is referred as 'Direct Channel'. Although 
these channels are relatively new, they are getting rapidly stronger. We will discuss 
these channels in the following sections. 
i. Direct Channel: 
Direct marketing channel 10 insurance is growing faster day by day in Europe. 
Through this channel customers can take stand by products over the telephone. It can 
be done through direct mail, telephone sale, company sales staffs or company agents. 
No intennediaries are involved here. This is to cut the commission cost. This is the 
alternative tool of insurers to compete with the bankers in insurance distribution. 
Major UK insurers have now direct line approach as an extra channel. Some banks are 
also approaching this strategy to minimise the cost. The launch by the Royal Bank of 
Scotland's Direct Line into the UK financial services, especially in the motor 
insurance market in 1984, heralded the beginning of a new era in financial service 
distribution. The customer proposition, delivered through a Telephone Call Centre, 
was a combination of very competitive prices and a superior service standard. The 
Direct Line was an immediate success, and this success led to the Midland Bank 
entering the direct banking market with the launch of First Direct in 1989. Currently, a 
number of banks as well as insurance companies have introduced this channel of 
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distribution for banking and insurance products. Some of the direct marketing 
(banking) outlets of European insurance companies are shown in Table 3.11. 
Table: 3.11 
I nsurance companIes m te e mg I bank· 
Insurer Tele Banking Established 
Allied Dunbar Assurance Allied Dunbar 1994 
Mortgage 
Churchill Churchill Direct 1989 
Colonial Mutual Colonial Direct 1995 
Insurance Club Insurance club 1995 
Preferred Assurance CO Preferred Direct 1982 
Prudential Prudential Direct 1994 
Sun Alliance Sun Bank 1989 
Scottish Widows Scottishwidow Bank 1995 
Trygg-Hansa Aktsam 1990 
AXA AXADirect 1992 
Generali Genertel 1994 
Maprre Mares 1996 
AGF Poseidon (Greece) 1994 
Zurich Insurance Group Zuritel 1994 
General Accident GA Vox (France) 1991 
GRE Guardian Direct 1995 
Source: own compJiation from various sources 
ii. 'Baneassuranee' and' Assuraneebank' channels: 
'Bancassurers' are the new entrants in the insurance distribution channel. 
Bancassurers are those who distributes insurance through their bank branch network 
to its existing customers. They are rising rapidly in Europe. In France, the distribution 
of insurance by banks count for more than 50% of the total distribution market. In 
other European countries, the market share of banks is 15-30%. Major commercial 
banks and building societies in Europe now have linked up with insurance distribution 
either with their own insurance underwriting companies or with traditional insurers in 
a form of strategic alliance or both. Details are discussed in chapter two. The 
assurancebank' channel is also growing to a lesser extent. Assurancebank is a term 
where the banking products are sold by the insurance companies. With this channel, 
the insurers can provide banking products as well as insurance products directly to the 
consumers. 
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3.4. ASSURANCEBANK AND ITS DIFFERENCE FROM BANCASSURANCE 
AND ALLFINANZ 
When insurance products are produced and/or sold through bank's country wide 
branch network, this is called bancassurance. But when banking products are 
produced and/or sold through insurance companies, this is called assurance bank 
(discussed In chapter two). Unfortunately, most writers mention both as 
bancassurance. There IS a clear difference between bancassurance and 
assurance bank. 
Table: 3.12 
Bancassurance vs Assurancebank vs Allfinanz model 
Bancassurance model Assurancebank model Allfinanz model 
Banks as principal yes Insurance Co as principal Yes Banks as principal 
Insurance Co as principal No Banks as principal No Insurance Co as principal 
Banks parent with Insurance CO parent with bank- Banks parent with insurance 
insurance -
- subsidiary yes -subsidiary Yes -subsidiary 
-
strategic alliance for yes -strategic alliance for joint sales Yes -strategic alliance for joint sales 
joint sales 
-joint venture yes -joint venture Yes -joint venture 
- majority/minority equity No -majority/minority equity holding No -majority/minority eqUity holding 
holding only but not engage in banking only but not engage in insurance 
only but not engage in directly or indirectly. directly or indirectly 
insurance 
directly or indirectly 
Banks parent with Insurance CO parent with Banks parent with 
-life assurance distribution yes -commercial banking Yes -life assurance distribution 
-life assurance yes -investment banking Yes -life assurance underwriting 
underwriting 
-general insurance yes -building societies Yes -general insurance distribution 
distribution 
-general insurance yes -tele banking Yes -general insurance underwriting 
underwriting 
-life and general both yes - -life and general both distribution 
distribution and and underwriting 
underwriting 
-securities dealing No -securities dealing No -securities dealing 
-industrial assurance No 
-reinsurance co No -reinsurance co No 
Bank Holdine CO with Insurance Holding CO with Bank HoldinK CO with 
-autonomous insurance yes -autonomous banking Yes -autonomous insurance 
management within the management within the group management within the group 
group 
Building Societies with yes Insurance CO with Building Yes Banks with Building Societies 
insurance business Societies 
Savings bank in insurance yes Yes Savings bank in insurance 
Bank's insurance No Insurance co's banking No Bank's insurance subsidiary's 
subsidiaries' banking subsidiary's insurance subsidiary banking subsidiary 
subsidiary 
French word UK origin yes German word German origin and 
European based German based 
Source: own compilatIOn 
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Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Not only that, some authors think bancassurance and allfinanz is the same. But 
allfinanz includes securities dealing, whereas bancassurance does not include 
securities dealing. We, therefore, have drawn a comparative model of 'Bancassurance', 
'Assurancebank' and 'Allfinanz' in Table 3.12. 
3.5. RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN INSURANCE BUSINESS 
Like the banks, European insurance companies also facing heavy competition due to 
implementation of the 'single licence' for insurance within the Member Countries 
[Hardwick (1997)] and the banks direct involvement in insurance business [Dickinson 
(1997)]. Therefore, the insurance companies are also trying to become involved in 
banking activities. A study by the Committee de European Assurance (1994) also 
shows a number of financial conglomerates (Appendix X). But the study did not 
provide information as to which insurance companies have diversified and what they 
are. 
The insurance companies entry into banking business start quite recently, mainly in 
mid nineties and, therefore, at this stage it is very difficult to conduct a thorough study 
and their impact. As a starting point in order to create a database for future analysis, 
we investigate which are the insurance companies in Europe who have entered into 
banking business? And what are they? We took the top 100 European insurance 
companies from to 'Top 15000 European'. We than start searching manually as to 
which insurance companies have diversified into banking through press clippings, 
companies annual reports etc. The result of this investigation is shown in Table 3.13. 
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Table: 3.13 
European msurance compames banking subsidiaries, 1996 
Insurance Groups 
Allied Dunber Assurance 
Commercial Union 
L10yds Abbey Life 
Scottish Widows Fund & Life 
Standard Life 
Corp Mapfre Cia international de 
Recsoyuros 
Achmea Holding 
Aegon 
Assurantieconcern Stad 
Rotterdam anno 
INA 
Riunione Adriatica de Sicurta 
AGF 
AXAGroup 
GAN Group 
GrovpamaSA 
UAP 
Aim. Brand af 
AlS Forsikrinl!;sselskabet Coden 
P&V Assuranees Ste Co-op 
Royale Bell!;e 
Allied Dunber 
Commercial Union 
Legal & General 
Norwich Union Assurance Grou 
Top 100 Banking subsidiaries 
1991 
33 Allied Dunber Bank PLC 
13 
24 
x 
6 
x 
x 
5 
x 
41 
45 
8 
4 
78 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
68 
33 
13 
to 
7 
Allied Dunber Bank International 
Ltd 
Delta Lloyd Bank 
Lloyds Bank 
Scottish Widows Bank PLC 
Bank of Scotland 
Banca Mapfre 
Achmea Bankholdings, 
Staal Bankiers 
Spaarbelg Bank, FGH Bank 
SR-Bank 
Banca Marino SpA 
Rasbank SpA 
BanQue du Phenix 
AXABanQue 
Banque pour I'indushrie Francaise, 
Union industrielle de Credit 
BanQue Financiere Groupona 
Banque UAP, Banque Worms, 
BNP 
Banque IPPA 
AIm. Brand Bank 
Coden Bank 
Banque Nagelmackers 
BanqueIppa 
Allied Dunber Mortgage Ltd 
CU Financial Holdings 
Legal & General Finance PLC 
Legal & General Mortgage Ltd 
General Practice Finance 
Corporation 
Prudential Corp I Prudential Financial Services Ltd 
Royal Sun Alliance Group 6· 
Scottish Amicable Life Nla 
Assurance Society 
Alieanza Assicurazioni x 
La Fondiaria 47 
Skandia Insurance Co 32 
Trygg-Hansa AB 49 
INGGroup 2 
Hafnia Nla 
Topsikring x 
Tryg-Baltica Group N/a 
Forties N/a 
Aachener & Muenchener x 
Athena x 
Sun Alliance Investment Mgt Ltd 
Scottish Amicable Finance Ltd 
Banca Ambrosiano Veneto 
Mediobanca 
Skandia Banken 
Skandiabanke Fondkomission 
Trygg-Banken, Trygg-Hansais 
INGBank 
Hafnia Services 
Top Dank, Top Center Bank 
Den Danske Bank,Baltica Bank 
(1987) 
Hambros (UK) 
Spaarbank Breukelin 
Metropoliton Bank 
VSB Bank, ASLK-CGER Bank 
Bank fuer Gemeinwirtschaft (IV) 
Athena-BanQue 
Source: own compilatIOn from vanous sources 
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Area of 
Operation 
Netherlands 
Channel 
Island 
UK 
Spain 
Spain 
Netherlands 
Netherlands 
Italy 
Italy 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
Denmark 
Denmark 
Belgium 
Belgium 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
Italy 
Italy 
Sweden 
Sweden 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
Denmark 
Denmark 
Belgium 
Germany 
Equity 
100% 
99.7% 
100% 
100% 
34.8% 
100% 
92% 
99.99% 
100% 
80.87% 
65% 
100% 
96% 
98% 
97% 
75% 
14.34% 
48.57% 
100% 
nla 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100010 
100% 
100% 
16.02% 
15% 
100% 
nla 
100% 
100% 
100% 
10% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
From Table 3.13, it is seen that that among Europe's largest 100 insurance groups, 
only a small number of them have entered into banking business, and these banks 
offer very few banking products such as mortgage and loan. The insurance companies 
commonly used products and their mortgages and loan value are shown in the Table 
3.14 and 3.15 respectively. 
Table: 3.14 
mg pro ucts range SUpPJ Ie ~msurers Bank' d r db . 
BankinS! products Suppliers Comments 
Current accounts, cheque Larger insurers through 
-
books etc. separate subsidiaries 
Mortgages Most insurers 
-
Credit/debit cards Few insurers AGF's Dianars Club card 
Loan Most insurers -
Investment Most insurers 
-
Annuity Almost all insurers -
Unit trusts Most insurers -
Securities dealing Larger insurers 
-
Foreign exchange dealing Larger insurers -
Source: own compIlation 
Table: 3.15 
Insurance companies mortgages and loans value (local currenm 1995 
Country Mortgages loan Loans other than mOJ1gages 
Belgium 202181 19477 
Denmark 5026 2373 
France N/A 56922 
Germany 112686 399001 
Italy 2042200 N/A 
Netherlands 39256· 93895· 
Portugal 954 564 
Spain 44024·· 4845 
Sweden 11993·" 32577 
Switzerland 27292 26479 
UK 3482···· 6121 
• = 1994 figure, •• = 1989 figure, ... = 1990 figure, .... = 1988 figure 
Source: Insurance statistics year book 1988-1995 & OECD 1997 
We have shown in Chapter two that the banks in Europe are engaged in insurance 
business. They are permitted not only to engage in insurance distribution but also in the 
core insurance activities, i.e. underwriting of insurance. This is a serious threat for 
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insurance companies. Earlier when banks started distribution of insurance, insurance 
companies used to underwrite the insurance and banks used to distribute these 
insurance products through their banks branch network. In this way, they had a 
principal-agent relationship, insurance companies as principal and the banks as agent. 
Such an agency relationship between the insurance companies and banks was a threat to 
traditional insurance intermediaries as these banks used to compete directly with the 
traditional insurance intermediaries in the intermediaries market. The insurance 
companies, by employing banks as insurance intermediaries, used to get an extra strong 
channel for distribution of insurance in addition to their traditional channel. 
Soon afterwards, when the banks realised that insurance business is a good prospect for 
them, they started to think about it. As they had now learnt the 'know how' of 
distribution of insurance, they started withdrawing support for distribution from 
traditional insurance companies. Instead, they established their own underwriting 
insurance ventures and distributed their own underwriting products through their own 
bank branch network. Therefore, the insurance companies not only lost their strong 
distribution channel but also directly faced competition from the banks. This time not 
the intermediaries but the underwriters face a serious threat from banks. 
In this situation, the insurance companies have three options: 1. Do nothing; 2. Improve 
existing services possibly with reduced price; 3. Counter respond. If the insurance 
companies do nothing, they will lose their market ultimately. The second option is to 
improve existing services. Diacon (1990c), Press Kit (1991) mentioned some of the 
following key factors as necessary in order to improve services: (i.) Quality of service; 
(ii.) Technological development; (iii.) Effective distribution and marketing; (iv.) 
appointment of good investment expertise, (v.) Innovation of products but not 
duplication or copying of products; (vi.) Lower pricing and higher quality of products in 
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the products line; and, (vii.) Advertisement of service quality, products and pricing. All 
these factors are very important and desirable but not enough within this competitive 
environment for insurance companies. Further more, one-third of customers now 
prefers everything under one roof [Swiss Re (1992)]. However, in this circumstances, 
Dickinson & Dinenis (1992) suggested the following:- discourage any initial predatory 
pricing; develop alternative distribution channels; increase of corporate image through 
advertise etc.; improve the size and quality of direct sales forces; support services to 
agents and brokers like laptop, training etc.; and finally a counter reaction, i.e. to 
acquire banks by insurance companies. 
Dickinson & Dinenis (1992) further suggested that 'Insurance companies would adopt 
strategies which were conditioned by the strategies of banks, since the banks would be 
the prime mover in the game'. They suggested that if banks are less aggressive in 
nature, Le. short-term maximising position, then insurance companies would tend to 
adopt a more passive strategy and may even seek to encourage the strategy in this 
direction. If the banks were to adopt a more aggressive, predatory strategy, then the 
insurance companies would react more positively. 
Currently we see that the banks are more aggressive in nature. In this situation, how 
insurance companies should respond? A simple answer is to acquire banks by insurance 
companies. This is in our opinion is 'assurancebank' (defined earlier in this Chapter). 
The lNG, one of the leading providers of insurance products in Europe has already 
adopted this strategy (Figure 3.1). From the corporate structure of the ING (Figure 3.1), 
it is seen that the lNG, in addition to its life assurance and general insurance business, 
has diversified into banking and investment business activities through different 
subsidiaries. 
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Figure: 3.1 
Corporate Structure of the INO Group 
lNG Group 
I 
I I 
ING Insurance INGBank 
Life ING Rank 
Non-life Posthank 
Investment Specials 
In 1997, the ING's total net income was 1.8396 billion Euro and in the same year it 
earned 1.2579 billion Euro from banking operation (Graph 3.2). It appears that the 
ING is doing well in its banking operation and, therefore, other competitors may be 
interested in assurancebank because ofINO's success. Other large insurance groups in 
Europe, such as Prudential , Aegon, etc have already moved in this direction (Table 
3.4), although the largest European insurance group, the Allianz has stated not to 
become involved in banking, 
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Graph: 3.2 
lNG's Income 1997-1993 
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mainly due to the potential increases of risks and decreases of profitability. We will 
test this issue empirically, i.e. the risks and return effects of diversification of 
insurance companies into banking, in Chapter six. However, the insurance companies 
that have already entered in banking business, are still struggling (for instance, the 
ING Group) in integrating the services at operational level. There needs to be more 
integrated corporate structure along with a shopesticated high tech IT network to 
deliver the financial products. We, therefore, propose an integrated model of 
'assurancebank' in order to overcome such problems. 
3.6. A SIMPLE MODEL OF ASSURANCEBANK 
3.6.1. THE MODEL 
We imagine 'X' a medium size life assurance company (it can be general insurance or 
composite insurance company). Due to the entry of commercial banks and building 
societies into life assurance distribution as well as underwriting activities, it is losing 
its market share. The direct competition in distribution as well as in underwriting with 
banks and at the same time, the withdrawal of strategic alliance support of banks 
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from insurance companies, have threatened them heavily. The existing clients are also 
moving slowly towards banks because of the changing habits of customers. They want 
all of their financial products from a single source l . Since the regulators removed the 
regulatory barriers between banking and insurance, banks have extended a range of 
financial products. Therefore, a customer can buy from hislher bank all the banking 
products, i.e. accounts, cheque book, loan, overdraft facilities, and direct debit as well 
as all the insurance products, i.e. life assurance, pension, household insurance, 
mortgage insurance, motor insurance, credit insurance, and above all the investment 
products. 
Mr. 'A', a customer of the insurance company 'X', has a life policy worth 75 thousand 
pounds. This life policy will have a policy number like traditional policy number. This 
number will be the key between Mr. A and the company X. Mr. A has a regular 
income (monthly, for instance) which currently goes to his traditional bank account. 
The annual gross income of Mr. A is 25 thousands pounds. He has a credit card and 
the credit limit is 4000 pounds. His bank has given him Over Draft facilities (OD). He 
wants to buy a house with 95% mortgage. He was preparing to apply to a building 
society for a mortgage. His bank manager, knowing that, proposed to him to apply for 
a mortgage in the bank. Mr. A has a motor car that is insured through a local insurance 
broker. The annual premium is 400 pounds. He goes for holiday every year and takes 
holiday insurance. The average premium is 75 pounds. He also pays 20 pounds 
premiums for his card protection insurance. Mr. A has some direct debits. These are 
for electricity bill, gas bill, water bill, council tax bill and a telephone bill. This goes 
from his bank through direct debit mandates. 
I A recent study supports this argument ['Life assurance Marketing' Swiss Re 1993]. 
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Now, Mr. A is planning to switch off his life policy and going to join with his bank to 
take a similar insurance. Can the insurance company 'X' give similar facilities to Mr. 
A? Ifit can, he may stay with the company X. 
Yes, X insurance company can by adopting this model. 
The policy account will be used as if it is also a bank and credit card account. A 
mortgage will be offered to Mr. A as he wants to buy a house. As his gross salary is 25 
thousands pounds he can borrow up to 75 thousands pounds, according to (UK) 
normal mortgage custom or more, i.e. 95% mortgage. The mortgage indemnity 
insurance will be taken against this mortgage like other banks and building societies 
do. A life protection cover will be given to Mr. A against the mortgage amount. A 
building insurance will also be given for the property being purchased by Mr. A. 
He will be given a credit/debit card depending on his financial strength and the 
number of years he is running the life policy like other bankers, where they require 
certain amount of credit scoring. As regular money comes to this life account, all the 
direct debits will be honoured as long as there is sufficient amount of money, 
including the credit zone limit like other traditional bankers. Mr. A may get OD 
facilities against his regular salary, and/or he may get it after two or three years of 
running the policy against his insurance policy. Since a life fund is created from his 
life policy which is traditionally invested somewhere else, now simply by switching 
off the traditional investment method and area, this life fund can be just invested to 
Mr. A as an investment if slhe requires any loan, and thus, get the interest from 
himlher instead of other investors. There might be government restrictions to invest in 
such ways but some of the funds at least can be invested. 
A motor cover can be arranged within the group if it is a composite company, or if it 
has a separate general insurance company, or if not, company X can make a strategic 
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alliance with one. As a large number of business volumes will pass through the 
company X, X will get special commission rate compared to the traditional broker's 
rate. The company X then can supply this relatively cheaply to its client to make sure 
the price is relatively lower or at least equivalent in the market. Similar arrangements 
may be made for his household, and holiday insurance. A plastic card, debit or credit 
card, will be given with the policy number, which will be used as account number for 
all these products, including as a card number. When customer A has any inquiry he 
will simply show his magnetic stripe plastic card or if over the telephone, simply 
quote his policy number (which is also account number). One account number may be 
caused problem for a series of financial products, i.e. banking as well as insurance, 
which he has already taken from the company X. The simple solution for this is, after 
having the account number, counter will simply ask for the policy number. In some 
cases, staff may ask further identity like date of birth etc, similar to traditional bankers 
when any body ask for an inquiry over the phone. When the staff confirmed the 
identity of the client then he can ask for what the query is. Alphabetical symbol can be 
used for each product in order to simplify the catalogue of the products that Mr. A has 
already taken out from the company. For life assurance L or for motor insurance M, or 
cheque book C, credit card for K or direct debit DB and if DB for telephone then 
DB.T, for gas bill DB.G, if instead of DB, the client uses cheque book, then C.T for 
telephone bill etc. In case of incoming money, just the policy number will be used, 
similar to traditional bank account number. For out going of money including 
withdrawal of cash by the client from the A TM, this single account can be used (Table 
3.17). For cash withdrawal this is important. ATM will be connected with a main 
computer like the traditional ATM. The company X can set up its own ATM in its 
branches and agency offices as well as links with traditional A TM network, so that, 
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Mr A can withdraw money easily whenever he needs subject to availability of funds or 
credit zone limit. Now in the following Table (3.16) we can classified all the products 
taken by Mr. A. 
Table: 3.16 
d Pro ucts range to e covere )y b db th e assurance 
Banking type Investment Life insure. type 
type 
Current account Savings account Pure life cover 
Cheque book Pension Life and savings 
cover 
Plastic card PEPs Linked life 
Direct debit Other savings Accident & health 
Deposit taking Annuity Mortgage indemnity 
Personal loan Share dealing 
Money transmission 
(internal & external)2 
Figure: 3.2 Assurancebank model 
Figure 
CUSTOMER BASE 
Specialist gro up 
Central computer 
" ;, 
Investment 
Assurancebank model 
bnk a 
Gn. Insurance type 
Household insurance 
Building insurance 
Content insurance 
Motor insurance 
Travel insurance 
Credit insurance 
Card protection 
Direct 
marketing 
2 For internal like commany's own products, i.e. monthly mortgage payment, insurance premium etc. 
and external payment like telephone bill , gas bill, council tax bill etc. either via Direct Debit or Cheque 
or phone banking. 
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Life type, investment type, banking type, and general insurance types of products will 
be underwritten in separate sections but all will have direct links with each other for 
harmonisation of products and for the protection of duplication and conflicts of 
products. After designing and approval of each of the products, these will then be 
transmitted to the central computer (Figure 3.2). The central computer will play an 
important role. This central computer will be connected with the front office as well 
as Direct Marketing (DM) section so that both can down load products as necessary 
and to the requirements of customers. The DM will be used like current DM system, 
i.e. direct sale of products over the telephone or in some cases referred to front 
specialist office group. 
The front office will usually have two groups, namely ordinary and specialist. The 
ordinary groups will deal all sorts of financial dealing like bank branch. If specialist 
advice is necessary the matter will be referred to specialist group who will be very 
easy to access almost stand by. The front office may be insurance companies' own 
banking branch or agency or brokerage office. But emphasise will be given to DM. 
For further details, please see the organisation chart in Figure 3.3. 
3.6.2. PRODUCTS TO BE COVERED BY THE MODEL 
3.6.2.1. LiFE ASSURANCE TYPE PRODUCTS 
(a) Life assurance: 
Just a pure life cover can be given as if this firm is a traditional life insurer. This life 
office may design life policy in such a way that it can give to customer the benefit of 
protection and at the same time saving. Thus, that the customer instead of being 
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interested in just traditional savings, can be interested in this product which will give 
both the benefits to the customer. 
(b) Linked life: 
Linked life cover can also be given to a customer. If customer qualifies for a mortgage 
product which is also life company's own product, can be given life 
coverage/indemnity against the mortgage value to this customer. The property for 
which the mortgage is sanctioned can also be given coverage with a building 
insurance. This building insurance policy can be the company's own or they can act as 
an intermediary for this building insurance. At the same time content insurance or 
household insurance cover can be given for the house being mortgaged with the 
company. So that this company is selling five (mortgage, mortgage indemnity, life, 
household, building insurance products) products at the same time with the same 
person to a same person. Scale and scope economies should exist in this case. 
Accident and health insurance can also be sold in this way. 
3.6.2.2. INVESTMENT TYPE PRODUCTS 
(a) Pension product: 
Since traditionally the insurance company 'X' as a life company, will have experience 
in selling pension products as a combination of coverage, it should minimise its 
administration cost and should sell relatively cheaply in the market. As the 
salaries/wages come to this firm, it is easy to chase the customer for pension. In this 
case, the firm will create a database for prospective persons' for pension products. 
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This data base will be created from the data already held the central computer on age, 
job type, whether the customer's employer run a pension scheme and whether it is 
adequate for the customer, sex, etc. Care should be taken that the customer is not 
forced if it is not necessary for him and if customer does not want it. 
(b) The PEPs: 
Insurance companies are now familiar with selling PEPs. So, this product will be 
distributed in the existing way or if necessary like pension method way mentioned 
above. 
Similarly, annuity, and share dealing can also be introduced through this investment 
sub channel. 
3.6.2.3. GENERAL INSURANCE TYPE PRODUCTS 
(a) Motor insurance: 
A significant number of households have motor car. Third party insurance is 
compulsory. So to the same person who has taken mortgage, life assurance etc. can be 
offered motor insurance. As most of the underwriting information is held for previous 
products it is easy to sell motor products over the phone. If this company or any of its 
group do not underwrite motor insurance, they still can act as an intermediary with 
minimum commission or in some cases without commission at all in order to not to 
say 'no' to a customer. Thus. customer can be satisfied. Though it does not sound nice 
as a trader, it should be remembered that the company should satisfy the customer to 
retain him as the customer giving money to the company for different related 
products. 
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(b) Travel insurance: 
Travel insurance can be sold in a similar way. But some holiday companies require 
their own products or a product that of a similar standard to that holiday company. In 
this case, the company can standardise the product to be similar to that of the holiday 
company's insurance products. It even can set pre arrangements such that if a 
customer comes and shows their proof, this will be accepted, as most holiday 
company keep the options that if you can bring similar products they will not charge 
for insurance. 
In the same way, mortgage indemnity insurance, building insurance, household 
insurance, credit insurance, and personal loan and card protection insurance can be 
designed and introduced to the production line. 
3.6.2.4. BANKING TYPE PRODUCTS 
(1) Current account and cheque book: 
This is important for assurancebank. If the customer has already taken a life or a 
mortgage etc. products, he will be offered a bank account number for banking 
activities. This account will receive his wages/salary etc. It can be the other way round 
if the customer has already opened an account and requires further services like 
mortgage etc. He will be given a cheque book so that he does not need to go to a 
traditional banks to do banking. This cheque will be of similar standard to the current 
banking chequebooks. Through this chequebook the customer can write cheques to 
others according to his need. The customer should confirm that he has sufficient fund 
to clear the cheque, other wise the cheque will not be honoured. This is same as in 
case of traditional bankers. The only difference is if the customer have opened a life 
policy, as long as he run the policy the firm will not charge the cheque return fee. If 
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the customer has not taken the life policy, a small charge can be taken but must be 
significantly lower than the traditional insurer. Putting the condition (mandatory) of 
life assurance is that the firm will be able to sell an extra life insurance. The customer 
will buy this policy thinking that as I will not pay the cheque return fee, instead I will 
pay a small amount of premium for my life cover. Not only that if the customer take a 
life policy or a mortgage and his salary should come regularly to the firm from his 
employer, he will be given free banking facilities. Currently traditional banks give free 
banking facilities if the customer do not overdrawn. Other services should also be free 
like as direct debit for paying gas bill, electricity bill, telephone bill etc, but the finn 
will pay the bill only if there is sufficient funds including pre arranged credit zone 
limit (if the customer is qualify for credit zone limit. The qualification measure may 
be the similar of traditional banks). 
(b) Mortgage: 
This product was offered traditionally by the building societies. Later on banks were 
allowed to offer mortgage (for instance Barclays). Lately insurance companies have 
also become involved in offering mortgage products (for instance, General Accident). 
Insurance company X can offer this mortgage. As the big insurers have already in the 
market and now have already learnt the 'know how', this will be easier for them to 
extend. If the customer is not the customer of the current company and has applied for 
a mortgage, he can be given the mortgage subject to qualification. He can (at the same 
time with mortgage offer or after giving the mortgage) be offered other services like 
bank account, chequebook, insurance cover etc. Once he has been captured by any of 
the major products, other products also can be sold to him as he needs these products 
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and he will take these if he has not already taken these products from some where 
else. 
c) Deposits: 
To qualify to take deposits from the public, an insurance company needs authorisation 
from the authority to do banking activities. The requirement of minimum capital is no 
problem for large insurance companies. The requirement of 'fit and proper' person 
can also easily be found as there are large number of redundancies in banking 
industries due to mergers and reducing of branches. For instance, the merger between 
UBS/Credit Swiss has cost redundancies about 4000 employees. 
However, once the authorisation is granted the legal requirement is done. One 
question needs to be addressed here that can an insurance company conduct banking 
business through the existing legislation of European countries? We will attempt to 
answer this question later on in the next section. Another question is whether 
insurance companies need banking authorisation for conducting distribution of 
banking business (not underwriting banking business)? To find out this, we quote an 
example: In the UK, supermarkets like Tesco, J. Sainsbury etc. conduct banking 
activities to their own retail customers without having authorisation from the central 
bank or from the appropriate authority. What they do is to make a tied alliance with an 
established bank, and sell their banking products. Regulators have not yet intervened 
in these activities. Insurance companies can acquire a small or medium size bank or 
can create their own having prior authorisation from the appropriate authority, usually 
from the central bank. If a suitable domestic partner is unavailable, a cross boarder 
strategy might be helpful to have a banking subsidiary. Now the established insurance 
company can back this new sister bank in order to expand the business with strong co-
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operation as if it were a different section of the same office. If authorisation is not 
granted simply within the existing scope of business, still some sort of banking 
operation must be conducted. 
(d) Direct debit/standing orders/chequebook: 
Insurance companies receive lots of direct debits/standing orders/ as well as bankers 
cheques as the payment of insurance premiums and fees. Insurance companies on the 
other hands pay small claims maturity money or surrender money to customer by 
banks cheques. If they have their own cheque they can reduce the dependence on 
traditional banks. Thus, the insurance companies that are very big customer of banks, 
by withdrawing their support, will be a serious threat for rebel banks on one hand, and 
on the other hand can save account fees. 
Personal loan can also be arranged, based on maturity value if he has a life insurance 
policy and/or just simply applying credit method of personal loan. 
Figure: 3.3 Organisation chart of assurancebank 
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Figure Organization chart of Assurancebank 
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Table: 3.17 
Table: 3.18 
Human resources of assurancebank 
Underwriter ofal1 products Distributor of all products Management/training/feed 
back/complains 
Life assurance type General distributor (all type) Post service Managers for 
(each product is headed by one Specialist distributor Banking, investment, life, 
and his deputies) & general to train/complain 
Investment type NIL to save cost NIL, thus save cost 
(each product is headed by one 
and his deputies) 
Banking type NIL to save cost NIL, thus save cost 
(each product is headed by one 
and his deputies) 
General insurance type NIL to save cost NIL, thus save cost 
(each product is headed by one 
and his deputies) 
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3.6.3. V ALIDITY OF THIS MODEL 
F or the validity of this model, the regulatory examination and a bankruptcy test is 
conducted. 
3.6.3.1. REGULATORY EXAMINATION 
i. Individual European Countries 
The United Kingdom is traditionally liberalised. There is no restriction for UK market 
for cross shareholdings, or owning or controlling or creation of holding companies. 
But any person taking a holding of more than 15% of a bank has to submit his project 
for approval by the Bank of England. Prudential, Sun Life, have already taken a 
banking license from the Bank of England. France is one of the leading countries. For 
instance, AXA. insurance company is allowed to control banks or to create their own. 
Insurance companies in Germany can freely acquire shareholdings of banks by using 
their shareholders' funds, but can not own more than 10% of a company's capital 
through their technical funds. A 1925 law in Italy prohibits insurance and fund 
management companies from engaging in additional activities. From June 1991 
insurance companies have been allowed to take shareholdings in banks. But the Bank 
of Italy retain the right to veto reciprocal shareholding arrangements. Insurance 
companies in Spain have been able to collect household savings since 1984. In 1981-
89, regulatory barriers prevented banks and insurance companies from owning more 
than 5% of each other's voting stock. However, the Dutch Government eliminated the 
ownership barrier on January 1, 1990, thereby allowing banks to acquire control of 
insurers - and - vice versa- by creating holding companies. Banks and insurance 
99 
companies are permitted to own more than 15% of each other's share capital. Banks 
and insurance companies are allowed to own building societies and subject to certain 
conditions, vice versa since 1987. The legislation permits structural regroupings 
involving banks and insurance companies through the creation of holding companies 
(for instance ING Holding) which allow each entity to retain its autonomous 
management structure. In Sweden following the changes of law in 1991, insurance 
companies are permitted to hold + 5% of a bank or a financial institution subject to 
the supervisory authorities approving the holding and a number of key ratios, based on 
shareholders' funds, being satisfied. Insurance companies are free to adopt any group 
structure. Following the amendment to the Insurance Supervisory Act 1990, insurance 
companies in Denmark are able to conduct banking activities through their 
subsidiaries. Since 1 January 1992, an amendment to the law has permitted the 
creation of financial groups in Norway. Banks can own insurance companies and 
insurance companies can own banking companies. 
ii. The EC Directives 
Article 61 (2) of the Treaty of Rome provides that 'the liberalisation of banking and 
insurance services connected with movements of capital shall be in step with the 
progressive liberalisation of movement of capital'. On the basis of this, the EC merger 
regulation came into force in September 1990. A merger falls within the EC merger 
regulation if it has a 'Community dimension'. The regulation does not define what is 
meant by a 'dominant position'. But The EC Court of Justice has defmed dominance 
as 'a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to 
prevent effective competition being maintained on a relevant market by affording it 
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the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its 
customers and ultimately of its consumers' . 
In order to decide whether a particular company does enjoy dominance, it is necessary 
to define the relevant market and then to assess the company's strength in that market. 
Insurance companies and banks are treated as a special case under the merger 
regulation. The value of gross premiums written is the basis of assessing the turnover 
of insurance companies, while one-tent of total assets of a bank is used to assess the 
ECU five billion criterion. 
Transactions involving insurance companies will have a Community dimension 
where: 
• the combined value of gross premiums written by the groups concerned world-wide 
exceeds ECU 5000m; and, 
• each of at least two groups concerned has gross premiums written with European 
Community residents of a value exceeding ECU 250m, unless of the groups 
concerned receives more than two thirds of its gross premiums from the residents 
of one member state. 
Under the EC merger regulation, certain mergers, take over, and joint ventures within 
the EC countries require to be notified to the Commission within a specified time 
limit. After receiving the notification, the Commission will consider whether or not 
the proposed merger is compatible with the Common Market. In the course of its 
consideration the commission has extensive powers to require companies to submit to 
an investigation at their premises and to provide all the information required by the 
commission to enable it to carry out its investigation. If a merger 'creates or 
strengthens dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be 
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significantly impeded in the Common Market or in a substantial part of it', then it 
must be declared incompatible with the Common Market. In such circumstances, the 
proposed merger may not proceed. In some cases the Commission may be prepared to 
approach a merger only if the parties agree to modify terms of the merger. In addition, 
the commission may attach conditions to any such approach and may Impose 
restrictions, 'directly related to and necessary to the implementation of the 
concentrations'. If the merger regulation is applicable, the national merger laws of the 
member states need not be considered. 
Insurance companies by merging with banks or securities companies may create 
problems for regulation and supervision. Because for such an amalgamation it is very 
difficult to assess a company's financial position by the regulators and supervisors as 
to whether the company is in safe and sound condition as different regulators and 
other problems. The EC has identified the following problems in particular: 
1. the difficulty of assessing the financial position of a regulated entity in isolation 
from unregulated entities within the same conglomerates 
2. the difficulty of assessing the adequacy or otherwise as a conglomerate's capital, 
specifically if there is double-gearing; 
3. the effects of intra-group exposures; and, 
contagion, i.e. the risk that financial difficulties encountered by an individual 
company within a group could have an adverse impact on the financial stability of the 
group as a whole. 
These issues were also addressed in the Tripartite Group Report. 
On the initiative of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, a tripartite group of 
bank, securities and insurance regulators was formed in early 1993 to address a range 
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of issue relating to the regulation of financial conglomerates. Their report was sent to 
the Basle Committee, the Technical Committee of the International Organisation of 
Securities Commission (IOSCO), and the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS) in 1995 for their consideration. Following the Tripartite Group 
Report, the groups established a joint forum to develop practical working 
arrangements between the different regulators of financial conglomerates. 
The commission established an expert group after a joint meeting between banking 
and insurance regulators on financial conglomerates in 1994. The groups mandate was 
to discuss the difficulties concerning the regulation of financial conglomerates and to 
address the different methods of dealing with the problems identified. 
The expert group's conclusion is included in the following points3: consolidated 
supervision, double gearing/capital adequacy, intra-group transactions. The expert 
group considered a number of ways of excluding or identifying regulatory arbitrage 
by: 
• applying the large exposure limits for credit institutions and investment firms on a 
solo plus basis to the entire financial conglomerate; 
• monitoring the observance of large exposure limits according to the rules of credit 
institutions at a solo plus level, but as a 'warning test' only, which would not 
trigger any regulatory remedies; and, 
applying the banking rules to the entire financial conglomerate if it is predominately 
banking and the insurance rules if it is predominately insurance. 
3 Details are reported in Chapter four of this thesis. 
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3.6.3.2. THE RISK EFFECT OF THE ASSURANCEBANK MODEL 
Measuring risk effect is an empirical issue. We will test this in Chapter six where the 
return and risk effects of insurance companies' diversification into banking business 
will be tested. If the test find risk reduction, this will support our model. 
3.6.4. BENEFITS FOR ADOPTING THIS MODEL 
• From Regulators side 
- Single regulatory authority for cost saving. 
- Easy co-operation and co-ordination on information flow allowing easy supervision 
as currently the regulators and supervisors from both side, i.e. banking as well as 
insurance, face the same problem. The UK government introduced this in 1997, 
named the Financial Services Authority (FSA) who will supervise banking as well 
as insurance and other financial services industries. 
Reducing risk by allowing diversification 
• From Consumers side: 
- every thing under one roof 
- time saving for customer 
- easy to keep financial record 
- cheaper 
• From Insurers side 
- keep existing insurance customer 
- attracting banking customer 
- cost savings 
- increasing business 
- opportunity of profit making 
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3.6.5. POSSIBLE PROBLEMS OF THIS MODEL 
• Regulators may think there is too much risk. Specially they are concerned about 
Bankruptcy risk. This will be tested in Chapter six. 
• Too complex for keeping accounts for customers. But once it can set 
up/programme, this become very easy and time saving of staff. 
• Dependence on central computer. This is now true in all sorts of business due to 
technological development and business virtually relies on it. 
• Requirements of banking technical knowledge and training for insurance staffs. 
This problem can be solved easily by providing internal and/or external training or 
in some cases to have readymade one from the traditional banking human resource 
market. 
• customers' attitude and preference may be negative about putting all the eggs in 
one basket. But research has shown that customer now want everything under one 
roof. 
• clash between underwriting risk and loan and credit risk. As individual product 
qualify for it own merits, we believe there will be no clash. Instead due to 
diversifying of products, it spread risk, and thus should reduce risk. 
• risk of fraud attempt. Due to the technological development like PDQ terminal, 
fraud can be prevented. 
3.6.6. LIMITATIONS OF THIS MODEL 
• This model should not be adopted initially for corporate customer level. 
• The model will suit most of those who have regular income among the personal 
customer base. 
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• upto a certain amount of loan/credit should be given those who can be covered 
through this model. 
• large exposure like aviation or marine risk should not be taken within this model. 
We believe if this model is adopted, the fundamental problem of insurance will at 
least partially be solved, i.e. the insurance products will be purchased rather sold. 
3.7. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we have examined insurance companies' movement into banking 
business. To the best of our knowledge, this is first such examination ever. Here, we 
have also developed an assurancebank model and have tested is validity by examining 
a regulatory examination. The bankruptcy test of this model will be tested in Chapter 
six. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
REASONS FOR BANCASSURANCE AND ASSURANCEBANK 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we will investigate the strategic motives for changing the interface 
between the banks and the insurance companies. Traditionally bankers are bankers, and 
insurers are insurers. Bankers can not enter into insurance business, and insurance 
companies, on the other hand, can not enter in to banking business because banking 
business is regarded as a risky business, and insurance business too is regarded as a risky 
business. The basic business of a bank is to take money as deposit from the public; money 
transmission services; and, the lending of money. On the other hand, the basic business of 
an insurance company is to take risk against financial loss. But in Europe the situation is 
changing [Dickinson (1997)]. Banks can enter into insurance business, and insurance 
companies can enter into banking business. This cross-business activity has broken down 
the long separation of banking business from insurance business and vice versa. 
Therefore, the main question we address here is what are the driving forces that have 
motivated diversification into such risky activities, and on what ground the European 
regulators have abolished the long tradition of separation between banks and insurance 
compames. 
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The rest of this chapter is as follows: in section 2, we investigate the strategic motives for 
bancassurance and assurancebank, and in section 3, we conclude. 
4.2. STRATEGIC MOTIVES FOR BANCASSURANCE & ASSURANCEBANK 
There are a number of motives for bancassurance and assurancebank activities. These 
motives differ with regard to the parties involved in the diversification move. Entering 
into another industry is not an easy matter. There are several obstacles. Porter (1980) 
stated seven major entry barriers for entering into another industry. These are-
government policy, economies of scale, access to distribution channels, products 
differentiation, capital requirements, switching costs, and cost disadvantages independent 
of scale. First five promote entry and the rest two restrict entry mode. In the whole 
process of bancassurance and assurancebank (these two terms are discussed in Chapter 
two and three respectively), there are four major parties. These are banks, insurance 
companies, the regulators, and finally the consumers. Therefore, to find out the reasons 
for bancassurance and assurancebank, we need to analyse each of the party's motives. 
4.2.1. BANK MOTIVES FOR DIVERSIFICATION INTO INSURANCE 
Hoschka (1994) studied the motives from the banks' viewpoint. He considered from two 
broad angles, namely fmn level factor, and industry level factor. In firm level factor, he 
considered the following driving forces. These are (i) synergy effects; (ii) economies of 
scale; (iii) economies of scope. In the industry level factors, he considered the following 
factors: Demographic changes, economic environment, savings trends, differential tax 
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treatment, growth performance and potential, and insurance penetration and saturation. 
However, most of the authors frequently described the potential existence of economies 
of scale and economies of scope in the bank diversification into insurance business. 
Among these authors the notables were Dickinson and Dinenis (1992), Grant (1992), 
DEeD (1992), Walter and Saunders (1994), and Kane (1994). Hardwick (1997) and 
Dinenis and Jung (1998) find the economies of scale and scope of the UK life assurance 
industry. 
A. Economies of Scale and Economies of Scope 
Dickinson and Dinenis (1992) mentioned that the economies of scale exist if per unit or 
average production costs decline as output rises. The traditional concept of scale 
economies in the single product firm refers to the behaviour of total costs as output 
expands, and economies of scale are said to exist if total costs rise less proportionately 
than output. When a firm experiences increasing returns to scale, monopoly is a 'natural' 
outcome of market forces. Any firm supplying the entire market can price so as to 
undercut any firm supplying part of the market. 
Economies of Scope arise if two or more products can be jointly produced at a lower cost 
than is incurred in their independent production. Samuelson (1966) defines jointness in 
production as the ability of one firm to produce a given level of multiple outputs at a 
lower cost than a series of separate firms each specialising in the production of a single 
output. This property has been re-defined by Panzar and Willig (1981) as economies of 
scope. Specifically, there are economies of scope over the production of goods X and Y if 
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C(X,y) < C(X,O) + C(O,y) 
where C(x,y) are the firm's (minimised) costs of producing x units of good X jointly with 
y units of good Yat a given vector of input prices. The effect of scope economies can be 
measured by 
SE = C(x,O)+C(O,y)-C(x,y) 
C(x,y 
SE is bounded from above by the value of 1 if marginal costs are non-negative (or if there 
is free disposal) so that the total costs of separate production can not exceed twice the 
cost of joint production. In the presence of scope economies, firms with diversified 
product mixes will tend to have total costs lower than the total costs of firms with 
specialised product mixes, for comparable levels of output. 
Willig (1979) suggests that economies of scope arise from inputs that are shared or 
utilised jointly without congestion. It might be expected that this interdependence is 
especially prevalent in the banking industry. Insurance activity especially insurance 
brokerage can use the same factors of production as the main banking activities such as 
the existing capital stocklbranch networks (Graph 4.1), branch personnel (Table 4.1) and 
data processing facilities. Joint use of general brand name advertising is also a source of 
economies of scope. 
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Graph : 4.1 
European Bank Branch Network 1996 
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Table: 4.1 
b f ank Num ero B ( 1000)' E Employees x In urope 1992 1996 -
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Austria· 70 68.9 71 .2 71 71 
Belgium· 76 76.3 76.2 76.5 76.9 
Denmark! 52 50 49 47 44 
Finland· 38.9 36 34.1 30.6 27.1 
France· 425 406.1 409.2 407.7 404.2 
Germany· 709 717 724 724 716 
Greece·· 37.1 37.5 39.6 40.3 43.1 
Ireland· n/a n/a n/a 33.3 32.3 
Italy· 337.3 340 338.5 337.5 327 
Luxembourg·· 17.6 18.5 19.7 20.1 20.6 
Netherlands· 119.9 115.4 109 111.4 115.9 
Portugal·· 63 61 61 60 60 
Spain· 253 247 246 245 242 
Sweden·· 284 37.2 39.1 39 39 
Switzerland· 118.5 117.1 116.5 115.1 115.1 
UK· · 401 .2 371 .7 386.5 382.7 414.8 
• = All banks; •• = CommercIal banks; ! = Commerclal and saving banks 
Source: Compilation from the OECD 1998 
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B. Reducing risks: 
According to portfolio theory, diversification spreads the risk, and thus reduces the risk. 
The banks by diversifying into insurance business may reduce their risks because of asset 
diversification [Brown et al (1996); Esibanies (1994); Walter and Saunders (1994); Boyd, 
Graham and Hewitt (1993); Ofeck (1992); Boyd and Graham (1988)]. On the other hand, 
insurance business itself is regarded as risky business because of the nature of its 
activities. Unexpected huge amount of claims may lead to bankruptcy. Rumelt (1974) 
argued that related diversification is beneficial and unrelated diversification is harmful. 
The banks diversification into insurance business may fall within the related 
diversification and therefore could be beneficial. Banks and insurance companies have a 
number of similarities. Maycock and Ravel (1976) identified the following similarities: 
1.)Both banks as well as insurance companies are within financial industries group. 
2.)Both involve in invisible and finance related trade. 
3.)Both take money directly from individual public banks as deposits and insurers as 
premium. 
4.)Both invest money in different long-term and short-term securities and bonds. 
5.) Both have a huge number of client bases. 
6.) Both are highly regulated industries. 
7.) Both give peace of mind banks as safe keeper and insurers as risk taker. 
Such similar characters justify the characters of relatedness and should support the 
diversification into insurance business. However, Llewellyn (1994) argued that if the 
probability of failure is decreased the diversification should be allowed, while if the 
seriousness of failure is increased the diversification should be limited. Therefore, this is 
an empirical issue and will be tested in Chapter five. 
112 
C.Productdependence 
Some banks' products are correlated to insurance products. For example, Credit 
Insurance, Mortgage Indemnity Insurance, Marine Insurance, Mortgage Interest 
Insurance, Employers Liability Insurance, Life and Pension Plan for banks staffs etc are 
frequently taken by banks. Such product dependence may influence banks to diversify 
into insurance. From the banks' standpoint, Wood (1993) mentioned five products that 
bank frequently take out from the insurers. However, there are many more on which 
banks are dependent on insurance companies. From the banker's side, the following 
insurance products are frequently taken-out: 
(i) Financial institutions insurance: -
A bank may demand this product from an insurance company to protect itself against 
criminal activities where the bank itself may be a victim. Such an insurance product may 
cover a loss arising from the dishonesty of an employee, a loss arising from forgery or 
counterfeiting or an armed raid on a vehicle carrying cash or valuable securities or even 
on the banks itself. 
(ii) Credit insurance: -
There are many types of credit insurance. A bank may take this insurance via bankers 
customers or directly by itself as assignee by complying with the requirements of section 
136(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 and section 50 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. 
Cover is provided against losses arising as a result of the default or insolvency of a 
borrower in the case of a bank lending money on the security of the property or assets. It 
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also arises in relation to trade receivable in the form of credit and export credit insurance 
which cover losses arising from the default or insolvency of a buyer of goods or services 
from the bank's own customer. 
(iii) Mortgage indemnity insurance: -
A bank may take this policy directly as insured as an assignee of its customer or via the 
customer. The risks insured against and losses covered are commonly the shortfall arising 
on the sale of the bank's security in the form of property, where a bank exercises its 
power of sale under its security arrangements or in the event of default by the borrower 
under a mortgage, or foreclosure, or where a property is the subject of a compulsory 
purchase order, demolition or clearance order or closing order or blight notice affecting 
the value of the property. 
(iv) Marine insurance: -
A bank might come across this type of insurance as part of a package of security where it 
has advanced money against the security of goods shipped aboard or where it has lent 
money against the security of a ship, under a ship mortgage, or against freight payable. 
This insurance will cover specified perils associated with maritime adventures such as 
perils of the seas, fire, war perils, piracy and barratry. 
(v) Mortgagees interest insurance: -
A bank may have a customer to whom it has advanced money on the security of the 
assignment of the proceeds of a policy of insurance and where the customer fails to 
disclose the material facts to the insurers. This may entitle insurers to avoid the contract 
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of insurance in its entirety, leaving the bank, through no fault of its own (other than its 
choice of customer) unable to recover under the policy. For this some insurers provide a 
bank with insurance, on payment of a premium by the bank, to cover the risk of the 
failure of the primary insurance taken out by the bank's customer in specified 
circumstances. 
(vi) Interest rate and liquidity risk: -
Life insurance companies assist banks to manage interest rate risk, either directly through 
purchasing long dated, fixed-rate debt issued through the capital markets or through direct 
placements, or indirectly by taking positions in swap and in other financial markets. 
Again when banks have sought to increase the liquidity within their asset portfolios by 
securitizing their non-tradable loans, life insurers have often purchased the bonds issued 
from this process [Dickinson & Dinenis (1992)]. 
(vii) Loss of earnings insurance: -
There are additional forms of insurance that a bank sometimes requires an owner to take 
out. Here a part of the security is the assignment of a time charter and in certain cases 
political risks insurance. Banks are looking such policies more frequently these days 
[Dickinson & Dinenis (1992)]. 
(viii) Employers liability insurance: -
This is compulsory insurance under the Employers Liability Act. Besides, banks' 
directors and officers are taking directors and officers liability insurance to provide cover 
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for defence costs as well as the amount of compensation for which directors may be liable 
to pay when courts hold them personally responsible for their negligence in operating the 
company. 
(ix) Life and pension plan for bank employees: -
Banks arrange special terms for life assurance for their employees with a sum assured as 
being payable in the event of death of an employee during his term of service with the 
bank or in the case of pension at the time of retirement. 
Some common products of bankers and insurers are shown in the table to indicate their 
dependence. Bankers-insurers dependencies are discussed more in chapter one. 
Table: 4.2 
s ome P d ro ucts o epen dence 0 B k ' n an mg an d I nsurance 
Bank products Insurance products 
Bank account Financial institution insurance 
Cheque, direct debit etc Credit insurance 
Letter of Credit Mortgage insurance 
Foreign exchange dealing Mortgage indemnity insurance 
Mortgage Marine insurance 
Loan Employers liability insurance 
Life and pension plan for employees 
[nvestment management 
Source: own compilation 
D. Other incentives of bank diversification: 
(i) Managers secret deal: 
During the sixties, the traditional insurance agents used to visit banks branches hoping to 
get prospects for potential customers, recommended by branches. When many of the 
agents started requesting bank managers for potential prospects, specially related to banks 
116 
products (for instance, Letter of Credit) the managers saw many requesters. Different 
agents tried to influence managers to get the business. Some went a little further. They 
started offering share of commission. Bank managers realised that this is a good source of 
income, and they were refereed more bank customers to these agents to get some extra 
money as commission in addition to their salaries. In this way, these managers were 
working as sub-agents of the insurers. Soon after, this is late sixties and early seventies, 
this secret deal became an open secret. This news spread to senior level. Then senior 
managers also saw that this is a potential source of income, they officially recognised this, 
and started up their own insurance brokerage firms. (reported in Chapter two). Banks 
managers were asked to refer all sorts of insurance business to these broking subsidiaries. 
Now the commission goes to the bank's pocket instead of going to the banks managers' 
pocket. 
(ii) Disputes over insurance: 
Banks with their banking products take out insurance for their clients as an assignee. 
Some times it is seen that policy cover does not come in time which is very important in 
this competitive market. Sometimes banks do not find suitable insurance products from 
insurance companies, which they need to match with their clients' requirements. Not only 
that some times there are disputes over the claims and claims settlements. This disputes 
damage customers faith towards banks as well as leading to financial losses (e.g. Banques 
Bruxelles Lambert v. Eagle Star, Banque Financiere de la Cite S.A. v. Westgate Insurance 
Company Ltd). Banks believe that insurers try to wriggle out of their obligations by 
relying on technical legal arguments (utmost good faith etc.) and small print. Insurance 
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companies also feel that the banks try to dump on them some of their disastrous losses, 
which arise purely out of bad lending. Such disputes gave them the idea to find an 
alternative idea of business. 
(iii) Customers' frequent visit to banks: 
Customers more frequently visit banks branches than the insurance agencies. Almost all 
sorts of business and day to day life involve contact with bank directly or indirectly. 
These vary from household telephone bill to shares and investments. When customers 
come to the branch for investment advice or for a car loan or mortgage or other sorts of 
credit facilities, then it is very easy to attract these customers at that moment for 
insurance. This helps banks in two ways, as an extra product line of business which gives 
extra profit, and a protection for the banks when it grants different types of credit like 
loan, Over Draft (OD) facilities, or mortgage for house purchase. So, for banks, it is easy 
to get in touch with the prospective customers to sell insurance. 
(iv) Banks' managers as key advisers: 
Most people take their financial advice from their banks' managers at first hand. As the 
bank managers know the customer's financial condition better than anyone else, so 
he/she can give the best advice to the client. Besides, the bank managers themselves have 
an image to the customers. Bankers can use such an image for insurance selling. 
(v) Declining profit of traditional current accounts: 
Bankers traditional current account, which is one of their core activities, is no longer a 
profitable business. To survive, insurance expansion may be a good one. 
(vi) Directors attitudes to be too big: 
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Bigger firms do not always want just to maximise profitability and/or potential 
scale/scope economies. There are some other reasons as well. For instance, banks 
directors may wish for high social status and prestige, and to acquire more bargaining 
power [Dickinson and Dinenis (1992); Dickinson (1994)] at government and industry 
level. Business directors always want to be giants. Then they can have more bargaining 
power, more independence, and at the same time can have enjoyed scale/scope economies 
in the firm. Like a colonial government they can expand their activities into other 
business areas such as insurance and can hold a greater position. 
(vii) Diversified attitudes: 
One of the most important characters of banks is their diversified attitude (discussed in 
Chapter two). They now extend far from their core business. The core activities of a bank 
are to take deposits from public, lending of money and money transmission services. Now 
a days, in addition to these core activities, they offer a wide variety of financial products. 
Securities dealing, foreign exchange dealing, mortgage lending, pension fund 
management etc. are not originally banks products, but banks have been offering these 
products for a long time. Diversification into different areas of business is a long tradition 
of banks. Now the time has come, after the removal of regulatory barriers, to diversify 
into insurance, which has already been started. They now claim 'what banks should not 
be'. 
(viii) Profit maximisation: 
Every profit making business has the target of maximising profit. Traditional current 
accounts are no longer a profitable business. Moreover, allowing building societies to 
offer core-banking products has brought high competition in the market. Some times it is 
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too difficult to survive. If banks introduce another product line like insurance, then this 
new product line may give extra income to the bank that will maximise the profitability of 
the business. For instance, 30% of the TSB's group profit came from insurance in 1994. 
This has attracted other competitors to diversify into the insurance area. 
(ix) Governments withdrawal support on pension: 
After the deregulation of financial services in the late eighties, the governments in 
different European countries have encouraged personal pension plans, and, thus, have 
decreased government support in pension sectors. In the UK, the governments pension 
expenditure to the GDP was 7% in 1985 and was decreased to 4% by 1995. Similarly, in 
Germany the expenditure was 12% in 1995 and was decreased to 10% in 1995. 
Table: 4.3 
Pension assets in the EU 1997 
Country Value of Assets as Assets per 
assets $bn %ofGDP capita $000 
Italy 133 10 2.3 
Sweden 196 177 2.2 
Gennany 360 16 4.4 
France 168 11 2.9 
Belgium 26 10 2.5 
Finland 39 31 7.6 
Spain 17 3 0.4 
Portugal 9 10 0.9 
Denmark 136 76 25.9 
Netherlands 482 121 30.7 
UK 862 72 14.6 
Ireland 26 38 7.2 
Source: EU Pension Provision, Mintel '98 
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From the table 4.3, we notice that top three countries contribute more than 70% of the 
pension market. Other EU governments (for instance, Italy) including the EC (for Pension 
Fund Directive) are reforming the pension plan. Therefore, this will be an attractive area 
into which banks can diversify. The Second Banking Directive has already permitted 
banks to offer pension products. Mintel (1998) reported that bancassurance companies 
have already gained control 20% of the life and pension market within the EU. 
(x) Motto of financial supermarket: 
In the modem world, customers want everything in one place for their shopping in order 
to save time and hassle. This is a dramatic change for customers' attitudes and habits. 
That's why the superstores are doing better day by day, and the specialist shops are 
declining rapidly. The changing habits of customers influence financial shopping as well. 
People want their insurance, investment, mortgage, loan, etc. from the same place without 
going different places. In a recent survey, carried out by Swiss Re [Sigma (1992)], 
showed that the customers prefer their financial products 'under one roof. Responding to 
customers changing habits and attitudes, the banks are now changing their name in the 
branch offices. For instance, instead of using 'Barclays Bank', or 'National Westminster 
Bank', or 'Midland Bank' or 'Halifax Building Society' as they used to use before, most 
of the branches are now simply using 'Barclays', 'Natwest', 'Midland'(HSBC), and 
'Halifax' respectively. This means they are no longer only a bank but a universal financial 
institutions for all sorts of the financial products. 
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4.2.2. INSURANCE COMPANY MOTIVES FOR DIVERSIFICATION INTO 
BANKING 
Insurance companies' motives in engaging banking business is of defensive type due to 
banks' heavy involvement in insurance activities and, at the same time of potential 
existence of economies of scale and economies of scope like the banks (discussed 
earlier). For instance, agency networks, policyholders database, common advertisement 
etc. may have potential scale and scope economies. Hardwick (1997) found the scale and 
scope economies in the UK ordinary life assurance. Dinenis and Jung (1998) also found 
the scale and scope economies in the UK life assurance industry. In addition to potential 
scale and scope economies, there may be other motives of diversification by the insurance 
companies. A study, by Precepta (1991), described the insurance companies' motives of 
diversification from three different angles. These are: 
(1) The threat of new entrants, i.e. banks, savings banks that are competing with 
insurance companies for a greater share of people's savings. 
(2) Socio-economic factors, i.e. increasing wealth of the European economies, higher 
personal disposable income, the accumulation of more assets to insure, demographic 
changes, and the increasing financial literacy of the population. 
(3) Governmental factors, i.e. particularly declining governmental role in the provision of 
social security benefits. 
Diacon (1990b) showed nine areas of advantages for the insurance companies' linkage 
with banks. These are:- (i) access to banks' customer base; (ii) lower marginal costs in 
generating new business; (iii) cost allocation method; (iv) banks' better image; (v) easy 
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exploitation of cross-selling; (vi) better post-sales service because of physical presence; 
(vii) useful distribution medium for insurance; (viii) utilisation of capital-intensive 
operation; and (ix) downstream vertical integration to secure distribution. From the 
European context, we can further investigate the driving forces from the insurance 
companies' viewpoint. 
(i) Counter respond to bank: 
As we have mentioned earlier, the banks in Western Europe are moving into insurance 
activities. These banks are moving not only into insurance distribution activities but also 
into the core activities of insurance, i.e. underwriting of insurance business. This is 
regarded as a serious threat to insurance companies. The insurance companies now have 
to compete not only with their traditional libel insurers but also these new entrants who 
have a very strong branch network channel and fmancial backing as well as a better image 
in the general public'S mind. Due this better image and other incentives, the banks' 
market share in insurance distribution is increasing dramatically. For instance, in 1995, 
the life assurance market share by the European banks were as follows:- France 56%, 
Germany 15%, Italy 19%, Spain 35% and Netherlands 15%. (Further details are shown 
in Chapter two). Even in underwriting activities they are increasing their market share 
day by day. Insurance companies have taken this as a great threat to their future survival. 
That's why, the insurers believe that they should also be involved in banking activities as 
a counter response. Some big insurance companies have already started banking 
operations. This is reported in Chapter three. 
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(ii) Product dependence: 
Insurance companies, frequently take banking products. For instance, banks do not offer 
Letter of Credit, which is one of the main statutory instruments for international trading, 
unless an insurance policy is taken out against it. This can be done directly by the banks 
as an assignee or via bank's customers. To diversify into insurance business reduces 
dependence on insurance companies. Some of the dependent products are discussed in the 
following sub-sections. 
(a) Bank account: -
To establish an insurance firm, whether it is underwriting or broking, a bank account is 
required by the company's law. Insurance firms have to notify to the regulator the details 
of the company with whom they will bank. In this respect, insurance firms are dependent 
on banks for this service. Insurance companies are dependent on banks not only for 
themselves but also for their customers. For instance, Read (1974) reported that the 
insurance companies make pension payments regularly to some three million pensioners 
(in the UK) and they do so by cheque by and large. Only about half of those pensioners 
have bank accounts. Therefore, the insurance companies by paying pension payments in 
the form of cheques, makes the pensioners obliged to ask a favour of the grocer at the 
comer to cash. 
(b) Bank and Building Society cheques: -
The insurance companies' customers commonly use Banks and Building Societies' 
cheques to pay the insurance premiums or brokers fee. 
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(c) Direct debit: 
This is a more advanced method where there is a regular premium payment schedule. A 
direct debit is a pre arranged system of payment between the customers (insured) bank 
and the seller's (insurers) bank to collect premiums having been instructed by both their 
bankers. 
One study indicates how strong bankers and insurance company's traditional relationships 
were. About two decades ago Read (1974) pointed out the insurance industry's share of 
the UK market for money transmission in 1972. Insurance companies in the United 
Kingdom in 1972 accounted for 60% of all bank direct debits and 51 % of all bank 
standing orders. Some of his illustrations are shown in the 4.4. 
Table: 4.4 
I ·d h tr nsurance m ustnes s are m money ansmlsslon servIces 
Insurance companies Total number 
Number % of total Numbers of items 
in millions 
RECEIPTS 
Bank cheques 40.3 2.0 1654 
Bank standing orders 47.8 51.0 94 
Bank direct debits 32.4 60.0 55 
Cash (items over SOp) 368.0 3.0 11238 
PAYMENTS 
Bank cheques 32.9 1.9 1642 
Bankcredit transfers 2.8 1.3 211 
Bank standing orders 1.4 1.4 94 
Source: Read (1974) 
(d) Insurance companies staff's salary and commission: -
There are a huge number of people working in insurance companies. Their salaries and 
commission are paid through banks or through cheques, which make them bound to open 
a bank account for this purpose. 
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(e) Foreign exchange dealings: -
Most of the banks provide a foreign exchange advisory service. This is important for 
insurance companies particularly those who conduct their business internationally. This 
service is particularly important in the international reinsurance market. Banks by 
providing such services can assist insurance/reinsurance companies in minimising 
exchange exposure. In this way insurance companies can improve on most money 
transmission times and thus interest-earning potential for all premium flows. Atkinson 
(1975) reported this, which was later cited by Maycock and Ravel (1976). 
(f) Investment: -
Insurers have two types of fund to invest. One is shareholders fund, and the other is 
policyholders fund. Shareholders fund is gathered by selling insurance companies shares 
like any other registered companies. The policyholder funds are gathered from the 
premium income. This fund is invested for meeting the future claims because the money 
the insurance companies take from the customers as premium is too small to meet the 
claims. On the other side, the sum of the small amount of premiums from the individual 
is huge. Insurance companies can give this money to banks for investment, so that the 
insurance companies can get investment return and banks can have extra money to lend or 
to keep for day to day banking activities necessitates by their vast client demands. 
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(g) Short-term lending: -
Banks provide short-term loan to insurers whenever required for their day to day banking 
business. 
Therefore, such product dependence may influence insurance companies to diversify into 
banking activities. 
(iii) Decreasing of traditional insurers brokers channel: 
The Brokers channels are declining rapidly (shown in graph 4.2) due to the bankers heavy 
involvement in insurance distribution. In 1989, flrms and individual brokers were 8550 
and 24000 respectively, which declined by 1994 to 5570 and 20900 respectively. The 
brokers can not cope with banks in the insurance distribution race as the banks have huge 
customer base with country wide branch network and a strong flnancial backing. 
Moreover, people are more interested in one stop flnancial shopping rather (mentioned 
earlier) than specialist sources, and thus these brokerage channels are declining rapidly. 
On the other hand, the banks are withdrawing their support for distribution of insurance 
from the traditional insurers. So, insurers are losing two very strong channels (brokers 
and banks). For this reason, establishing a bank will give them a strong channel of 
insurance distribution as well as expansion of flnancial products. Diacon (1990b) 
mentioned four long-term strategic implications for declining independent intermediaries. 
Firstly, it will become difficult for insurers to offer a wide product range because it may 
not be cost effective to have specialised sales staff dealing with a subset of the full range. 
Secondly, price and quality based competition will be less important and sales will be 
more dependent on image, advertising etc. Thirdly, disturbance of innovation and flnally, 
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if the competition is on size-based advantages then the market is more vulnerable to 
competition from the much larger EC and international companies. 
Graph: 4.2 Declining of insurance brokers channel 
Jul-89 Jul-90 Jul-91 Jul-92 JUI-93 JUI-94 
Source: FIMBRAlWhitaker '94 
(iv) Banks and Building Societies withdrawing distribution support: 
Banks and Building Societies started offering insurance to their banking client bases in 
the late sixties. A very few banks started by offering insurance products with their 
banking products. These insurance products were not manufactured by the bankers. These 
were made by traditional insurers. Banks began to make strategic alliance with traditional 
insurers on the condition that insurer will underwrite and bankers will just distribute the 
insurance products in return for commission. Insurance companies by keeping their 
traditional channel added a very strong new channel i.e. bank channel, in their 
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distribution network. Thus, the insurance companies were getting huge amount of 
businesses from banking channel, and they were offering special commission rate. In this 
way, both parties were getting benefits from each other for this co-operative interface. 
Banks were getting extra sources of income as commission, and insurance companies 
were getting an extra huge source of business from a single source. Other banks and 
Building Societies followed the example of their rival banks to retain their market share. 
Soon, the banks realised this is a big source of income almost without bearing any risk 
and they emphasised insurance distribution. When the banks learnt 'know how', their 
bargaining power increased [Dickinson & Dinenis (1992); Dickinson (1995)], and they 
were demanding more as now they were now in a better position compared to other sales 
channel. Some started going further. They decided to have their own insurance outlets. 
Having their own insurance outlet, they then started distributing their own insurance 
products and terminating strategic alliance with traditional insurers. In some cases, they 
bought all or significant amount of equity share of that allied companies. For example, 
Halifax Building Society, by terminating its agreement, set up its own insurance company 
in 1995. This is called Halifax Life Assurance Company. Similarly, Bank of Scotland 
started acquiring Standard Life's equity holdings (34%). For this reason, the insurance 
companies are moving towards banking to fill up the gap. 
(v) Synergy effects:-
Synergy exists when 2+2=5. Insurance companies by using their agency network and 
insurance agents, brokers channel to the huge number of policyholder clients, and getting 
customers database from the policy forms through IT network can use scale and scope 
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economies. Economies of scale exist if average production costs decline as output rises, 
i.e. banking products. On the other hand, economies of scope arise if two or more 
products can be jointly produced at a lower cost than is incurred in their independent 
production [panzar and Willig (1981); Samuelson (1966)]. In economic term, 
If x is insurance product; and y is banking products, then economies of scope exist if 
C(x,y) < C(x,O) + C(y,O). 
With the insurance products agents/brokers can sell banking products to their clients. 
This way they can cut the unit cost and can sell products relatively cheaply if they engage 
into banking business as well. Details are discussed in earlier section of this chapter. 
(vi) Expand o/financial products:-
In the business literature, there is a simple strategy that on demand 'no' should be 
minimised. Especially in personal sector of business, sellers keep a wide range of 
products, assuming that if customers come for one item may take another item. Insurance 
companies by entering into banking area can expand their product line. People coming for 
insurance products may take banking products as well. Hardwick and Dou (1998) also 
stated that insurance companies, which develop new marketable policies and other 
products, give themselves an immediate comparative advantage in the production of those 
products. 
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(vii) Decreasing dependence on banks:-
Every insurance company has to have a bank account to start up a business with. This is 
required by company law. Moreover, staff salaries, agents' commission, and claims 
payment, etc. go through banks. Much of the premiums come to insurance companies 
through direct debit and/or cheque account. Both are banking products. Insurance 
companies by setting up their own bank can reduce dependence on banks and they can get 
rid of paying fees/charges etc. to banks. Or by entering into foreign exchange market, for 
instance, insurance companies can handle their own international claims settlements or 
transferring premiums into local currency. In this way, they can get rid of paying 
commission to banks and reduce dependence on bank. 
More importantly, money gathered, as premiums from individuals are huge. Most of this 
money is given to banks for long and short-term investments for capital gain. Insurance 
companies have to meet the claims if they occur in the future, and the money they receive 
as premium is not sufficient to meet the claims. In most of the long term insurance 
policies insurance companies give bonus to policyholders. It may be said that insurance 
companies have two sources of income, one from premium income and the other from 
investment income. This investment consists of shareholders fund and policyholders fund 
(in technical term life fund for life assurance companies). Insurance companies by setting 
up their own investment banks can do investment banking and make more money. Now a 
day most of the insurance firms have their own investment banking/fund management 
subsidiaries. 
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(viii) Retain existing customers:-
Banks are offering wide range of products, l.e. banking products, building societies 
products, and insurance products. Banks are offering different incentives to its customers 
for switching off their other financial products from other providers. For example, 
mortgage, insurance etc. Since the bank managers are regarded as key financial adviser to 
customers, these managers may influence bank customers in buying other financial 
products, and in that case at least some of the insurance customers may go to the banks. 
Therefore, to retain these (existing) customers, the insurance companies should be in the 
position to offer similar facilities. And to do this they need a banking licence. Moreover, 
we have mentioned earlier that the customers attitude and habits are changing (Swiss Re 
1992). People want everything from one roof. If customers do not get all the products 
from his insurers he may change his insurer and may go to other who offer all the 
products he needs, i.e. banking as well as insurance products. 
(ix) Profit maximisation:-
Profit is the main target for the traders (except charities and few others). By expanding 
into new line of business there is a chance of maximising profits. Insurance companies' 
profitability has decreased during the last ten years or so [Dinenis & Verkati (1996)]. So 
entering into banking business could be profitable. Or if even not profitable, it can be 
substitute to insurance in different ways as discussed above. We can draw a bank 
example. 30% of TS8's total profits in 1994/5 came from insurance business. In the 
following table we reported other European banking companies' insurance contribution to 
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banking profitability. This may be the same when Insurance companies enter into 
banking. 
(x) Reducing risk:-
The insurance business itself is regarded as risky business because of the nature of its 
activities. Unexpected huge amount of claims may lead bankruptcy. The insurance 
companies, by diversifying into banking business, can reduce risk because of asset 
diversification like the banks (discussed earlier section of this chapter). According to 
portfolio theory, diversification spreads the risk, and thus reduces the risk. Therefore. to 
reduce risks. the insurance companies may diversify into banking business. However. this 
is an empirical issue and will be tested empirically in Chapter six. 
(xi) Cross-border entry facilities within the EU: 
Through a series of banking as well as insurance Directives the European market is more 
liberal then ever and anywhere in the world. These Directives give power to EU nationals 
to set up business anywhere in Europe. This is called single passport for business. Banks 
or insurance companies existing in one country can set up their branch in other EU 
countries without prior authorisation from the host country. They are even free from host 
country control. but they are controlled by the home country authorities. This gives an 
idea of cross-section activities between banking and insurance. How does the strategy 
work here? For example. one big bank of one European country can buy a smaller local 
insurance company in another EU country or arrange joint ventures or simply make a 
strategic alliance with another insurance company. On the other hand, one big insurance 
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company in one EU country can acquire a smaller bank in other EU country. The logic 
behind this is to enter into each other's market [Dickinson & Zajdlic (1994); Dickinson 
(1997); Hardwick and Dou (1998)]. Thus, the European liberalisation through 'single 
licence' within the member states motivates banks to move into insurance and vice versa. 
We have shown such cross-border entries in the Table 4.5. 
Table: 4.5 
Banks-insurance cross-border links in Europe, 1996 
Bank Insurer Venture formed 
Banco Popular Espanol (UK) Allianz (Germany) and its joint venture life company 
Italian subsidiary RAS 
Abbey National (UK) Winthertur (Switzerland)· Joint venture ABBEY COR to 
market endowment mortgages 
Caser, the Spanish insurance Skandia (Sweden) Joint venture life company, 
company of CECA, the saving Intercaser 
bank confederation 
Spanish subsidiary of BNP (a Generali (Italy) Joint venture pensions 
leading Franch bank) management company 
Banque Indosuez (France) Mapfre Vida (Spain) Joint venture Mapfre Indosuez 
Banco Atlantico (Spain) AGF Espana (subsidiary of Joint venture company, AGF 
AGF France) Atlantico 
R+V (Germany) Cajas Rurales (Spain) Rural Vida and Rural Seguros 
Generales 
Banesto (Spain) AGF (France) Agreement to set up a 50%/50% 
insurance company for products 
distributed through Banesto 
Monta del Paschi di Siena Predica (France) Joint venture life and non-life 
(Italy) company 
ICCRI, the central institute of AXA-Midi (France) Joint venture life company 
Italian saving banks 
Credito Italiano (Italy) Commercial Union (UK) Distribution agreement and local 
cross-shareholdings 
CARIPLO (Italy's largest TSB (UK) and CNP Joint venture life 
savings bank) (France) 
ING Group (Netherlands) Bishopsgate Insurance Co Acquisition 
(UK) 
Delta Lloyd (Netherlands) Commercial Union (UK) 99% ofCU's subsidiary 
Baltica Group (Denmark) Hambros (UK) 10% of Hambros 
Forties VSB bank 
Source: own compIlation from varIous sources 
134 
4.2.3. THE EUROPEAN REGULATORS MOTIVES 
4.2.3.1. THE EUROPEAN REGULATORS MOTIVES FOR ALLOWING 
DIVERSIFICATION 
Traditionally the banking and insurance industries have operated under different laws and 
regulations, which implied separate supervisions. The banking business is mainly 
regulated by the central bank of the country (Table 4.6) and the government's trade 
department mainly regulates the insurance business. (Table 4.7). There is a strict legal 
barrier, so called 'Chinese Wall' between banking and insurance industry. Banks can not 
own insurance companies, and on the other hand, insurance companies can not own 
banking companies. Even in insurance business life assurance companies can not own 
general insurance companies and general insurance companies can not own life assurance 
companies 1• 
(i) The Need/or Regulation 
The basic function of a bank is of taking deposits from public, lending of money and 
money transmission services, on the other hand, the basic function of an insurance 
company is to take risks against financial loss [discussed in Chapter one]. 
These two industries are regarded as the two core pillars of the whole financial system. 
The country's economy is mainly based on them. Banks take money directly from the 
public in two ways: One is by selling shares, debentures etc. like other registered PLC 
companies and the other is by taking money as deposits. Insurance companies also take 
money directly from the public in two ways. One is by selling shares, debentures etc. and 
135 
the other is taking insurance premiums against specified risks. So, we see that both of 
them take moneys directly from public and conduct their business with public moneys. 
To evaluate the need for regulation, it is necessary to highlight the banking and insurance 
market structure. In the banking and insurance market there are (1) manufacturer, i.e. 
banks and insurance underwriters, (2) suppliers, i.e. different intermediaries like branch 
network, agents, brokers etc, and (3) consumers, i.e. policyholders and depositors. Some 
specialist market place are designed like stock market, future market, foreign exchange 
market, insurance exchange market (Netherlands only) to conduct different financial 
business operations. All the parties mentioned above thus are directly involved in the 
operation process in the market and every party in the process is dependent on each other 
to complete the whole business process. The government has responsibility to protect all 
the parties involve in the process as well as to protect the market in order to maintain a 
sound and smooth financial operation to stabilise the economy. Government through its 
financial watchdogs or regulatory agencies protects all the parties and the market by using 
various regulatory and supervisory tools. 
However, there is a debate in the market economy as to whether the regulation is 
unnecessary because it hinders the efficient operation of markets [Rahman (1992)]. In the 
market economy, the market will decide who will stay, and who will not stay in the 
market in a competitive environment by allowing 'caveat emptier'. In a competitive 
market, those who perform better will survive and those who do not will be automatically 
out of the market. In case of banking and insurance, the situation is different since both 
conduct their business with public money one as deposits and other as premiums. So, it is 
1 One may argue on the composite companies, i.e. that offers both life as well as non-life cover. But even 
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the government's duty to protect such depositors and policyholders savings. Carter and 
Dickinson (1992) in the banner of 'barriers to trade in insurance' identified the following 
objectives for regulation from the insurance companies' perspective. These are protection 
of policyholders, avoidance of wasteful and destructive competition, development of 
local insurance market, protection for balance of payments, channelling funds to local 
capital markets and national security. On the other hand, from the banks' perspective, 
Meier (1991) identified the following objectives: to monitor corporate solvency, to ensure 
fair trading to regulate entry to markets, to promote price stability, and to satisfy social 
objectives. Therefore, it is seen that the regulation in banking as well as in insurance 
broadly serves a common goal, i.e. (1) Protect the public money, (2) Safeguard the 
economy, (3) Control the economy. Brady et al., (1995) in their regulation theories also 
justified these reasons. 
(ii) The Rationale for Keeping Separation of Banking and Insurance Business 
Banking business is regarded as a risky and complex business; insurance business is also 
regarded as a risky and complex business. This can be seen by observing the huge volume 
legislation and regulation for insurance and banking businesses. Keeping separate these 
two risky and complex business will reduce the complexity and risk. Also keeping them 
separate will stop them from becoming a giant financial finn that may manipulate the 
business and economy. Dickinson and Dinenis (1992) argued that the prohibition of cross 
business activities between banks and insurance companies has existed in order to reduce 
the vulnerability of the financial system and to minimise the potential growth of power by 
composite companies have to operate under two different section life and non-life business. 
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large financial conglomerates. For this reason, almost every jurisdiction has deliberately 
kept separate these two businesses through prohibitive regulation. Furthermore, insurance 
companies accounting system and banks accounting system are totally different. The 
firm's financial positions and risks are assessed from the accounting system by the 
regulators and supervisors2. By keeping them separate it is easy to assess each groups 
risks and financial strength to obtain an overall picture. Since banking and insurance 
businesses are both based on paramount faith by the public as if a bank or an insurance 
company goes bust, then the depositors or policyholders will lose their savings. This will 
then have a negative effect on the survival of other companies because the public will 
loses faith in them. People will withdraw their deposits or close their insurance policies. 
From this will result a shortage of capitals and in this respect the economic system of a 
country may collapse. 
(iii) The Reasons for Abolishing Restrictions by the European Regulators 
As we mentioned earlier, bankers can not invade insurer territory and insurers on the 
other hand, can not invade bankers' territory. There is a Chines Wall between them. 
Because the law does not allow such cross activities. But why are the regulators and 
supervisors in Europe now liberalising legal barriers between banking and insurance 
business, while in the rest of the world, including other very strong and open economy 
likes the US, Japan, Canada still keeping banking firms separate from insurance firms. In 
this respect, Europe may be used as a laboratory or a test-field for the possibility of 
2 There is a requirement by the regulators and supervisors of banks and insurance companies that banks and 
insurance companies have to submit fmancial statements, prescribed by the regulatory authorities from 
where they can assess individual company's risks and fitness. 
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'financial supermarket' for others. There are good reasons for liberalising legislation's 
and regulations in Europe. This is the direct effect of the formation of the EEC that is 
based on the Treaty of Rome of 1957. The purpose of the EEC was to create a 'common 
market' for a greater integration within the European countries. The European regulators 
have liberalised the market for (a) creating greater competition in the market so that 
customers can get competitive lower prices and better quality of services; (b) integrating 
and harmonising the market to achieve the 'single market' theme in Europe; and more 
importantly (c) decreasing bankruptcy risks (this will be tested empirically in chapter five 
and six) by allowing diversification. 
In the modem world, customers habits are changing3. People want everything from under 
one roof including banking products as well as insurance products4• There are also 
business trends, which we see these days. For instance, tobacco companies own insurance 
companiess. Airlines own insurance companies6, clothing stores are entering into banking 
7 business, groceries stores are entering into banking8 and so many cross section activities 
are developing. This trend has also influenced banks and insurance companies to 
diversify into each other's territory. 
Technology has been improved dramatically, especially since the seventies. Information 
can be sent more efficiently and faster than ever before. Laptop, mobile telephone, 
Internet, and modem telephone system have made it easier to transfer messages. Banks 
3 Hoschka (1994) 'Bancassurance' in Europe. 
4 This is supported by a recent survey on banking customers with regard to bancassurance. 
5 Eagle Star insurance company is owned by BAT industries, a tobacco company. 
6 Virgin Atlantic. 
7 Marks and Sponsors in the UK. 
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and insurance companies by using these technologies can spread their business with 
efficiency. 
Risk management tools have also been improved. Sophisticated high tech has allowed 
financial companies to asses risks efficiently and thus minimise risks9. Instead of 
traditional option and future market, high standard derivative instruments have been 
implanted in the financial markets. Trade and business are become more internationalised 
by the day. This has also given an influence to liberalise markets. 
As trade and business are increasing day by day financial company's business volume are 
also increasing. The more and more increasing business the more dependence to each 
other companies, i.e.. Banks to insurance companies, or vice visa. A substantial amount 
has to be paid for taking the services that provide that. As banking and insurance 
businesses are co related in the business world, banks or insurance companies can reduce 
dependence by setting up their own outlets if legislation allows them to do so. Moreover, 
due to a common market theme from the Treaty of Rome (1957), cross-border strategy 
can easily be applied, i.e. large banks in one member state can acquire small insurance 
companies to enter that insurance market and thus have a direct pressure to regulators to 
liberalise the market. 
8 Tesco superstore, J. Sainsbury in the UK. 
9 For instance, PDQ terminal for fraud cards transactions. 
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4.2.3.2. TRADITIONAL REGULATORY & SUPERVISORY SYSTEM OF 
BANKING AND INSURANCE: AN OVERVIEW 
Traditionally the banking and insurance industries have operated under different laws and 
regulations, which implied separate supervisions. The banking business is mainly 
regulated by the central bank of the country (Table 4.6) and the government's trade 
department mainly regulates the insurance business. (Table 4.7). Therefore, there are 
different regulatory frameworks for banking and insurance. These regulatory frame works 
are based on legislation's and further regulations to cover up the 'A to Z' of the whole 
business process, i.e. authorisation process, scope of business, capital requirements, 
solvency margin, suitability of directors and managers, accounting rules, monitoring 
intermediaries, protection of depositors and policy holders, and winding up process of 
business. Within the respective regulatory frameworks, there is a strict legal barrier, the 
so-called 'Chinese Wall' between banking and insurance industry. Banks can not own 
insurance companies, on the other hand, insurance companies can not own banking 
companies. Even in insurance business life assurance companies can not own general 
insurance companies and general insurance companies can not own life assurance 
companies lO• 
There are a great variety of regulatory and supervisory systems that differ from country to 
country in Europe. This differences are in the insurance business as well as in the banking 
business because of the nature of different jurisdictions and country's economic system 
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although the EC has harmonised these system among the Member Countries by 
introducing a series of insurance and banking directives (discussed later in this chapter). 
However, in Europe two basic models are generally distinguished in insurance. On going 
supervision which is mainly followed by the UK and Netherlands, and the comprehensive 
material supervision which is mainly followed by Austria, Switzerland and Germany. 
Other countries in Europe follow the mixed forms [e.g. Hohlfeld (1993)]. In banking too 
the UK and the Netherlands are regarded as having the most liberal regulation while 
Germany and others are regarded as strictly regulated. Whatever the methods used, 
traditionally the banking and insurance regulation and supervision are conducted 
separately by the separate regulatory and supervisory institutions. This argument is 
supported by our preliminary investigation results in Table 4.6 and 4.7. 
10 One may argue on the composite i.e. that offers both life as well as non-life cover. But even composite 
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Table: 4.6 
vervlew 0 uropean an 109 e~a system o fE b k' 
Country Main Banking Laws Central Bank Regulators & Supervisors Main Banking 
Association 
Austria The Banking Act Osterreichische Fachverband der Banken 
1979 (amended 1986) Nationalbank ( 1922) und Bankiers 
Belgium The Banking Law Banque National de The Banking Commission, Association BeIge 
1935 Belgique (1850) Banque National de des Banques 
Belgique, Institut Belgo-
Luxembourgeois de 
Change 
Denmark The Commercial Danmarks Finanstilsynet Den Danske 
Bank and Savings Nationalbank (1936) Bankforening 
Bank Act 1975 
(amended 1985) 
France The Banking Law Banque de France Commission Bancaire Association 
1984 (1800) Francaise des 
Banques 
Germany The Banking Law Deutsche Federal Banking Bundesverband 
1934 (amended 1961, Bundesbank (1957) Supervisory Office, Deutscher Banken 
1974) Ministry of Finance, eV 
Deutsches Bundesbank 
Italy The Banking Law Banca d'Italia (1893) Banca d'Italia Associazione 
1936 Bancaria Italiana 
Netherlan The Act on the The Netherlands The Netherlands Bank Nederlands 
ds Supervision of the Bank (1814) Ministry of Economic Vereniging van 
Credit System 1952 Affairs Banken 
(amended 1956, 
1978), The Credit 
Control Act 1976 
Portugal Banco de Portugal Associacao 
(1846) Portuguesa Bancos 
Spain The Banking Law Banco de Espana Banco de Espana Consejo Superior 
1962, 1988 (1922) Bancario 
Sweden The Banking Law Sveriges Riksbank Bankinspektion, Ministry Svenska 
1969 (amended 1987) (1897) of Finance Bankforeningen 
Switzerlan Federal Law on Schweizerische Federal Banking Schweizerische 
d Banks and Savings Nationalbank (1906) Commission Bankiervereinigung 
1934 (amended 1971, 
1972, 1976,1981) 
United The Banking Act Bank of England Bank of England, British Bankers 
Kingdom 1987, The Financial (1694), The Securities and Investment Association, 
Services Act 1986, Registerer of Friendly Board Building Societies 
The Building Societies Association 
Societies Act 1986 
Source: own compllatlon from VariOUS sources 
companies have to operate under two different section life and non-life business. 
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Table: 4.7 
o fE vervlew 0 uropean msurance ega system 
Country Main Insurance Laws Regulators and Supervisors Main Insurance Association 
Austria The Insurance Supervisory Law Insurance Supervisory Verband der 
1978 (with amended upto 1986) Authority (Ministry of Versicherungsunternehmung 
Finance) en Osterreichs 
Belgium The Belgian Insurance Act Insurance Control Office Union Professionnelle des 
1975, The Insurance Entreprises d' Assurance 
Companies (Regulation) Decree 
of 1976 
Denmark The Insurance Companies Act The Insurance Council, Assurandor Societet 
1959 (revised 1981), The Financial Supervisory 
Insurance Contract Lae 1930, Service (Ministry of 
The Marketing Act 1975 Industry) 
France The Law of 13 July 1930, The Insurance Directorate Federation Francaise des 
Law of 26 July 1992, The Law (Ministry of Economy, Societes d' Assurance, Union 
of 4th January 1994. Finance, and Budjet) des d' Assurance et de 
Capitalisation par Actions 
du Secteur Privee 
Germany The Law for Insurance Federal Supervisory Office Gesamtverband der 
Regulation 1901, Insurance for Insurance Deutschen 
Business Law 1983 (amended Versicherungswirtschaft e V 
1984) 
Italy The Insurance Industry Law Ministry of Industry, Trade, Associazione Nationale 
449 1959 for Life, Law 990 and Crafts, Istituto per la Imprese Assicuratrlci 
1969 and Law 45 1981 for Vigilanza sulle 
motor, Law 295 1978 for Assicurazioni Private e di 
Property and Liability and Law Interesse Collettivo 
14 1978 for armual return 
Netherlands Supervisory Insurance Business Insurance Commission Verbond van Verzekeraars 
Act 1987 in Nederland 
Portugal Portuguese Insurance Associacao Portuguesa de 
Institute, Ministry of Seguradores 
Finance 
Spain The Insurance Control Law Insurance Supervisory Union Espanola de 
1969The Laws of2 February Service (Ministry of Entidades Aseguradores, 
1912 for regulating insurance Finance) Reaseguradoras y de 
companies, the Law of 16 Capitalizacion 
December 1954 for regulating 
private insurance 
Sweden The Insurance Business Act Swedish Private Insurance Svenska Forsakringsbolags 
1982, The Anti-Trust Act 1953 Supervisory Service Riksforbund 
Switzerland Federal Law on Insurance 1895 Btv Schweizerische 
(revised 1978) Versicherungsverband 
United The Insurance Companies Act Department of Trade and Association of British 
Kingdom 1982, The Lloyd's Act 1982, Industry (Insurance Insurers 
Financial Services Act 1986 Division), Personal 
Investment Authority 
Source: own compIlatlon from vanous sources 
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A recent survey on banking and insurance by the DEeD (1992) within the DECD 
countries shows that European countries have the most liberalised cross-sectional 
activities between banking and insurance of all countries. In some countries, underwriting 
activities are relatively restricted while the distribution activities are very liberalised. This 
is shown in the table. This study did not show the exact laws that allows for cross 
activities and the exact time period from when the regulators in Europe have liberalised 
the cross section activities. In our own investigation in 1996 we have filled in this gap. 
We have shown which laws of the individual European countries have allowed cross-
sectional activities between banks and insurance companies, from when, and in what 
capacity i.e .. directly or by setting up a subsidiary etc. This is reported in Table 4.8. 
4.2.3.3. ABOLISHING RESTRICTIONS BETWEEN BANKS CHANGING 
POSITION IN INDIVIDUAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
Europe was the first mover in the changing patterns between banking and insurance, 
especially Western Europe. The UK was the first mover in such cross-section activities. 
TSB (1967) become the model, which was later copied by other European firms, though 
Barclays Bank started this operation two years earlier than TSB. Here, we will investigate 
the development of changing laws and regulation country by country in European 
countries with regard to banking - insurance cross-section activities, i.e. 'bancassurance' 
and 'assurancebank'. 
i. The United Kingdom (UK): 
Under the Insurance Companies Act all insurance companies must be authorised to carry 
out insurance business. Insurance business is divided into long term and short term. Each 
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is divided into classes following the classification into first life and non-life directives. 
The second and third life and non life directives have been implemented into the UK law 
by regulations amending the Insurance Companies Act and by revoking the Insurance 
Companies Regulations 1981 and replacing then with the Insurance Companies 
Regulations 1994. Amendments were also made to Insurance Companies (Credit 
insurance) Regulations 1990, the Insurance Companies (Amendment) Regulations 1992 
and the Insurance Companies (Accounts and Statements) Regulations 1983. This 
changing approach is to follow the EC Directives wordings and to adopt a liberal 
approach where there is a choice. The United Kingdom is traditionally liberalised. There 
is no restriction in the UK market for cross shareholdings, or owning or controlling or 
creation of holding companies. But a person acquiring a holding of more than 15% in an 
insurance company is regarded as a controller of that company and is then subject to the 
obligation to report the proposed acquisition to supervisory authorities for approval. The 
UK is the first mover with regard to bancassurance. Although the term 'bancassurance' is 
a French word, in the UK in 1965 the largest commercial bank and one of the then world 
largest banks, Barclays PLC, set up its own life assurance subsidiary, named Barclays 
Life Assurance Company, a life underwriting company. Two years later in 1969 TSB set 
up its own life assurance subsidiary, named, TSB Life Assurance Company, a life 
underwriting company of the bank. The TSB is now called the model of bancassurance. 
30% of TSB's group total profit comes from insurance. But after the implementation of 
The Financial Services Act 1986, such cross-section activities increased dramatically. 
All the commercial banks and major building societies now have their own life assurance 
subsidiary. The Building Societies Act 1986, also allow building societies to offer most 
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of core commercial banking products i.e. cheque book, current account etc. and to own 
life assurance underwriting companies. For distribution of insurance UK banks have a 
long tradition of distribution of insurance. Almost all the commercial banks have their 
own insurance broking subsidiaries. From 1994 onwards building societies were free to 
acquire general insurance underwriting companies if they so wish. On the other side, any 
person taking a holding of more than 15% of a bank has to submit his project for approval 
by the Bank of England. 
ii. France: 
France is one of the leading countries where banking insurance commercial interface 
appears to have developed significantly. In France bancassurance operation started from 
mid 80' s. Banks are allowed to control insurance companies or to create their own. At the 
same time insurance companies are allowed to control banks or to create their own. The 
first bank entered in insurance was Federales Vie in 1969. 
iii. Germany: 
In Germany bankers-insurers cross section activities also started in the late 80s. Banks 
have to notify the Federal Control Office and the Bundesbank when they plan to acquire 
of more than 10% in an insurance company. Insurance companies can freely acquire 
shareholdings by using their shareholders' funds, but can not own more than 10% of a 
company's capital through their technical funds. Although the regroupings of banks and 
insurance companies started in the 80s, in 1992 the Raidheisen Co-operative banks 
started selling both life and non life insurance pro~ucts on behalf of their subsidiary, R + 
V Allgemeine, which in 1922 was ranked as the second largest company for non-life 
business and the 4th largest for life business. 
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iv. Italy: 
The 1936 Banking Act prohibits banks and special credit institutions from ownmg 
insurance companies. A 1925 law also prohibits insurance and fund management 
companies from engaging in additional activities. From June 1990 banks are permitted to 
acquire insurance companies and from June 1991 insurance companies have been allowed 
to take shareholdings in banks. But the Bank of Italy retains the right to veto reciprocal 
shareholding arrangements. 
v. Spain: 
Although insurance companies have been able to collect household savings since 1984, 
the banks could not directly offer insurance products until the Act of 30 April 1992 and 
had to set up their own brokerage firms. Banks can now negotiate distribution agreements 
with insurance companies. 
vi. Netherlands: 
Between 1981-89, the regulatory barriers prevented banks and insurance companies from 
owning more than 5% of each other's voting stock. However, the Dutch Government 
eliminated the ownership barrier on January I, 1990, thereby allowing banks to acquire 
control of insurers - and - vice versa- by creating holding companies. Banks and insurance 
companies are permitted to own more than 15% of each other's share capital. Banks and 
insurance companies are allowed to own building societies and subject to certain 
conditions, vice versa since 1987. The legislation permits structural regroupings 
involving banks and insurance companies through the creation of holding companies (for 
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instance ING Holding) which allow each entity to retain its autonomous management 
structure. 
vii. Belgium: 
Banks are permitted to take control of insurance companies, subject to authorisation from 
the Financial and Banking Commission. Banks can create their own insurance companies, 
run insurance broking and set up Joint-Ventures, as long as they do not infringe the 
limitations imposed on the investments of their liabilities to policyholders. 
viii. Sweden: 
Following the changes oflaw in 1991, insurance companies are permitted to hold + 5% of 
a bank or a financial institution subject to the supervisory authorities approving the 
holding and a number of key ratios, based on shareholders' funds, being satisfied. Banks 
have to meet the same requirements as these imposed on insurance companies. Unlike 
insurance companies, which are free to adopt any group structure, banks may only be 
subsidiaries of others banks, insurance companies, or holding companies. However 
regrouping of banks and insurance companies have already taken place in Sweden. 
ix. Denmark: 
Following the amendment to the Insurance Supervisory Act 1990, insurance companies 
are able through their subsidiaries to conduct banking activities. Banks are not permitted 
to have qualified shareholding in a company, which exceeds 15% of their shareholders' 
funds. The total amount of 'qualified' shareholdings of a bank must not exceed 60% of 
their funds. These restrictions do not apply to subsidiaries of banks if these are either 
credit institutions or insurance companies. Insurance companies are allowed to create 
banking subsidiaries, and vice versa. 
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x. Norway: 
Since 1 January 1992, an amendment to the law has permitted the creation of financial 
groups. Banks can own insurance companies and insurance companies can own banking 
companies. 
xi. Portugal: 
Portuguese legislation neither prohibits nor explicitly permits the distribution of insurance 
products by banks. Now almost all the commercial banks offer insurance products. 
Table: 4.8 
ross- usmess permlssl e ac IVI les 10 C b' . 'bl f'f . E urope 
Feature UK Franc Germ Italy Spain N.Lands Denmark Belg Swed Portu Norw 
e any ium en _gal ay 
1.Legillatory 
permission 
Bank 1986 1992 1990 1992 1990 1990 1991 • 1992 
Insurance 1986 1992 1991 1984 1990 1990 1991 • 1992 
2. Direct 
Production 
Bank No No no no No No No No No No No 
Insurance No No no no No No No No No No No 
3. Direct 
distribution 
Bank Yes Yes yes yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Insurance Yes Yes yes yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
4. Equity 
holdin2 
Bank 15% 10% N/a N/a N/a 15%%+ 15%+ but +5% N/a N/a N/a 
-60% 
Insurance 10% 10% N/a N/a N/a 15%+ 15%+ but +5% N/a N/a N/a 
-60% 
5. Creation of 
subsidiary 
Bank Yes Yes ves ves Yes Yes Yes Yes -'yes Yes Yes 
Insurance Yes Yes yes yes Yes Yes Yes Yes yes Yes Yes 
6. Creation of 
"oldinR 
Bank Yes Yes yes yes Yes Yes Yes Yes yes Yes Yes 
Insurance Yes Yes yes yes Yes Yes Yes Yes yes Yes Yes 
. . . . ... 
·Portuguese legIslatIOn neIther prohIbIts nor explIcItly permIts cross sectIon actIVItIes between banks and msurance companIes. N/a 
= Not available. 
Source: Own compilation from various sources 
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4.2.4. CONSUMER MOTIVES 
The consumers also influence diversification, especially banking and insurance cross 
diversification. The Swiss Re (1993) conducted a survey about the consumers' attitude 
towards insurance. The survey shows that 34% prefer to buy life assurance from sales 
man, 21 % from brokers, 18% from building societies, 15% from banks and 3% choose 
post as their favoured method. The banks and building societies combined account for 
(18% + 15%) = 33%, which is one third of the national market. Such consumer 
preference has also influenced banks and insurance companies to diversify towards each 
other's activities. 
Consumers by buying everything under one roof can save time and energy. They may 
possibly save cost by getting especial offer from a bank or from an insurance company 
(for instance, mortgage and building insurance from the same company). On the other 
hand, there is a proverb, 'do not put all your eggs in the same basket'. If all the saving 
elements are bought from the same company and if the company become insolvent or if 
there is any fraudulent misrepresentation in the contract then there is a risk of losing 
everything in that case. We will test the bankruptcy risk in chapter five and six from the 
bancassurance and assurancebank perspective respectively. 
4.5. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we have investigated the strategic motives with regard to changing 
interfaces between the banks and the insurance companies. In other words, we have 
investigated why the European banks are moving towards insurance activities and why 
the insurance companies, too are moving towards banking activities. We have 
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investigated these strategic motives from the bankers' point of view as well as the 
insurers' point of view. We have seen that the bank strategies are offensive type and 
insurer strategies are more defensive type. From the above investigations, we have seen 
that the changes of regulation are the crucial factor for changing interfaces between the 
banks and the insurance companies. The EC directives have also a great influence in 
changing their interfaces. It is believed that bank diversification into insurance or vice 
versa, will provide opportunities of risk reduction and cost savings. On the other hand, it 
is believed that such diversification will increase bankruptcy risks. Therefore, in the next 
two chapters, we will test bancassurance and assurancebank risks respectively. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
TESTING RETURN AND RISK EFFECTS OF BANKS DIVERSIFICATION 
INTO INSURANCE BUSINESS 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
We have shown in Chapter two that banks have diversified into insurance business, i.e .. 
bancassurance activities, and in Chapter three that the insurance companies, have also 
made incursions into banking business, i.e. 'assurancbank' activities. The main objective 
of this chapter is to test the effect of European banks' diversification into insurance 
business, in particular, life assurance underwriting business, general insurance 
underwriting business, and insurance broking business on their risk and return. The main 
issue we deal with is whether the probability of bankruptcy decreases or increases. To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to quantify the benefits of bancassurance in 
Europe. 
Bancassurance may be potentially beneficial since it allows the commercial banks to 
diversify into insurance activities and diversification may spread risk and thus reduce the 
risk of failure. On the other hand, insurance activities may be riskier than banking 
activities when viewed on a stand-alone basis. If so, then the 'bancassurance' firms may 
increase the probability of bank failure. 
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The rest of this chapter is as follows: in section 2, we outline the alternative measure of 
risks. In section 3, we discuss the review of literature. In section 4, we develop the 
methodology and describe the data collection for the test. In section 5, we conduct the test 
and analyse the results. Finally in section 6, we conclude. 
5.2. ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF RISKS 
Studies of the risk implications of insurance activities can be approached in three ways 
[Eisenbeis (1994)]. 
The first approach is descriptive examinations of the risks inherent in insurance and 
banking activities as compared with those found in banking generally. Various studies 
have attempted to characterise the risk and related attributes of insurance and to identify 
the kinds of synergies that might exist between traditional banking activities and 
insurance brokerage and underwriting [e.g. Maycock and Ravel (1976); Dickinson and 
Dinenis (1992); Walter and Saunders (1994); Eisenbeis (1995)]. Brokerage is mainly a 
commission and/or fee oriented business. It is not a capital utilising activity, and since the 
bank is merely acting as an agent, there are little safety and soundness concerns. 
However, the potential risks to the safety and soundness (or solvency risk) of a broking 
firm relates to: losses from its inability to sell enough policies, that is, to earn sufficient 
commissions to cover fixed and variable costs of operations; the potential opportunity 
cost of diverting scarce management resources toward an unprofitable area of business; 
and potential legal liability for errors and omissions made in marketing such policies. 
Nevertheless, brokerage activities have been typically profitable with high yields on 
invested equity (mainly in the form of incremental physical capital). For instance, in the 
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UK in 1996, out of the top ten profitable insurance brokerage firms, six firms were owned 
by bank. 
Insurance underwriting, on the other hand, may pose some higher risks to those banks that 
seek to undertake the activity. Historically, the activity is capital intensive and 
profitability has typically been low (Arthur Y ong 1983). 
General insurance underwriting entails knowledge of specialised risks, most of which are 
not closely related to traditional banking activities. For instance, in general insurance 
underwriting, the key feature of claims loss is the actuarial predictability of losses relative 
to premiums earned, which banks are not familiar with. Banks are not even familiar with 
how to handle this type of losses. Walter and Saunders (1994) reported that the general 
insurance underwriting companies' insolvency risk may arise as a result of unexpected 
increases in loss rates, unexpected increases in expenses (legal expenses, commissions, 
taxes etc.), and unexpected declines in investment yields/returns. General insurance 
underwriting companies' underwriting profits are generally negative. Table 2.15 in 
Chapter two clearly shows how risky underwriting activities are. However, underwriting 
companies try to manage profits from their investment income. 
Life assurance underwriting is less risky than general insurance underwriting, because the 
risks are more predictable. Nevertheless, profit levels have remained lower than in 
general insurance underwriting. The industry has been characterised by a rapidly changing 
product mix as whole life policies decline in attractiveness relative to other products. The 
largest growth area has been in annuity type products, which closely resemble longer-term 
bank CDs [e.g. Eisenbeis (1995)]. 
However, there are certain types of risks that are not fundamentally different in nature 
that banks typically undertake in their other activities. For instance, project risk 
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assessment and pricing of risks are everyday banking activities, as are hedging and 
investment activities to control exposure. 
The second approach is event studies, i.e. by examining stock market data to determine 
if the announcement of intent to engage in insurance activities is perceived by the market 
to be a positive or negative event. In the market data, a risk measure is commonly used in 
the finance literature, one which can only be computed with market data. It is the beta 
coefficient of a firm's common stock, a measure of the relationship between the rate of 
return on the stock and the average rate of return to the market. Here, the beta is obtained 
by estimating the time-series regression. 
where R; is the market rate of return on equity for j period, a is an intercept term; P is an 
estimate of the beta coefficient; RSP is an estimate of the return to the total market, which is 
based on the value of Standard and Poor's SOO-stock price index, pSP: 
and p is an error term. 
However, market data have their own problems. The volatility of market returns, for instance, 
may reflect random noise or at least some kind of exogenous shocks which are unrelated to 
the true profitability of the firm. No one as yet has satisfactorily explained why market returns 
are consistently as volatile as they are (Mehra and Prescott 1985). Market data also have a 
dating problem, which has been called look-ahead bias. Market prices have been found to 
respond to published accounting data. The publication date of financial data typically lags the 
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end of the reporting period by two or three months. Therefore, computing market returns 
based on stock prices for the same date as the end of the accounting period may imply that the 
investor is able to forecast without error (Banz and Breen 1986). Nevertheless, we were 
interested in using stock market data as well as accounting data, but we were unable to obtain 
market data for banks' own insurance subsidiary companies, as majorities of them are not 
reported separately in the market. Hopefully, other researchers may be able to employ stock 
market data in future whenever they are available. 
The third approach takes a portfolio selection approach and attempt to determine, using 
returns from banking, insurance and other possible activities, whether insurance is likely 
to be risk reducing and whether it is found in the efficient asset set. Since we have 
managed to collect only accounting data, we will employ this approach in our risk/return 
analysis of bank diversification into insurance activities. 
5.3. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
A number of US studies examined the potential portfolio implications of permitting 
banking firms to engage in different forms of insurance business. [Heggestad (1975), Wall 
& Eisenbeis (1984), Litan (1987)]. They have employed data from federal income tax 
returns which allow aggregate comparisons of the potential impact on return on assets over 
different time periods by examining the correlation between returns on non banking and 
banking activities, and the coefficient of variation of returns from non-banking business as 
compared with banking business. A lower coefficient of variation would suggest that the 
activities might potentially be risk reducing if permitted to banking firms or vice versa in 
the case of higher coefficient of variation. Litan (1987) calculated the coefficient of 
variation(CV) of returns for each industry and their correlation coefficient(CC) with 
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banking. He argued that mergers of banks and non-banks would be potentially risk 
reducing if the coefficient of variation for non-banking industry is small relative to 
banking, and if the correlation coefficient between banking and non-banking returns is 
negative. The results of some of the studies are shown in the table 5.1. 
Table 5.1. 
Results of some studies on risk effects of banks diversification into insurance business 
Activity Heggested John & Wall & Eisenbeis Litan (62-72) Litan (73-82) Litan (62-82) 
Meinster 
CV CC CV CC CV CC CV CC CV CC CV CC 
Banks .25 .33 .21 .23 .20 .22 
BHCs .20 .79 .20 .63 .20 .63 
Insurance .18 .41 .18 -.79 .29 .23 .25 -.19 
underwriti 
ng 
Life .10 -040 .13 -.87 .32 -.04 -.27 
assurance 
Mutual 049 .31 .59 -.55 Al .44 -.21 
insurance 
Other .43 .45 .18 -.46 049 .36 .08 
insurance 
Insurance .12 -.38 .15 -.42 .19 .70 .10 -.62 .23 .21 -.06 
agency 
. CV = Coefficient of Vanatlon; CC = Correlatlon CoefficIent. 
Source: Litan 1987 
Utan (1987) presents the coefficients of variation for return on asset (ROA) for pair wise 
combinations of banking and insurance agency and underwriting activities. In mutual 
insurance underwriting, the combined bank-insurance underwriting coefficient of 
variation (CV) of ROA is greater than for banking alone. The results suggest that 
insurance agency activities are less risky than banking if they had been permitted to 
banks. The returns on insurance underwriting for life assurance, mutual insurance, and 
other insurance were negatively correlated with those of banking, suggesting that in the 
158 
right proportions, had banks been permitted to engage in insurance underwriting activities 
over the period 1962-1982, their risk, on average, would have been reduced. 
Litan (1987) reached a slightly different conclusion when efficient portfolio combinations 
of various banking and non-banking activities were considered using the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) data in a mean-variance framework. Banking clearly appears to be 
among the least risky activities - with low variance and mean returns. Insurance activities 
appear to be riskier. Insurance agency activities appear to be the most risky, but highest 
yelding, activity. Meinster & Johnson (1974) reached similar conclusions. 
Boyd & Graham (1988) employ accounting data rather than income tax data, to 
investigate the return and risk implications of expanding bank holding company 
activities. They use return on equity (ROE) to capture returns and two measures of risk. 
These two are the standard deviation of ROE and a measure of the probability of 
bankruptcy. Their data include information on insurance activities [life assurance 
underwriting; general insurance (property & causality) underwriting; insurance agency 
activities], securities and, real estate activities. Their method was a simulation merger 
between banks and firms in these industries, and a comparison of the resulting bankruptcy 
risk measures for the simulated firms with those of unmerged banks. In their experiment, 
they found that bankruptcy risk falls slightly when banks merge with life assurance 
companies, but rises when banks merge with property/casualty insurance or insurance 
agentlbroking or securities or real estate firms. 
Profitability of agency (broking) and underwriting of general insurance business (property 
& causality) exceeds that of bank holding companies, but all insurance activities looked 
more risky according to their measures. Simulating pair wise combinations of BHes and 
various insurance activities, they found that ROE would have been slightly higher if 
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agency activities had been permitted and slightly lower if general insurance and life 
assurance underwriting had been permitted. However, risks would have been lower for 
bank combinations with life assurance and slightly higher if agency and general insurance 
activities had been permitted. 
Another study by Boyd, Graham and Hewitt (1993) found that mergers of bank holding 
companies with life assurance or property/caswilty insurance (general insurance) firms 
would reduce risk but with insurance agency/broking would have increased. 
Wall (1987) found that the probability of failure is greater for non-banking subsidiaries 
than for banking subsidiaries. Liang and Savage (1990) found that risk is greater in non-
banking than banking. In examining the potential impact on bank risk of permitting 
securities business, Kwast (1989) found that diversification gains were relatively small. 
Rosen et al., (1989) also found minimal benefits. 
Walter & Saunders [1994] conducted analysis of US banks diversification into different 
non-bank activities including insurance. They found that highest return per unit of risk 
would be obtained in the combination of banking with property/casualty insurance. 
Brown, Genetay, and Molyneux (1996) further developed the Boyd and Graham model. 
They include UK accounting data to conduct a simulation study of banks and building 
societies diversification into life assurance. In their simulation, they found that building 
societies and mutual life insurers would be significantly risk reducing. But for other 
combinations like building societies with proprietary life, commercial banks with 
proprietary life, and mutual life, risk would not significantly change measured by standard 
deviation and covariance. However risk would significantly fall, measured by Boyd 
Graham's Z score method. 
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5.3.1. BOYD & GRAHAM (1988), BOYD ET AL., (1993) METHOD AND SOME 
MODIFICATIONS 
Our methodology in this test is heavily reliant on Boyd & Graham (1988), Boyd, Graham 
& Hewitt (1993) and further Brown et al., (1996). Boyd & Graham (1988) conducted a 
test on the US banks' involvement in six different non-bank activities. These non-bank 
activities were property/casualty insurance, life insurance, insurance agentlbrokers, 
securities, real estate development, and other real estate business. In the US, such cross-
business activities are prohibited by the Glass-Stegal Act 1933, and therefore, they 
conducted a simulation merger analysis by developing a model of risk/return 
characteristics. First they analysed the risk/return characteristics of the various existing 
industries, using the data for 249 publicly traded bank and non-bank financial firms 
during 1971-1984. They captured the median rate of ROE as return measure, and standard 
deviation of median ROE and Z score (developed by them) as the two risk measures. 
Three variables, namely, the consolidated total assets, equity, and net income (after tax) 
are chosen for these measures. Based on these variables, they computed sample risk and 
rate of return statistics for each industry to look at the historical relative risk and return in 
these industries. They then conducted hypothetical mergers between banks and each of 
these non-bank industries and compared them with the banks to show the differences 
between the pre-merger and post merger results. Their hypothetical merger method is 
based on simple assumptions, i.e. simply the sum of the two individual firms' 
consolidated total assets, equity, and net income. In their hypothetical mergers, they 
randomly choose one bank and one non bank firm with replacement, and generate a time 
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series of returns and estimate return, standard deviation and Z-score for each hypothetical 
firm. For each type non-bank financial firm that the banks were merged with, 100 
hypothetical firms - each with its own median return, standard deviation, and Z score -
were obtained and thus created six new hypothetical industries. They then calculated 
(with the same procedure as in the pre-merger) the median rate of return and risks of these 
newly created hypothetical firms and compared them with the pre-merger results. 
Boyd, Graham & Hewitt (1993) modified their previous hypothetical merger method. In 
1993 analysis, they employed a scaling procedure in their hypothetical merger instead of 
using the simple adding method, and observed the effect at different average weighted 
level, i.e. from 10% to 99% level. 
Brown et al., (1996) applied the Boyd and Graham method in the UK life assurance 
industry. They captured mean return on assets (ROA) as return measure and three 
measures of risk, namely standard deviation, covariance, and Z score. In their merger 
simulation study, they also used simple method for merger but they considered all 
possible combinations and tested the significance unlike Boyd and Graham (1988) 
method. Some of the other problems of Boyd and Graham (1988), and Boyd et al., (1993) 
as well as Brown et al., (1996) are identified and have modified later on in section 5.5.2. 
5.4. DATA COLLECTION 
We gathered data from a number of different sources. In chapter two, we have created our 
data sample for life assurance, general insurance and insurance broking in European 
context. For Bank Holding Companies (BHC), data have been collected from FT EXTEL 
1997. To collect banks' own insurance subsidiary data, we have had to go through a long 
arduous process. 
162 
We have initially taken The Banker's (1994) top 100 European banks out of top five 
hundred European banks. We then started a manual search from press clippings, industry 
reports, companies' annual reports, different directories etc. in order to ascertain how 
many out of top 100 have adopted bancassurance strategy. We have found that all the 
banks have at least some sorts of direct involvement in insurance business. We then 
started searching the banks involvement in life assurance underwriting, general insurance 
underwriting, and insurance brokin.g. Here we faced some problems. 
There are some banks who have 100% wholly owned insurance subsidiaries, while some 
have just 10% to 15% equity holding of underwriting insurance subsidiaries or even just a 
tied agreement/strategic alliance for joint sales. At this stage, we decided a criterion that 
we will take as our sample only the underwriting insurance subsidiaries that have over 
50% equity holdings in the underwriting insurance subsidiaries. Fortunately 90% of the 
life assurance sample fall within this criteria. 
We have decided to take only banks' own insurance underwriting subsidiaries (life and/or 
general insurance), excluding those who just have a tied agreement/strategic alliance for 
joint sales of insurance. This is because in a joint distribution agreement, banks bear very 
little risk l , and underwriting insurance companies bear the main risks since if claims arise 
underwriting companies will have to bear the claims, not the banks. If banks can sell 
insurance they will get commission/fees from the underwriting companies otherwise not. 
Therefore, the main risk ultimately falls on the insurance underwriters. 
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We have also excluded strategic groups for insurance distribution, but we have included 
banks that have wholly owned insurance broking subsidiaries to see the impact of banks' 
involvement in insurance broking business. 
One thing to note here is that there are some banks within the top 100 that do not have 
any insurance underwriting subsidiaries. These banks have a tied relationships or strategic 
alliance agreement with traditional big insurers for insurance distribution. For instance, 
Dresdner Bank, which is in the 12th position by assets size, has a strategic alliance with 
Allianz in Germany. On the other hand, we have found some banks in our manual search 
that are not in the top 100, but have insurance underwriting subsidiaries. For example, 
Leeds Permanent Building society in the UK has a life assurance underwriting subsidiary 
named Leeds Life. We have, therefore, included them in the sample and excluded the 
banks that have no underwriting or wholly owned insurance broking subsidiary in the top 
100 list. 
We have also found that some banks have more than one life insurance underwriting 
subsidiaries (TSB in the UK, Credit Lynnoise in France) in addition to general insurance 
underwriting subsidiaries and broking subsidiaries, while some have just one life 
underwriting or broking subsidiary. Anyway, we have included them all. 
However, after a long time-consuming manual search, we have found 58 life assurance 
underwriting subsidiaries, 18 general insurance underwriting subsidiaries, and 22 
I For details please see universal banking in the United States, what could we win, what could we lose?, Walters 
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insurance broking subsidiaries2. This is reported in Appendix III. Most of the wholly 
owned insurance subsidiaries are domestic companies. Only two (Generali, and 
Bishopgate insurance) in our sample are cross-border mergers. 
Now, the next stage is to collect the data of the above sample. At this stage, we also faced 
severe problem. Accounting data have been collected from the period of 1991-1996. 
Researchers always have to pay attention while collecting data, in particular, to the 
validity and the accuracy of data. Accounting data have been collected from the 
companies published annual reports and accounts. This is probably the most reliable 
method and is widely used in empirical analysis. 
To get the accounting data, we first searched in the commercial sources like FT EXTEL, 
Data Stream etc. but we did not succeed. We then wrote to the individual European 
countries insurance regulators, specifying the names of the insurance companies. We had 
a very little success in this process. We then wrote to individual parent banks, specifying 
their insurance subsidiary name, to supply us these subsidiaries data and we got some 
effective response after a second reminder letter. 
But still these samples are not sufficient to run a valid statistical test. We then wrote to 
the banks' insurance subsidiaries directly. Here also after a second reminder letter, we 
have got some positive reply. But still we fail to get some companies data. This is 
because probably they do not want to disclose their data to the outside world. 
& Saunders, (1994), Cambridge university Press, New York, 1994. 
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In the final stage, we created a databank in spreadsheets from the annual accounts. Also 
this time, we face some potential problems. Our sample is an international base sample. 
Therefore, different countries will have obviously different accounting system and 
different timing period of accounts. Moreover, different countries have different currency, 
and local companies produce accounts in local currency. We, therefore, can not combine 
all the different company's data together. To solve this problem, we converted the local 
currency data to the European Currency Unit (now Euro) year by year. 
All the insurance subsidiary data are 31 st of December in each final year in all the 
countries in our sample. Only in the UK two banks have 31 st of March timing period data. 
We believe this should not bias our results. Though different countries may have different 
accounting systems, our sample is within the EC countries3. The EC Directive has 
harmonised the accounting system within the member countries. Moreover, our variables 
are too broad [like total assets, total net income etc] to have a potential bias. 
The UK life assurance companies, data have been collected from the DTI (now FSA) 
returns. We also face problem with the UK data. UK life assurance companies have to 
submit their returns in a specific prescribed form, supplied by the DTI. The DTI forms do 
not indicate shareholders equity, and net income. We, therefore, have taken minimum 
required margin (form 9) as a proxy of shareholders equity. If a life assurance company 
become insolvent, this required minimum would be used as shareholders equity. Net 
income is calculated as total income minus total expenditure including taxation4• 
There may be an argument in selecting accounting data verses economic data. Each has 
advantages and disadvantages. But there is not a totally satisfactory explanation as yet 
2 Country profile and cross border proportion are reported in Appendices III. 
3 We have included Switzerland in our sample. Though this country is not within the EC but it is treated as if it 
is a member of the EC in case of the financial services. 
4 Brown et al .. (1996) adopted similar proxy in their study of UK life companies return and risk characteristics. 
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which data is most suitable for empirical analysis [e.g. Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988); 
Mehra and Prescott (1985); Franklin et al., (1982)]. However, we did not have any choice 
in selecting data due to unavailability of economic data. 
We have selected our banks sample if and only if a bank has at least any of the wholly 
owned insurance subsidiaries, i.e. either life assurance underwriting subsidiary or general 
insurance underwriting subsidiary or insurance broking subsidiary. 44 banks, 40 life 
assurance companies, 12 general insurance companies, and 11 insurance broking 
companies have been found by applying this criterion to our observations5• Sample firms 
for the bancassurance test are shown in Appendix IV. 
s.s. METHODOLOGY 
We use one measure of profitability and two measures of the risk of failure (bankruptcy 
risk) that take into account average rates of return, the variability of rates of return, and 
the level of capitalisation. First we analyse the risk/return characteristics of the various 
existing industries. (Table 5.2). Using our sample, we compute sample risk and return 
statistics for each industry. [This is done by calculating each company's mean return and 
risks over the sample period and then by aggregating them to each industry's mean return 
and risks characteristics]. This analysis provides an objective look at the historical 
relative risk and profitability in these industries. It also provides a basis for comparison 
with the second, i.e. mergers part of our study. There we analyse the effects of BHC 
expansion into insurance activities. This approach let us generate sample risk and return 
statistics for merged industries [like BHC-life assurance industry etc]. To see the effects 
, The sample size decreases because we dropped out some samples due to the lack of availability of data for the 
whole sample period. 
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of the mergers, these statistics are compared to risk and return statistics for the unmerged 
BHe industry. 
5.5. J. Risk and Return Measures Before Merger 
Let 1(, be the net after tax income and A, the book value of total assets in period t . The 
profitability of a company before and after the acquisition is the measure of the return on 
book assets which is measured by 
R=!2 
I A 
I 
Profitability for the entire sample period is measured by the arithmetic mean 
1 T 
R=-IR, 
T 1=1 
The first risk measure, (j', is a measure of the volatility of rate of return on assets or, 
more precisely the standard deviation of R which is defined as 
l~, - 2 
(T= -£ ..J~-R) 
T-I/=I 
The second risk measure, 'Z' (or Z score, which is always negative) is an indicator of the 
probability of bankruptcy developed by Boyd and Graham (1988) and Boyd et al., (1993). 
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One reason for using the risk measure Z is that, from a public policy perspective, the risk 
of failure of bank subsidiaries is the primary concern regarding BHe product line 
expansion. 
The development of Boyd and Graham's (1988) 'Z' score is driven as follows: 
k -R 
Z =-''---
u 
E, 
where k =--
, A 
, 
If we define bankruptcy as the situation in which equity E is insufficient to offset losses, 
or 'Tt t < -Et, then the probability of bankruptcy is given by 
1t E R -R k-R 
P(1t, <-E,)=P(-' <--')=P(R, <k,)=P(' <' ) 
A, A, u u 
From Bienayme-Tchebycheff inequality we have that 
peR, ~ k,) = (~)2 = -;2 
R-k, 
For further details, please see Boyd and Graham (1988), Boyd et al., (1993) and Brown et 
al., (1996). 
169 
5.5.2. Risks and Return Measures After Merger 
Before assessing the impact of mergers, we compute for each bank's the mean ROA, 
standard deviation «(j), and Z score for the period of 1991 to 1996. We then compute the 
same statistics for each life assurance company, each general insurance company, and each 
insurance broking company over the same period. [It is important to note that we first 
compute individual firm statistics and then aggregate. Risk measures are never computed 
using industry average (or total) returns. Because that method would lower estimates of the 
industry risk measures by some unknown amount. We are interested in the riskiness of the 
average firm in the industry, not the riskiness of the industry average.] 
Next, we compute the correlation coefficients between returns on banks and insurance 
companies. To do so, we compute the individual correlation of returns between each 
insurance company and each bank. This figure gives an indication of how the returns in 
insurance and banking have been correlated over time. If the mean correlation is relatively 
high, we can not use the simple combination method (just adding banking and insurance 
raw data for merger) like Boyd, Graham (1988), and Brown et aI., (1996) because such 
combinations ignore the correlation of returns between banks and insurance. In the Boyd 
and Graham (1988) merger simulations, firm pairs were chosen at random and the data 
entirely determined the relative portfolio weights of banking and non-banking assets. 
Portfolio weights thus were not varied, and they made no attempt to ascertain the optimal 
(risk-minimising) combination. Though Brown et al., (1996) overcome random selection 
problem by allowing all possible combination, still some problem remains. They, like 
Boyd and Graham (1988), also used adding method in their merger simulation study. In 
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our case instead of using simulation merger, we use actual merger analysis (discussed in 
Chapter 2). 
We include a bank in our sample analysis if and only if it has a wholly owned life 
assurance subsidiary and/or general insurance subsidiary and/or insurance broking 
subsidiary. Here for our analysis, we not only consider the impact of life assurance like 
Brown et ai., (1996) but also general insurance and insurance broking activities by banks 
and, instead of only one country perspective, we consider from the European perspective. 
Instead of using simple adding combination method for merger analysis, we employ an 
alternative method to overcome the adding problem. We use portfolio approach. The 
portfolio approach is appealing because it allows an analysis of varying asset combinations 
and computation of the risk-minimising portfolio weights. Furthermore, we know that the 
risk effects of combining a bank with a firm from one of the other industries (different 
insurance industries in this case) depend not only on the standard deviation of returns in 
each industry, but also on the covariance between returns. 
Following Markowitz (1952), the return and risk measures associated with a portfolio can 
be derived as follows: 
The return of the combined entity (post-merger) is given by 
R = w R + (1- w )R 
BA B B B I 
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where R ,R , and R ,are the returns on the bank, insurance entity and the combined 
B I BA 
entity respectively and W B is the proportion of banking assets in the combined entity. 
The variance of the combined entity's return is given by 
where cr B ' cr I ' are the standard deviations of the bank, and insurance entity returns and 
cr Bl' is the covariance of returns. Boyd and Graham (1988) pointed out the firms effect 
and time-stationary problems in the merger analysis. We overcome the firms effect by 
employing each company's variance and the time-stationary problem by employing each 
year by each year combination. } 
The Z-ratio is given by 
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5.6. ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
For the comparison of the two groups, either an independent t-test or a paired t-test is 
employed in the parametric approach. The independent t-test is employed when two 
unrelated groups of subjects are used, and the paired t-test is employed when the two 
related paired groups are used. We, therefore, employ the paired t-test for the actual 
merger of pair wise combination of return and risks characteristics between banks and 
their own different insurance industries. 
The results of this test for the mean differences between banks and different insurance 
industries in terms of return and risks are shown in Table 5.2. 
5.6.1. Return and Risk Results Before Merger 
The return (Table 5.2.) in the industry (aggregation from firm to industry) estimation 
between the banks and the· different insurance industries show that the insurance broking 
activities have the highest returns and life assurance underwriting activities have the 
lowest returns among all the activities. The general insurance underwriting activities and 
the insurance broking activities have significantly higher return than the banking 
activities (e.g. 5808 vs. 3.196 and .5808 vs. 49.51 respectively) and life assurance 
underwriting has lower return than banks but not significantly (-27.75 vs .. 5808). 
The risks in the industry (aggregation from firm to industry) estimation between the 
banks and the different insurance industries, i.e. life assurance underwriting, general 
insurance underwriting, and insurance broking, show that all the insurance activities have 
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higher risks than the banking activities (Table 5.2). General insurance underwriting and 
insurance broking have significantly higher risks than banking in terms of (J' risk 
measurement, and the life assurance underwriting and the general insurance underwriting 
have significantly higher risk than banking in terms of Z-score risk measurement. 
Table 5.2 
Mean Value of Returns & Risks before merger 
(Banks vs. Banks' Insurance industry) 
European industry Profitability Risk Measurements 
groups 
R(%) (J' Z -score 
Bank lBaneassura Bank Bancassurance Bank Bancassurance 
nee 
Banking activity vs. .5808 -27.75 .4840 66.66 258.54 37.06 
bank's life (.754) (1.254) (1.829)'" 
assurance 
underwriting 
Banking activity .5808 3.196 .4840 6.102 258.54 14.87 
vs. bank's general (2.158)""" (4.948)"''''''' (2.160)""" 
insurance 
underwriting 
Banking activity .5808 49.51 .4840 32.66 258.54 5.31 
vs. bank's (6.091)"""'" (3.352)"""· (1.115) 
insurance Broking 
R = Mean of mean return; (J' = Standard deviation; t value in braketsO; significant level ·"=1%, 
**= 5%, and *=/o%. Bancassurance = Insurance companies owned by banks. 
5.6.2. Return and Risk Results After Merger 
The industry results, reported above, of course have some interest. Because from this 
industry analysis we can find which industry is less risky and more profitable or vice 
versa. But the industry analysis provides little information on the risk effects of combining 
banks with firms from other insurance industries. As we mentioned earlier that the risk 
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effect depends not only on the distributions of banks and non-banking profits, but also on 
the correlation among them. Therefore, we calculated correlation. 
Table: 5.3 
Correlation of return from banking and insurance 
activities in an combined entity 
Life 0.0094 
General 0.3147 
Brokers -0.0184 
From the Table 5.3, it is seen that Bank Holding Companies and General Insurance 
companies return have a higher correlation while the Bank Holding Companies and 
Insurance Broking have negative correlation. This suggest that the banks combination with 
insurance broking would be better off and the opposite effect with the combination with 
general insurance. The life assurance is in the middle position among the three insurance 
activities. 
Nevertheless, the diversification effects is tested by testing whether the return and risk of 
the combined entity are statistically different from the return and risk of the banks alone 
that have acquired the insurance enterprises. We use paired t-test for a pair wise 
combination between the banks and the banks and different insurance groups combined. 
The results of this test for a mean difference between the banks and the banks and 
insurance companies' combined in terms of return and risks are shown in Table 5.4. 
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Table 5.4 
Mean Value of Returns and Risks after Merger (Bank vs. Bank & insurance combined) 
European industry groups Profitability Risk Measurements 
RI%) (j Z Score 
Bank BAIC Bank I BAIC Bank I BAIC 
Bank alone vs. bank & life .5146 .8365 .2585 .4405 249.64 56.91 
assurance combined (2.335)** (1.444) (2.029)** 
Bank alone vs. bank & general .4291 1.892 .1218 1.630 163.99 24.69 
insurance combined (1.480) (2.361)** (1.751)* 
Bank alone vs. bank & 1.186 1.595 1.163 .7440 354.24 64.20 
insurance broking combined (2.015)* (.877) (1.011) 
R = Mean of mean return; (j = Standard Deviation; BAIC = Bank And Insurance Combined; t value in 
braketsO; Significant level ***=1%' **= 5%, and *=10%. 
The returns on the actual merger results (Table 5.4) show that between banks merger with 
life assurance underwriting companies and the banks merger with insurance broking 
companies' significantly increase banks' return (.5146 vs .. 8365, and 1.186 vs. 1.595 
respectively) and although return in gereral insurance underwriting increases but not 
significantly (.4291 vs. 1.892). 
The risks, in the merger analysis (Table 5.4), show that the bank merger with general 
insurance underwriting companies significantly increase banks risk in tenns of (j risk 
measurement (.1218 vs. 1.630) as well as Z-score risk measurement (163.99 vs. 24.69). 
The banks merger with life assurance underwriting companies also significantly increase 
banks risk in tenns of Z-score risk measurement (249.64 vs. 56.91) and although risks 
increase in other risk measurement, but not significantly. However, in the banks merger 
with insurance broking although the risks increase slightly but not significant in any risk 
measurements. Therefore, on the basis of above return and risks criteria, this analysis 
suggest that insurance broking is most suitable for banks among all the three insurance 
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activities, because in insurance broking the return increases significantly and the risk does 
not have any significantly effect. We can further summarise the results in the Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5. 
The post-merger significance results of returns and risks 
WI n e ancassurance ·thi th B G roups 
Bancassurance Groups Profitability Risk 
Bank merger with Life Assurance ./ ./ 
Underwriting 
Bank merger with General Insurance X ./ 
underwriting 
Bank merger with Insurance Broking ./ X 
Note: Based on only the slgmficant results . ./ = slgmficantly mcrease; X = no slgmficance. 
From the Table 5.5, it is clear that the return and the risks increase simultaneously in the 
bank merger with the life assurance underwriting activities. According to risk/return 
theory, this is a normal situation, Le. higher return in higher risks. The post-merger 
increasing profitability in life underwriting may be the cause of the relatedness of 
business activities between banking and life assurance. Rumelt (1974) argued that related 
diversification affects value more positively than unrelatedness. Therefore, the banking 
activities and the life assurance activities may have relatedness to each others.{Le. 
mortgage and life assurance). There may also be the existence of scope economies [e.g. 
Dickinson & Dinenis (1992); OECD (1992); Dinenis & Jung (1999)] of bancassurance 
companies. Banks have countrywide branch network with huge number of bank staffs for 
the vast client base. Since distribution costs represent a higher proportion of total costs of 
life products. [e.g. Llewellyn (1994)], banks by introducing insurance distribution through 
the branch network channel can increase profitability. But the underwriting activities are 
conducted in separate workshop and by separate life underwriting specialists, i.e. 
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actuaries that gives little chance for scope economies. Moreover, the long-term nature of 
life assurance contracts itself as well as the inappropriate/complex management structure 
may cause increasing risk. 
However, the banks' merger with general insurance underwriting companies' do not 
provide any significant profit, instead it significantly increase bankruptcy risk of banks 
(Table 5.5). This is quite interesting, i.e. no significant post-merger returns but the 
significant increase of risk. Underwriting general insurance requires knowledge of 
specialised risks [e.g. Kane (1994), therefore, most of them are not closely related to 
traditional banking activities. [e.g. Rumelt (1974); Kane (1994); Saunders and Walter 
(1994)]. Banks general insurance underwriting companies underwrite very few general 
products (motor, household etc.) in a limited way (Discussed in Chapter two). This also 
may downturn returns and upraises risks of banks in the general insurance underwriting 
activities. Furthermore, the nature of the general insurance underwriting activities itself is 
risky, i.e. unexpected loss like heavy storm, flood, or other natural dissenters. [e.g. 
Saunders & Walter (1994)]. This argument is also supported by our industry analysis 
(Table 5.2), i.e. general insurance underwriting is significantly riskier than banking 
industry and diversifying into this risky area should increase risk. 
On the other hand, the bank merger with insurance broking companies significantly 
increase banks profitability and no significant risk effect (Table 5.5). Brokerage is mainly 
a commission/fees oriented business and the sales and services dimensions are closely 
aligned with some of the other services conducted in banking. Furthermore, broking is not 
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a capital utilising activity, and hence there is little risk to which an institution's capital is 
exposed through brokerage. [e.g. Kane (1994); Saunders & Walter (1994)]. 
Llewellyn (1994) mentioned that if the probability of failure is reduced diversification 
should be allowed, and if the seriousness of failure is increased diversification should be 
limited. Based on our results we recommend that banks should not either engage in life 
assurance underwriting or in general insurance underwriting business if they are 
concerned about risk effects. But the insurance broking should be permitted. 
The main objectives of the regulators are to minimise risks for the protection of the 
depositors and policyholders. [e.g. OECD (1992); Carter & Dickinson (1992); Bank of 
England (1993); Fever (1993); Berghe (1996)]. Therefore, the regulators in Europe 
should tighten the regulatory barriers for banks' entering into life as well as general 
insurance underwriting business in order to minimise the banks' bankruptcy. However, 
the banks should be permitted in engaging insurance broking activities. 
5.7. CONCLUSION 
According to the portfolio theory diversification spreads the risks and thus reduces risk. In 
our analysis in this chapter, the thesis investigated European banks' diversification into 
different insurance business, namely, life assurance underwriting, general insurance 
underwriting, and insurance broking business. Over the six years period of investigation 
from 1991 to 1996 on European banks and their own life assurance underwriting 
subsidiaries, general insurance subsidiaries, and insurance broking subsidiaries, we found 
some interesting results. In our estimation (pre-merger analysis), it is seen that life 
assurance and general insurance underwriting activities appear to be more risky than 
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banking. The return between life assurance underwriting and banking as well as the return 
between banking and general insurance underwriting do not have significant effect. 
However, insurance broking has significantly more positive return than banking and the 
risks between them do not have significant effect. 
In the post-merger analysis, we find that the merger with life as well as general insurance 
underwriting significantly increases banks' risks. However, the merger with insurance 
broking companies significantly increases the banks return and the risks do not have 
significant effect. Therefore, since the regulators objectives is to minimise the risk of 
bank/insurance company's failure, our results suggest that European banks should not be 
permitted to acquire life and general underwriting companies. But they may be permitted 
to acquire insurance broking companies on the grounds that though the risk increases in 
engaging insurance broking, this does not have a significant effect, instead the returns 
significantly increase when banks engage into insurance broking. 
One may argue that allowing banks in engaging different insurance operation may be cost 
effective, i.e. possibility of scale and scope economies in combining banking and 
insurance business. But several studies have found little evidence of scope economies in 
combinations of banking and non-banking firms [ e.g. Rhoades and Boczar (1977); 
Dinenis & Jung (1998)]. Some studies have even found evidence of diseconomies of scale 
[ e.g. Humphrey (1990)]. Anyway, this is a separate issue and needs to be tested separately 
from the European bancassurance perspective. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
TESTING RETURN AND RISK EFFECTS OF INSURANCE COMPANIES 
DIVERSIFICATION INTO BANKING BUSINESS 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this Chapter is to investigate the impact of acquiring banks by the 
European insurance companies on the return and risk effects. This is opposite to 
Chapter five. To the best of our knowledge this is the first attempt to quantify the 
benefits of assurancebank. Engaging into another risky business like banking may 
increase insurance companies' bankruptcy risk. On the other hand, due to a 
diversification, the insurance companies may spread the risk and thus reduce their 
bankruptcy risk. As the insurance companies have adopted this strategy very recently, 
there is a lack of available data. Due to the lack of availability of data we conduct a 
merger simulation study in order to assess the impact. 
The rest of this chapter is as follows: in section 2, we discuss the review of literature; 
section 3 describes the methodology and data collection; section 4 is the simulation 
results; and section 5 concludes. 
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6.2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Banks in Europe are permitted by the regulators to engage into insurance business. 
[OECD (1992); CEA (1992)]. They are permitted not only for the insurance distribution 
but also for the core insurance activities, i.e. underwriting of insurance. This is a serious 
threat to insurance companies. Earlier (during 80s) when European banks started 
distribution of insurance, insurance companies used to underwrite the insurance 
products and banks used to distribute these insurance products through bank's branch 
net work in addition to insurance companies' traditional channels. In this way, they had 
a principal-agent relationship, insurance companies as principal and the banks as agent. 
Such insurance companies - banks' agency relationship was a threat for traditional 
insurance intermediaries as these banks used to compete directly with the traditional 
insurance intermediaries in intermediaries market. Insurance companies by employing 
banks as insurance intermediaries used to get an extra strong channel for distribution of 
insurance. In other words, insurance companies used to get huge volume of business 
from a single source, i.e. banks channel. Soon after words when banks realised that 
insurance business was a good prospect for them, and as they had now learnt the 'know 
how' of distribution of insurance l , they started withdrawing support of distribution 
from traditional insurance companies2• Instead, they established their own underwriting 
insurance ventures and distributed their own underwriting products. (reported in 
Chapter two). Therefore, the insurance companies have not only lost their strong 
distribution channel but also directly faced competition from the banks. This time not 
the intermediaries but the underwriters face a serious threat from banks. If only the 
banks are permitted to engage into insurance business but not the insurance companies 
I Because European banks have been distributing insurance for a number of years. 
2 For instance, UK's Halifax, Abbey National, Nationwide etc. 
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in banking, then this will produce an imbalance between the banking and insurance 
industries as banks will share the insurance market share with insurance companies and 
not the banking industry's market share by insurance industry. Therefore, insurance 
companies should have similar opportunity to compete with banks as part of a fair deal. 
For this, the insurance companies may adopt a defensive strategy, which can be termed 
as the 'Assurancebank' strategy. As a defensive strategy insurance companies then can 
diversify into banking business in addition to their traditional insurance business and 
can offer one stop financial shopping 
But the fundamental questions are, should insurance compames be permitted to 
diversify into banking business in the context of liquidation of risk or bankruptcy risk as 
insurance business is regarded as a risky business? Or should they be prohibited from 
engaging in banking business by the regulators as banking business is regarded as risky 
business too? The regulators are deeply concerned about the possible liquidation or 
bankruptcy risk for the sake of public interest. If a company goes bust, huge numbers of 
investors will lose their savings and the public will lose faith in financial institutions. If 
this were to happen, there would be serious consequences for the stability of the 
country's economy. Therefore, this is a crucial issue to be tested. Whereas emphasis has 
been placed to look for the phenomenon of 'Bancassurance' [e.g. Diacon (1990); 
Dickinson & Dinenis (1992); Hoschka (1994); Brown et al., (1996)],less attention has 
been paid to 'Assurancebank', i.e. acquisition of banks by insurance companies. 
Diversified firms by definition are collection of businesses. These individual 
businesses compete in different industries. The different industries have different 
structural characteristics and these different structural characteristics result in different 
average (and potential) profits in each industry. This is in fact a central tenet of 
microeconomic theory and industrial organisation economics [e.g. Bettis & Hall 
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(1982); Scherer (1980); Shepherd (1979)]. Chandler (1962) established the general 
nature of diversified firm and the interaction of organisational structure with 
diversification. This was later refined by Wrigley (1970), Rumelt (1974), and by 
others. Two distinct modes of diversification have been identified: unrelated and 
related. Unrelated diversifiers have been defined as firms that diversify predominantly 
across industries, while related diversifiers have been defined as firms that diversify 
predominantly within industries [e.g. Palepu (1985); Kim, Hwang & Burgers (1989)]. 
Of course insurance companies' diversification into banking falls in the unrelated 
group. Unrelated firms do not enjoy superior risk-pooling characteristics and that the 
superior returns attributed by Rumelt (1974, 1977) to related diversification may be 
due largely to industry effects [e.g. Bettis & Hall (1982)]. The arguments linking 
diversification to profit stability revolve around the portfolio notion, which suggests 
that investing in diversified stock with non-correlated profits can reduce the volatility 
ofa firm's total profits [e.g. Markowitz (1959); Tobin (1950)]. 
But a diversification strategy with a favourable return may not be managerially 
acceptable due to its risk [e.g. Kim, Hwang & Burgers (1989)]. Therefore, the risk is an 
important factor to be considered with strategy. However, the leading hypothesis is that 
diversification increases markets power and should, therefore, result in greater 
profitability for diversifier [e.g. Caves (1981); Miller (1973)]. Empirical results of 
industrial organisational studies, however, have not found a positive relationship 
between the extent of diversification and profitability [e.g. Gort (1962); Arnould 
(1969); Markham (1973)]. 
The importance of incorporating risk into diversification studies has been asserted by 
a number of strategy researchers [e.g. Chang & Thomas (1989); Bettis & Hall (1982); 
Baird & Thomas (1985)]. Since Chang & Thomas (1989) argued that diversification is 
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a well-defined strategy and its impact on risk and return can be empirically examined. 
Our study, therefore, may add further insight into the relationship between strategy 
and risk and return. 
In case of financial firms like insurance, it may be said that insurance companies have 
higher risk than banks because of the catastrophes of risk and nature of their business. If 
the insurance companies were allowed to engage in banking business, the risk 
(measured by the volatility of insurance companies' profitability) would decrease 
because of the effect of asset diversification. On the other hand, such risk might 
increase, but that increase would be more than compensated for by an increase in 
average profitability. Therefore, the insurance companies' failure would decrease. There 
may be another argument as to whether or not risk would increase, as it is not a problem 
because insurance companies' banking subsidiaries will be legally protected. But if the 
banks exist as stand alone basis, its maximum risk will not be more than zero (0). In 
case of a subsidiary of an insurance company, the maximum risk will be -1, because as 
a parent company it would have to compensate for the extra negative value of that 
banking subsidiary. 
We have found some real data of insurance groups' banking income, which is reported 
in Table 6.1. In Table 6.1, we have shown the contribution from banking income to net 
income of insurance companies. From this table, we see that eight out of ten companies 
have positive banking income, only two companies have negative banking return. It 
seems expanding into the banking arena is likely to be profitable one. However, we can 
not conClude on the basis of this. We, therefore, employ a simulation analysis to test the 
impact of Assurancebank. Boyd and Graham (1988) developed a model to test return 
and risk effects of bank diversification into insurance business, a simulation study based 
on the US data. 
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Table: 6.1 
Assurancebank's contribution in insurance groups profitability, 1996 
Insurance groups Total assets Net income Banking 
(£m) (£m) income (£m) 
AegonNV 57439 492 328 
AGF Assurances Generales de France, 43638 162 9 
STECEN 
CardifSA 9261 36 4 
Codan Forsikring 5217 99 11 
FINAXA 118456 119 1959 
GAN, STE Centrale Dhaka University 86208 -188 -93 
INGGroupNV 151778 1042 669 
Trygg Hansa AB 2692 194 -3 
UAP, CIE 91957 -217 10 
Source: Denved from FT EXTEL 1997 
In the US and the rest of the world, this cross section activity is prohibited3• But in 
Europe, this is allowed in both the cases, i.e. banks into insurance as well as insurance 
companies into banking diversification. 
Eisemann (1976) conducted a study by using market data to derive an efficient multiple 
activity frontiers, over the period of 1961-1968. He found that Bank Holding 
Companies (BHCs) would have significantly increased their risk if they had expanded 
in permissible and non-allowable non-bank activities. Litan (1987) constructed pair 
wise portfolio selection approach with pair-wise combination of banking and non-
banking activities. He used the accounting data ROA (Return on Asset) to capture the 
rates of return and CV (Coefficient of Variation) of returns as a risk indicator. A lower 
CV suggests that the activities might potentially be risk reducing. Over the period of 
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1962-1982, the study suggest that for seven out of nine activities considered, the risk 
adjusted return would have been equal or lower than banking alone. Boyd and Graham 
(1988) simulated mergers of randomly selected BHCs and non-bank financial firms like 
insurance, real estate etc. They used one measure of profitability, ROE (Return on 
Equity), and two measures of risk, i.e. standard deviation (0-) of ROE and 'Z' score 
developed by them. The higher the Z scores the lower the risk. The results, using US 
accounting data, indicated that only the mergers of BHCs with life insurance companies 
reduced bank risk. Further test by Boyd, Graham and Hewitt (1993) shows that 
engaging in life and property/casualty insurance activities yielded significant risk-
reducing effects. Here, instead of using just adding method (combination of insurance 
and banking raw data in merger study), they scaled non banking firm data in each 
random merger in order to produce a predetermined initial portfolio weight, i.e. ratio of 
non banks most merger assets to total assets. Walter & Saunders (1994) conducted 
analysis of US banks diversification into different non-bank activities including 
insurance. They found that highest return per unit of risk would be obtained in the 
combination of banking with property/casualty insurance. Brown, Genetay, and 
Molyneux (1996) further developed the Boyd and Graham model. They include UK 
accounting data to conduct a simulation study of banks and building societies 
diversification into life assurance. In their simulation, they found that building societies 
and mutual life insurers would be significantly risk reducing. But for other 
combinations like building societies with proprietary life, commercial banks with 
proprietary life, and mutual life, risk would not significantly change measured by 
3 only where there is not more than five thousand popUlation. The G lass Legal Act 1933 separate 
insurance business from banking. There is a intense pressure in the US to liberalise the fmancial 
companies cross business activities. 
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standard deviation and covariance. However, risk would significantly fall, measured by 
Boyd Graham's Z score. 
6.3. DATA 
Accounting data were obtained from FT EXTEL 1997 for the period of 1991-1996. 
We only included companies with six years data of assets, equity and net income. We 
found 57 insurance companies and 40 large banks. The 57 insurance companies count 
for over 60% of the total European insurance companies' assets. 
We divided the insurance sample into two groups, the first group from Euro 20 billion 
assets onward, and the other group from just below Euro 20 billion up to Euro 5 billion. 
We have found 38 companies that have over Euro 20 billion assets each and 20 
companies that have lower than Euro 20 billion assets each. We call the upper bound as 
large insurance and the lower bound as medium insurance. Sample firms are shown in 
Appendix v. 
To standardise the data sample, currencies are converted into European Currency Unit 
(now Euro) dated in 24/9/97 through the FT EXTEL. There may be questions about the 
potential biases with regard to combining different European countries' data. But FT 
EXTEL has set up the data so smoothly that we find no difficulties in selecting our 
sample. In Europe, all the countries keep their accounts in a same manner according to 
the EC Directives. Moreover, our variables are so broad [e.g. total assets, total net 
income] that biases should be eliminated. 
6.4. METHODOLOGY 
Following Boyd and Graham {l988) and Boyd, Graham & Hewitt (1993) and further 
Margaret Brown et aI., (1996) we use the merger simulation framework to explore the 
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risk consequences of insurance companies diversification into banking business III 
Europe. 
6.4.1. Risks and Return Measures Before Merger 
Let 1f, be the net after tax income and A, the book value of total assets in period t. The 
profitability of a company before and after the acquisition is the measure of the return 
on book assets which is measured by 
R=!2. 
I A 
I 
Profitability for the entire sample period is measured by the arithmetic mean 
1 T 
R=-LR, 
T 1=1 
The first risk measure, (j, is a measure of the volatility of rate of return on assets 
or, more precisely the standard deviation ofR which is defined as 
1~, - 2 
(7= -L ..JR,-R) 
T -1 t=1 
The lower the standard deviation the lower the risk. We use this measure because this is 
very popular in banking, insurance and other business literature. Another reason is that 
this risk measure tests the insurance companies' banking expansion proponents. In other 
words, we can say that the insurance companies by engaging into banking business 
would reduce the volatility of rates of return because of asset diversification. 
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The second risk measure, 'Z' (or Z score, which is always negative) is an indicator of 
the probability of bankruptcy developed by Boyd and Graham (1988) and Boyd et al., 
(1993). Bankruptcy is defined as the situation where loses exceed equity. One reason 
for using the risk measure Z is that, from a public policy perspective, the risk of failure 
of bank subsidiaries is the primary concern regarding BHe product line expansion. 
k -R Z = .....;':..---
a 
E 
where k = __ I 
, A, 
The higher the Z score, the lower the risk of failure, and vice-versa. 
The development of Boyd and Graham's (1988) 'Z' score is driven as follows: 
If we define bankruptcy as the situation in which equity E is insufficient to offset losses, 
or 7t t < -Et, then the probability of bankruptcy is given by 
n E R -R k-R P(n, < -E,) = P(-' < __ I ) = peRI < k,) = P(' <' ) 
~ ~ a a 
From Bienayme-Tchebycheff inequality we have that 
peRI ~ k,) = (-!--)2 = -;2 
R-k , 
For further details, please see Boyd and Graham (1988), Boyd et al., (1993) and 
Brown et al., (1996). 
190 
6.4.2. Risk and Return Measures After Merger 
Before conducting simulations, we compute each large and each medium insurance 
companies mean ROA, standard deviation (0'), and Z score for the period of 1991 to 
1996. Then, in the same process, we compute each medium and each small banking 
companies mean ROA, standard deviation (u), and Z score over the same period. [It is 
important to note that we first compute individual firm statistics and then aggregate. 
Risk measures are never computed using industry average (or total) returns because that 
method would lower estimates of the industry risk measures by some unknown amount. 
Weare interested in the riskiness of the average firm in the industry, not the riskiness of 
the industry average as we did in Chapter five.]. 
We then compute the mean correlation of returns between unmerged and merged 
firms. To do so, we compute the individual correlation of returns between each 
insurance company and each bank. This figure gives an indication of combination 
about how the returns in insurance and banking would have correlated over time. If 
the correlation is higher we can not use the simple combination method, i.e. just 
adding banking and insurance raw data as merger like Boyd and Graham (1988) 
and Brown et aI., (1996) because such combinations would have ignored the effect 
of correlation of returns between banks and insurance. Therefore, we have to find 
an alternative method. Instead of using simple adding combination method for 
merger analysis, we employ an alternative method to overcome the adding 
problem. 
We use portfolio approach as we did in Chapter five. The portfolio approach is 
appealing because it allows an analysis of varying asset combinations and 
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computation of the risk minimising portfolio weights. Further more, the risk effects 
of combining a firm with a firm from other industry depends not only on the 
standard deviation of returns in each industry, but also on the covariance between 
returns. 
Following Markowitz (1952), the return and risk measures associated with a portfolio 
can be derived as follows: 
The return of the combined entity (post-merger) is given by 
R = w R + (1- W )RB 
AB I I I 
where R, R , and R , are the returns on the insurance, bank entity and the 
I B AB 
combined entity respectively and 
combined entity. 
w is the proportion of insurance assets in the 
I 
The variance of the combined entity's return is given by 
where (j, (j ,are the standard deviations of the bank, and insurance entity returns 
I B 
and (j , is the covariance of returns. Boyd and Graham (1988) pointed out the firms 
IB 
effect and time-stationary problems in the merger analysis. We overcome the firms 
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effect by employing each company's variance and the time-stationary problem by 
employing each year by each year combination. 
The Z-ratio is given by 
where k = w k + (1- w )k 
AB I I I B 
Boyd and Graham (1988) considered random combination, and Boyd, Graham & 
Hewitt (1993) considered average portfolio approach in their simulation merger 
analysis. To see the impact of insurance companies' merger in our simulation 
merger analysis, we consider all possible combinations to avoid random bias and 
we calculate actual weight in the merger to avoid average weight bias. 
6.5. SIMULATION RESULTS 
In comparison of two groups, either the independent t-test or the paired t-test is 
employed in the parametric approach. The independent t-test is employed when two 
unrelated groups of subjects are used, and the paired t-test is employed when the two 
related paired groups are used. We, therefore, employ the independent t-test for the 
hypothetical merger between insurance and banking industries for their return and risks 
impact. Before conducting the test, we aggregate both insurance and banking firms to 
industries. This aggregation is conducted from the each and every company's 
computation of mean return, standard deviation ((I), and Z-score over the period of 
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1991-1996. The industry results of the t-test for the mean differences of return and risks 
between insurance and banking industries are shown in Table 6.2. 
Table: 6.2 
Mean Returns & Risks be/ore Merger (Insurance vs. Banking) 1991-1996 
Groups Sample Profitability Risks 
R (%) 0-% Z-SCORE 
Insur I Bank Insur I Bank Insur I Bank 
Large Insurance vs. (37-40) .6446 .3407 .4693 .2056 45.93 78.73 
Bank (2.879)** (2.815)** (2.171)* 
Medium Insurance (20-40) .6459 .3407 .5831 .2056 82.62 78.73 
vs. Bank (2.36)* (3.109)** (.106) 
Large & Medium (57-40) .6451 .3407 .5092 .2056 58.45 78.73 
Insurance vs. Bank (2.841)** (3.206)" (1.112) 
Insur = Insurance companies; R = Mean of mean returns; U = standard deviation. 
Significant level: "·=1%, ··=5%, ·=10%. I value in brackets. 
The above test shows that there are significant differences of returns between banking 
and insurance industries. The insurance industry has higher returns than banks. This is 
in all the groups' comparison, (Le .. 6446 vs. 3407; .6459 vs. 3407; and .6451 vs. 3407). 
Similarly, there are some significant differences of risks between insurance companies 
and banks. The insurance industry has higher risks than banks. This is also in all the 
groups' comparison and in both the risk measurements. For details please see Table 6.2. 
The industry results, reported above, of course have some interest because from this 
industry analysis, we can find which industry is less risky and more profitable or vice 
versa. But the industry analysis provides little information on the risk effects of 
combining banks with firms from other (insurance) industries. We, therefore, simulate 
hypothetical mergers using annual accounting data over the period of 1991-1996. Each 
insurance company is coupled with each bank in the same year. In this way, we have 
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got (37 x 40 x 6) 8880 merger cases for large insurance with banks, (37 x 20 x 6) 4440 
merger cases for medium insurance with banks, and [(37 + 20) = 57 x 40 x 6] 13680 
merger cases for large & medium insurance combined with banks. However, the actual 
merger cases are 1480,800 and 2280 respectively due to six year average of each firms. 
For the large & medium insurance companies' combined merger with banks (LMIB), 
which have 2280 merger cases, we find 825 mergers appear to be profitable, that is 
around the 40% of the sample case. For the same group's merger, we find 1482 merger 
cases decrease risk in standard deviation (a ) risk measurement, and 1439 merger cases 
decrease risk in Z-score risk measurement which is around 65% in both risk 
measurements. This indicates risk reduction in diversifying into banking business 
activities by insurance companies. 
The large insurance companies' mergers with banks (LIB) as well as for the medium 
insurance companies' merger with banks (MIB) have also similar results. (For details 
please see Table 6.3). Therefore, size of insurance group does not effect in merger with 
banks. 
Table: 6.3 
P M ost- erger ene on e an s s B fits It turn d Ri k 
Groups LIB MIB 
Merger Benefits Merger Benefits 
Total Number 1480 100% 800 100% 
of Hypothetical 
Merger 
RETURN 574 38.78% 251 31.37% 
STD (a) 960 64.86% 522 65.25% 
Z-SCORE 952 64.32% 487 60.87% 
LIB = Large Insurance WIth Bank; MIB = MedIUm Insurance WIth Bank; 
LMI = Large & Medium Insurance with Bank. 
LMIB 
Merger Benefits 
2280 100% 
825 36.18% 
1482 65.00% 
1439 63.11% 
As we mentioned earlier that the risk effect depends not only on the distributions of 
banks and non-banking profits, but also on the correlation among returns. Therefore, we 
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calculated correlation. Our calculation of the mean correlation coefficient on the return 
between insurance and banking groups are as follows: 
Table: 6.4 
Mean correlation coefficient on the return 
b d bank' etween msurance an mg groups 
Large insurance and bank .7045 
Medium insurance and bank .7880 
Large & medium insurance and small bank .7338 
The correlation in all the combinations is higher. 
Now, like the pre-merger test (Table 6.2), we also use independent t-test in post merger 
analysis to compare the mean values between insurance companies with their newly 
hypothetical merged firms' (i.e. assurancebank) return and risks. The simulation results 
of the t-tests are shown in Table 6.5. 
Table: 6.5 
Mean Value ofRetum and Risks after Mergers 
I Insurance vs. Assurancebank) 1991-1996 
Combin Profitability 
ation Risks 
sample 
R (%) 0'% Z-SCORE 
Groups IC IIABC IC I IABC Ie \IABC 
Large Insurance 1480 .6446 .4220 .4693 .2176 52.53 78.04 
with Bank Merger (4.54)··· (6.784)··· (2.674) 
Medium Insurance 800 .6459 .3558 .5831 .2031 82.62 83.99 
with Bank Merger (4.414)··· (5.845)··· (.039) 
Large & Medium 2280 .6451 .3988 .5092 .2125 58.45 74.33 
Insurance with (6.233)··· (8.940)··· (1.l79) 
Bank Merger 
IC = Insurance Companies; !ABC = Insurance And Banking Combined; R = Mean of mean retums; 
cr = standard deviation;. Significant level: ***=1 %, **=5%, *=10%. t value in brackets. 
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The results in the Table 6.5 show that there are significant differences of returns 
between insurance companies and assurance banks. Insurance companies have higher 
returns than assurancebank companies. This is in all the three groups combination, (Le . 
. . 6446 vs . .4220; .6459 vs. 3558, and .6451 vs. 3988). 
However, insurance companies significantly decrease their risks when diversifying into 
banking business. The standard deviation (CT) decreases significantly in all the groups, 
(i.e . .4693 vs . .2176, .5831 vs .. 2031, and .5092 vs .. 2125). Risks also decrease in other 
risk measurement Le. Z score. For details please see Table 6.5. 
From the above analysis, we see that from a firm's profit point of view the 
assurancebank strategy does not appear to be suitable. But from a firm's risks point of 
view this strategy appears to be suitable one since standard deviation ( CT) significantly 
decreases. This reduction means that the return would be consistent. Holsboer (1993) 
pointed out that the European insurance companies have adopted assurancebank 
strategy for both defensive and the offensive reasons. The offensive strategy appears to 
be less successful since assurancebank firms can not increase profitability. On the other 
hand, viewed from the defensive strategy, it appears to be more successful in the sense 
that adopting assurancebank strategy by the European insurance companies reduces 
standard deviation ( G ) to secure their consistent returns. 
Moreover, customers those who prefer so called 'one stop financial shopping' can be 
retained by the insurance companies, otherwise losing these existing customers would 
have been further threat for insurance companies for survival. Swiss Re (1992) market 
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survey shows that a significant number of customers (around 34%) prefer 'one stop 
financial shopping'. 
The major commercial banks in Europe have moved into insurance business. Others are 
planning to follow the same route. Insurance market share is increasing day by day the 
Bancassurance companies. Above all, most of the big banks have already entered into 
core insurance business, i.e. underwriting of insurance. Customers are moving towards 
banks insurance services due to one stop financial shopping [Swiss Re (1992)]. All 
these are a serious threat for insurance groups. Bearing in mind of such heavy threat 
from Bancassurance companies, the above analysis suggest that the strategy of 
Assurancebank by the European insurance groups may be desirable as a counter 
response, and for a balanced competition with Bancassurance companies to retain 
market position. 
Further more, assurancebank might be more successful in terms of scale and scope 
economies since there is an opportunity of cost reduction for jointness of banking and 
insurance products, particularly in marketing. In this thesis, we do not examine 
economies of scope or scale that may result from such merger. The theoretical 
arguments have been presented elsewhere [see Dinenis and Jung (1998); Hoschka 
(1994); Dickinson and Dinenis (1992); Grant (1992)]. 
From the regulatory authority point of view, the assurancebank appears to be suitable 
since their bankruptcy risks decreases (according to Z-score risk measurement in Table 
6.5). The regulators prime concern is minimising risks by applying different regulatory 
tools to safe guard the economy and to protect the depositors and the policyholders 
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[Berghe (1996); Brady (1995); Kane (1995); Carter and Dickinson (1992); OECD 
(1992)]. 
6.6. CONCLUSION 
Over the period of the six years observation from 1991 to 1996 in Europe, the results of 
merger simulation supports risk reduction but does not improve the insurance 
companies' return significantly. 
The regulators in Europe have permitted banks to diversify into insurance business. 
Most of the big banks have already entered into core insurance business, i.e. 
underwriting of insurance. Customers are moving towards banks insurance services due 
to one stop financial shopping [Swiss Re (1992)]. All these are a serious threat for 
insurance groups. Bearing in mind of such heavy threat from bancassurance companies, 
the adoption of assurance bank strategy by the European insurance groups may be 
suitable as a counter response, and for a balanced competition with bancassurance 
companies to retain market position. 
The above results are based on simulation analysis, which is academic, and in actual 
merger analysis, the diversification may increase insurance companies' profitability. 
Furthermore, one may argue that assurancebank might be more successful in terms of 
scale and scope economies since there is an opportunity of cost reduction for jointness 
of banking and insurance products, particularly in marketing. In this thesis, we do not 
examine economies of scope or scale that may result from such merger. On the other 
hand, there may be diseconomies of scope, because running a bank branch will be more 
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costly than running an insurance agency. Furthermore, since the underwriting activities 
will be conducted separately by separate personnel, there will be little chance of having 
the scale and scope economies. Anyway, this is a separate issue and needs to be tested 
separately from the European assurancebanks' perspective. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SUMMARY FINDINGS, POLICY RECOMMENDATION AND 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of undertaking this research was to examine the interface of insurance 
and banking and its effects from the European context. We considered a number of 
relevant issues and their impact. The purpose of this chapter is to summarise the 
findings of this research, and make some policy recommendations based on the 
findings. We mentioned earlier that this research had two parts. In the first part 
(Chapter two, three and four), we investigated the various interfaces both from the 
perspective of a bank as well as from the perspective of an insurance company. In the 
second part (Chapter five and six), we performed empirical tests of the effects, i.e. of 
bank involvement into insurance business, and insurance companies involvement into 
banking business. 
The rest of the chapter is organised in the following way: - in section 2, we summarise 
the findings; in section 3, we make some policy recommendations based on our 
findings; in section 4, we identify some of the limitations of this thesis, and suggest 
some of the issues for further research. 
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7.2. SUMMARY FINDINGS 
The most important of our findings is that of return and risk effects of banks as 
well as insurance companies cross-business activities. Another major contribution, 
in this thesis, is the creation of a databank from the European context and from the 
bancassurance perspective as well as assurancebank perspective. These data can be 
invaluable for further research and development on this crucial issue. 
Our two sets of empirical tests, based on return and risks, show that banks 
significantly increase their risks when they diversify into life assurance 
underwriting and general insurance underwriting business. On the other hand, 
although insurance companies bankruptcy risk increases slightly, other risk 
measurement «(j) indicates significant risk reduction when they diversify into 
banking business. Returns in both cases do not have significant effect. Only 
insurance broking by banks has significant positive return, and acquiring medium 
banks by large insurance have significant negative return. Engaging into insurance 
broking by banks slightly increases banks risk but does not have any significant 
effect (Chapter five). 
The main questions, we ask in this thesis, are- should banks be allowed in 
insurance business? If so, in what capacity - distribution only or underwriting as 
well? In what sector - life assurance or general insurance as well? Again, should 
insurance companies be allowed in banking business? 
Our results do not favour underwriting activities (Chapter five and six). Insurance 
broking appears to be most suitable out of all the three insurance activities. On the 
other hand, (at least) as long as banks are permitted to engage in insurance 
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underwriting activities, the insurance companies should also be permitted to 
engage in banking activities since it significantly decreases an insurance 
company's risks, although bankruptcy risk increases but not significantly (Chapter 
six). Furthermore, there may be potential economies of scale and economies of 
scope that may decreases bankruptcy risk which need to be tested separately. 
In the first part of the thesis, we found that traditionally banks and insurance 
companies enjoyed very close links. But during late 80s the situation changed 
dramaticallyi. Banks became more aggressive in entering insurance business. They 
entered not only in insurance distribution but also in core insurance business, i.e. 
underwriting of insurance business. This is a serious threat for the traditional 
insurance companies. On the other hand, insurance companies have not made any 
significant response to banks' action. Banks have still their monopoly power in the 
core banking activities, i.e. taking deposits, money transmission services, lending 
of money etc. We, therefore, have developed a qualitative model of 'assurancebank' 
for insurance companies in order to provide a defensive strategy as counter 
response. This is reported in Chapter three. However, in the next paragraphs, we 
summarise the findings in chapter by chapter. 
Chapter two examined the recent development in banking industry. Here we 
develop bancassurance model and attempt to answer four questions. How do 
banks enter into insurance business? How does bancassurance work at branch 
level? Who are the main players in this field in the EU market? And how well are 
they performing in this new area? Banks do not use single or same entry strategy. 
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Different banks adopt different entry strategies available to them. These are de 
novo entry, formation of holding companies, joint venture between a bank and an 
insurance company, strategic alliance for joint sales or simply equity holding. We 
have found that all the major European banks have entered into insurance business 
in different capacities2• But we did not further investigate as to which entry was 
most suitable for banks or the merits and demerits of each entry strategies. This is 
probably one of our limitations in the thesis. However, we generalised the 
bancassurance process, i.e. how the system of bancassurance works at banks 
branch level. This is based on previous case studies and our personal interviews at 
branch level. We believe this will add to the literature as to how the system works. 
We have also investigated the main bancassurance players in Europe through a 
long time consuming manual search that is one of the hardest task in this thesis. 
The results of this search, Le. creating data sample as well as collecting 
accounting data for these sample, is one of our main contribution in this thesis. 
These data can be invaluable for further research and development and some of the 
data were used in Chapter five for econometric analysis. Furthermore, we 
measured the bancassurance companies performance through a simple analysis. 
Although the bancassurance companies market share (in distribution) in life 
assurance market is significant, they do not have significant market share in 
general insurance business. This is because banks are very much interested in life 
assurance business, not in the general insurance business, whereas banking 
1 Factors that affect this dramatic changes are considered in Chapter four. 
2 Specifications are reported in Chapter two. 
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products have more links with general insurance products than life assurance 
products3. 
Chapter three examined the recent development in the insurance industry. This was 
opposite to chapter two. In this chapter, we develop assurance bank model and 
differentiate between bancassurance, assurancebank and alljinanz. We believe this 
comparison will be helpful to correct the common mistake in the literature. We 
have created assurancebank data from the European context that can be invaluable 
for further research and development on this crucial issue. In our investigation in 
this chapter, on the insurance companies' diversification into banking activities, we 
found that the insurance companies are less aggressive than the banks in cross-
business activities. However, the insurance companies have taken an alternative 
strategy as a strategic response. Instead of direct competition with banks by 
offering banking services, most of the insurance companies are becoming more 
direct marketing oriented to minimise costs in order to survive. We have, therefore, 
developed a qualitative model of assurancebank in this chapter as a direct strategic 
response to banks. We also tested the model from the regulatory perspective and 
from the risk perspective. Both tests supported the model. 
The logic for bancassurance is that banks by using their country wide branch net 
work with huge number of employees can market insurance products in addition to 
and with banking products to a vast customer base, and, thus, might benefit from 
scale and scope economies. However, banks have little success in bancassurance in 
the sense that the bank staffs are not capable enough to offer insurance business 
since insurance products require a very special technical knowledge and skills. 
3 For details please see Chapter four. 
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Admitting this, banks took professional insurance people for insurance business 
like the traditional insurance companies. However, costs therefore would increase. 
Moreover, running a highly costly branch network (compared to insurance agency 
office) would also increase insurance unit cost. However, this cost issue should be 
tested separately from a bancassurance perspective. 4 
Chapter four examined the reasons for 'bancassurance' and 'assurancebank'. In 
this chapter, we have found how strongly banks and insurance companies are 
dependent on each other, which implies cross-section activities. Therefore, we 
found that much of banking products are related to insurance products (mortgage 
and life assurance) and vice versa. For instance, financial institutions insurance, 
credit insurance, mortgage indemnity insurance, marine insurance, mortgagees 
interest insurance, employers liability insurance, officers and directors liability 
insurance, life and pension plan etc are frequently taken out by banks as an 
assignee or via bank customers. On the other hand, bank account, direct debit for 
insurance premium, insurance companies staff's salaries and commissions, foreign 
exchange dealing (for international claims settlement etc), investment, short term 
lending etc are frequently taken out by insurance companies. Such strong links may 
influence them to diversify towards each other's arena if the regulation permits. We 
have also found, in this chapter, some incentives for banks as well as insurance 
companies to diversify towards each other. For instance, branch/agency network, 
vast number of employees, IT and information, advertisement etc areas there is a 
strong scope for the existence of economies of scale and scope. Such potential cost 
savings may help to keep/gain the competitive market position. Further more, the 
4 Dinenis and Chang (1998) found weak scope economies in examining UK data. 
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implementation of the Treaty of Rome (1957) directly and indirectly forced 
European regulators to liberalise the market in order to (i) create greater 
competition in the market so that customers can get competitive lower prices and 
better quality of services; (ii) to integrate and harmonise the market to achieve the 
'single market' theme in Europe; and more importantly (iii) to decrease bankruptcy 
risks (this is tested empirically in chapter five and six) by allowing diversification. 
As the banking and insurance industries are highly regulated and are kept separate 
traditionally, we looked in detail at the regulatory issues with regard to 
bancassurance and assurancebank that too influence banks and insurance 
companies to diversify towards each other. After highlighting the traditional 
regulatory system of banks and insurance companies (both individual European 
countries and the EC directives), we investigated the changing regulation between 
banks and insurance companies and the regulators motivation for change. We have 
found that all the EU countries have liberalised their national regulation of 
separation of banking and insurance business. The EC directives also moved into 
the same direction. The motivation of the regulators was to create the motto of 'one 
stop financial shopping', creating greater competion in the European financial 
market, and reducing the financial companies bankruptcy risks by allowing 
diversification (mentioned earlier). But we found that this 'supermarket motto' has 
created some new problems for them, i.e. regulatory and supervisory activities. In a 
financial group, the banking part is regulated and supervised by the banking 
supervisors, usually a country's central bank, and the insurance part of the same 
group is regulated and supervised by the government's trade department. This duel 
regulatory system has created some loopholes for these financial conglomerate 
firms, such as double gearing, contagion risk, lack of information of intra-group 
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transitions etc. in prudent supervision. We have argued for a single regulatory 
system in order to over come some of these problems as long as the banking and 
insurance cross-business activities are permitted. We have also found that (Chapter 
five) the bankruptcy risks increase instead of decreases that contradict the 
regulatory authorities' predicted decision. 
Chapter five and six was our econometric work. In Chapter five, we tested our first 
hypothesis, i.e. the return and risks effects of the banks' diversification into various 
insurance activities. Based on the European data (data were created in chapter two), 
we examined the impact on returns and risks effects of European banks' 
diversification into life assurance underwriting, general insurance underwriting, and 
insurance broking activities. We examined pre-merger activities and post-merger 
activities in terms of return and risk effects over the six years period from 1991-1996 
and we have found some interesting results. The pre-merger analysis between the 
banks and different insurance companies (owned by these banks) showed that life 
assurance and general insurance underwriting companies are more risky than banking 
business. Even insurance broking is more risky than banking but not significant. 
However, insurance broking is more profitable than banking. Life assurance 
underwriting as well as general insurance underwriting is less profitable than banking 
but not significant. (Table 5.2). In the post-merger analysis, we found that banks 
significantly increase their risk in underwriting of life as well as underwriting of 
general insurance business. Expansion in life underwriting significantly increases 
returns but the effect on return from expanding in general insurance underwriting is 
not significant. The most profitable expansion is into insurance broking business since 
our results indicate a significant positive effect on return with no adverse effects on 
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risk. This suggests that the cross-business distribution activities should be permitted 
and special consideration should be given in allowing the cross-business underwriting 
activities in order to reduce the probability of bankruptcies. 
Chapter six is the opposite of Chapter five. This tested the second hypothesis, i.e. the 
impact of the return and risks effects of insurance companies' diversification into 
banking business (Le. assurancebank strategy). Over the period of six years 
investigation from 1991-1996, we also found some interesting results here. In our pre-
merger analysis in this assurancebank strategy, it is shown that banks have 
significantly lower risk than insurance companies in terms of 0 risk measurement. 
However, returns between insurance and banking do not have a significant effect 
(Table 6.2). In the post-merger analysis, the results show that the insurance companies 
bankruptcy risk although increases slightly, other risk measurement indicates 
significant risk reduction and the return in this case does not have significant effect 
(Table 6.3 and 6.4). Since the returns are not significantly negative, and at the same 
time, since the risk decreases significantly, the insurance companies, from a firm 
viewpoint, may adopt assurancebank strategy as a defensive response as long as the 
banks are permitted to engage in insurance underwriting activities. 
We have mentioned earlier that the banks are more aggressive than the insurance 
companies in cross-business activities. Banks have entered into core Insurance 
business, i.e. underwriting of insurance. This is a serious threat to insurance 
companies. On the other hand insurance companies have not significantly responded 
to the banks' reactions. In the core activities of banks like taking deposits, money 
transmission services etc., banks still have the monopoly. The existence of insurance 
companies in the core-banking activities is not significant. We have found that almost 
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all the commercial banks now have life assurance underwriting subsidiaries, but a few 
banks have a general insurance underwriting subsidiary. Even those who have general 
insurance underwriting subsidiaries, underwrite very simple general insurance 
products like household insurance, motor insurance, accident and health insurance. 
The large exposures like marine, aviation, still insurance companies have the 
monopoly. In this case, bankers are still bankers and insurers are still insurers. 
7.3. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis makes some policy recommendations based on the research findings. The 
recommendations can be drawn from a number of perspectives, in particular from the 
banks' perspective, from the insurance companies perspective, from the regulatory 
authorities' perspective and above all from the public policy perspective. 
The main questions we asked were that should banks be permitted in insurance 
business? If so in what capacity, distribution only orland underwriting? And, in 
what sector, life assurance orland general insurance business? Should insurance 
companies be permitted to engage in banking? The main objective of regulators are 
to protect the companies from bankruptcies, thus, to safe the individuals savings 
and investments. As to whether banks be permitted to engage in insurance 
business, or vice versa, these results will be useful to the regulatory authorities for 
further decision making. Based on our findings, we can recommend that if the 
objective of public policy is to minimise the risk of bank/insurance company's 
failure, then our results suggest that European banks should be restricted to 
acquiring life assurance and general insurance underwriting companies. But they 
may be permitted to acquire insurance broking companies on the ground that 
though the risk increases in engaging in insurance broking business, this does not 
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have a significant effect, instead the returns significantly increase when banks 
engage into insurance broking. On the other hand, insurance companies should be 
permitted to engage in banking business (at least) as long as banks are permitted in 
engagmg banking activities. This is because, although the bankruptcy risk 
increases slightly, the other risk measurement (0) indicates significant risk 
reduction, which strongly support the consistent returns of the insurance 
companies. However, underwriting activities in both cases should be restricted. 
Holifield (1994), President of the Insurance Supervisory Office of Berlin, also 
suggested for limited use of liberalisation. 
Our recommendation to banks are that banks should concentrate on insurance 
distribution in addition to their core business, i.e. banking business. Because our 
results suggest that only insurance broking is profitable and is at the same time a safer 
arena. Banks should spend more money on staff training for insurance operations 
(marketing) since it requires special technical knowledge. Professional bodies like the 
Chartered institute of Bankers, the Chartered Insurance Institute in the UK and similar 
other European countries professional bodies should thoroughly revise their syllabus 
structure to meet their clients' need. In their professional syllabus, the core banking 
activities and core insurance activities should be made compulsory for both 
professional bodies' professional exams, so that, staff can cope with the newly 
amalgamated environment. Life assurance underwriting as well as general insurance 
underwriting by banks does not show a positive return. One may argue that our 
sample period is in too early a stages. But underwriting insurance, especially life 
assurance underwriting, by banks date back to 70s and 80s. Therefore, a new 
, our sample period is from 1991 to 1996. Most of the underwriting activities started during late 
eighties or early nineties. 
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organisation generally should make profit after fifth year. There may be another 
reason for this. The combination of banking with insurance might not be an efficient 
set of businesses (especially underwriting) due to their nature of business and complex 
structure of organisation forms. 
Our recommendations to insurance companies are that insurance companies should 
response to banks as long as the banks are permitted to conduct core insurance 
activities, i.e. underwriting of insurance. Although no significant change of returns, 
the significant reduction of 0 strongly supports the consistent returns of the insurance 
companies. Furthermore, as a significant number of customers are moving towards 
banks- insurance services due to one stop financial shopping, insurance companies in 
order to retain existing customers should adopt the assurancebank strategy. 
Banks as well as insurance companies are regulated separately, banks by the central 
banks and the insurance companies by the government trade department. Due to the 
heavy amalgamations of banking and insurance business, there should be a single 
regulatory body to overcome the duel regulatory problems as long as this cross-
business is permitted, and it will, therefore, be easy for prudent supervision by the 
supervisory authorities. 
According to industrial economic theory, people in general want the best products 
with a relative cheap price. Allowing cross-business distribution and tightening the 
cross-business underwriting will facilate one stop financial shopping for consumers 
and at the same time minimise the bankruptcy risks of banking and insurance 
companies. 
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7.4. LIMITATIONS OF THIS THESIS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
Allowing banking insurance cross-business raise four fundamental questions. These 
are - does bankruptcy risk increase when banks diversify into insurance business? Or 
, 
do the scale and scope economies exist if banks diversify into insurance business? On 
the other hand, does bankruptcy risk increase when insurance companies diversify into 
banking business? Or do the scale and scope economies exist if insurance companies 
diversify into banking business? We conducted both bankruptcy and profitability test 
but one of the main limitations of this thesis is that this thesis did not considered the 
potential benefit of scale and scope economies for banks and insurance companies 
cross-section business. Banks' diversification into insurance business or vice versa 
may be potential beneficial in terms of cost efficiency. Diacon (1990c), and Dinenis 
and Jung (1998) conducted test from the UK perspective. Others may conduct the test 
of the existence of scale and scope economies of banks/insurance companies in 
European context. 
We conduct simulation test on insurance company's diversification into banking 
business due to the lack of data, since insurance companies have started very recently 
(mid nineties) to engage in banking business. Like our bancassurance test, other 
researchers may undertake research with actual data in several years time to show the 
actual impact. 
We have found banks as well as insurance companies adopt various entry strategies 
for cross-section business (like de novo entry, mergers and acquisitions, strategic 
alliance etc.), but we did not consider which type of entry is most suitable for banks or 
insurance companies. One may undertake research as a comparative study on this 
issue. 
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We have excluded those banks that have only tied alliance with insurers in our 
empirical test. Therefore, we are unable to make recommendation on to them. 
We did not investigate pricing policies. Therefore, we do not know who provides the 
same products cheaply banks or insurance companies since both provide all sorts of 
personal line products such as pension, life assurance, mortgage and loan etc. From 
consumer point of view, one might undertake research on this issue as to where the 
customers are better off. 
In case of bancassurance activities, we did not test problems of bancassurance 
operation at bank branch level. There might be cultural clash, regulatory restriction, 
lack of technical skill etc. Someone may undertake research through a survey method 
to test this empirically. However, as a first attempt from the European context, we 
believe this thesis will be the basis for further research in the area of bancassurance 
and assurance bank. 
THE END 
-:-
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APPENDIX: I 
List of top /00 European banks 
1 Credit Agricole 51 Caja de Ahorros y Pen de Barcelona 
2 HSBC Holdings 52 Norddeutsche Landesbank 
3 Union Bank of Switzerland 53 Kreditbank 
4 Deutsche Bank 54 LandesBank Berlin Girozentrale 
5 Credit Lyonnais 55 Caja de Madrid 
6 ABN-AMRO Bank 56 Credit Commercial de France 
7 Banque National de Paris 57 Credit Local de France 
8 CS Holdings 58 Bank of Scotland 
9 Compagine Financiere de Paribas 59 Credit Communal de Belgique 
10 Swiss Bank Corporation 60 Banque Brussels Lambert 
II Barclays Bank 61 Creditanstalt -Bankverein 
12 National Westminister Bank 62 Standard Chartered 
13 Rabobank Nederland 63 Landeskredit Baden-Wurttemberg 
14 Societe Generale 64 Caixa Geral de Depositos 
15 Dresdner Bank 65 Allied Irish Bank 
16 Westdeutsche Landesbank Giro 66 BHFBank 
17 Groupe Caisse dEpargne 67 Cassa di R di Verona Vicenza, B & A 
18 Cariplo 68 Banco Populair Espanol 
19 San Paolo Bank Holding 69 Nordbanken 
20 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya 70 Mediobanca 
21 Abbey National 71 SG Warburg Group 
22 Banca di Roma 72 Unidenmark 
23 Lloyds Bank 73 BancaCRT 
24 Commerzbank 74 Unitas 
25 Argentaria 75 CERA 
26 Bayerische Hypo & Wechsel-Bank 76 Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten 
27 Banco Central Hispanoamericano 77 Swedbank 
28 Banca Nazionale del Lavoro 78 Banco di Sicilia 
29 Istituto Mobilare Italiano 79 Zurcher Kantonalbank 
30 Intemationale Nederland Bank 80 Berliner Bank 
31 Bayerische Vereinsbank 81 Banca Popolare di Milano 
32 Banco Santander 82 Landesbank Schleswig-Holstein Giro 
33 Banca Commerciale Italiana 83 ASLK-CGER Bank 
34 Monte dei Paschi di Siena 84 Credit National 
35 Groupe des Banques Populaires 85 Greek Post Office Savings Bank 
36 Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau 86 Bank of Ireland 
37 Bayersche Landesbank Girozentrale 87 Hamburger Sparkasse 
38 DGBank 88 Wustenrot Holding Gmbh 
39 Den Danske Bank 89 Kansallis-Osake-Pankki 
40 Generale Bank 90 SudwestLB 
41 Skandianaviska Enskilda Banken 91 Hamburgische Landesbank 
42 Royal Bank of Scotland 92 VSB Groep 
43 Banco di Napoli 93 Banco Comercial Portugues 
44 TSB Group 94 Helaba-Landes Hessen-Thuringen 
45 Banesto - Banco Espanol de Credito 95 Deutsche Pfandbrief-und Hypo 
46 Svenska Handelsbanken 96 Banca Popolare di Novera 
47 Union Europeenne de CIC 97 Banco Ambrosiano Veneto 
48 Credito Italiano 98 Schroders 
49 Banque Indosuez 99 Grupo Banca March 
50 Bank Austraia 100 Girocredit 
Source: The Banker, September 1994 
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APPENDIX: III 
E B c 1996 
Bank Holding Country Ufe Assurance Company General Insurance Company Broking Company 
Company 
I Abbey National UK Abbey National Life Abbey National-Commercial Abbey National Insurance Consultant Ltd., 
Scottish Mutual Assurance Union, Carfax Insurance Ltd. Future Insurance Services Ltd. (GN INSU.) 
Society Ltd. 
2 Barclays Bank UK Barclays Life Barclays Insurance Services Ltd. 
Barclays International Insurance Services 
Ltd. 
3 Natwest Group UK Natwest Life National Westminister Insurance Services 
Ltd. 
4 Lloyds Bank UK Lloyds Abbey Life L10yds Bank Insurance Services Ltd. 
Ambassador Life 
Lloyd Bowmaker 
Black Horse Life 
5 Midland UK Midland Life Midland General Insurance Ltd. Midland Bank Insurance Services Ltd. 
6 Royal Bnank of UK Direct Line RBS Insurance Services Ltd. 
Scotland 
7 Bank of Scotland UK Standard Life· Bank of Scotland Insurance Consultant Ltd. 
S TSBGroup UK TSB Life TSB General Insurance Ltd. TSB Insurance Services Ltd. 
TSB Pension 
Target Life 
9 SG Warburg Group UK Merc~ Life Assurance 
10 Allied Irish Bank UK Irish Life 
! 11 Bank of Ireland UK Lifetime· 
I 12 Alliance &: Lecicester UK Alliance &: Lecicester Life 
13 Nationwide UK Nationwide Life 
! 14 Leeds Permanent UK Leeds Life 
I IS Yorksbire Bank UK Yorkshire Life· 
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16 Hansard Financial UK Liberty Life Assurance 
Trust Co 
17 First National UK First National Life 
Finance Corp Assurance 
18 Britannia B. S UK Brittania Life* 
19 Halifax UK Halifax Life Robinson Insurance Services Ltd., Halifax 
Mortgage Services (Insu. Brokers) Ltd. 
20 Woolwich UK Woolwich Life 
21 National & UK N &P Life National & Provincial Insurances Ltd., N & 
Provencial P Independent Financial Consultants Ltd., N 
& P Insurance and Investment Services Ltd. 
22 Hill Samuel UK Hill Samuel Life 
Gisbome Life 
23 Hambros UK Hambro Assured Hambro Legal Protection Ltd., Berkeley 
(Insurance) Ltd. (80%) 
24 HFCBank UK Hamilton Life Hamilton Insurance Co 
25 Clystesdale Bank National Australia Life Clysdale Bank Insurance Brokers Ltd. 
26 Credit Agricole France Predica Life( 1986>- Pacifica Non-Life (1990) 
27 Credit Lyonnais France CL Assurance 
28 Banque Nationale de France Natiovie, Assuvie*, Natio 
Paris Assurances 
29 Caisses D'Epargne France Ecureuil Vie (1988) 
30 Credit Municipal France Assurances du Griffon 
(1987) 
31 Credit Commercial France Erisa-Vie (1989) 
de France 
32 Credit Populaire France Groupe Fructivie (1982), 
Prosperite (1989), 
Fructivie, Prevoyance 
33 Sovac France Assupar Vie, Vie Plus 
34 Groupe Paribas France Cardif Societe Vie, Helios 
-- -- --_._- --" 
Societe Vie 
- - --
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35 Groupe Indosuez France La Henin Vie 
(Banque la Henin) 
36 Uniion Europeene de France Socapi(1985) 
CIC 
37 Credit Lyonnais France UDAF Life, Elysis Medical de France-vie 
38 Societe Generale France Sogecap, Sogenal Vie 
39 Deutsch Bank Germany DB Leben 
40 Commrzbank Germany DBV 
41 Generale Bank Belgium Alpha Life T. C. D. Thibut-Colson-Dene 
42 Kreditbank Belgium OMNIVER-VIE Almaver N.V. 
43 Credit Commercial Belgium Mega Life Mega- Non-Life 
de Belgium 
44 CGER Belgium 
45 Assubel Belgium 
46 Argenta Belgium 
47 IPPA Banque de Belgium Royal Beige 
Epar~o 
48 Metropoliton Bank Belgium Groupe AG 
49 SEFG Belgium GAN 
50 Banque Commercia Ie Belgium GrowpeJosi 
de Bruxelles 
51 Banque Brussels Belgium BBL Life, BBL Life BBL Insurance BBL Insurance Brokerage SA 
Lombert Luxembourg SA (99.960/11} 
52 ANYHP Belgium ANYHPLife 
53 Baltica Denmark Baltica insurance 
54 Banque Generate de Luxembour BGL Vie 
Luxembourg g 
55 Banco Commercial Portugal Occidental 
Portugues 
56 Monte de Pasechi Italy Ticino, Montepasehi Vita 
57 Banca Nazionale de Italy Lavoro Vita (1986) 
Lavoro(BNL ) 
_ .. _-
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58 BPN Italy SAl 
59 San Paolo Italy Polaris Vita CIDA, SIPEA 
60 Istituto Mobiliare Italy Fideuram Vita (l984) Fideruam Danni (1989) 
Italiano 
61 Monta del Paschi de Italy Ticino( 1989) 
Siena 
62 Banco Bilbao Spain Euroseguros, Plus Ultra, Aurora Polar, BBV Brokers 
Vizeaya DAPA 
63 Banco Espagnol de Spain La Union yel Fenix 
Credit Espagnol 
64 Banco Central Spain Banco Vitalicio, Navarra 
Nacional-Hispinieay 
Vasco, 
65 Cajas de Ahorro Spain Caser 
66 Banco de Santander Spain Cenit 
67 Banco Zaragozano Spain Uniseguros 
68 Banco Itispano Spain La Estrella 
Americano 
69 Allianz-RAS Spain Cresa, Ercos 
Adriatica Y AlIianz 
70 PKBanken Sweden Livia 
71 ABN-AMRO Netherlands ABNI AMRO Verzekeringen 
72 INGGroup Netherlands ING Insurance NRG Fenchurch General Insurance 
73 RABOBank Netherlands Interpolis 
74 VSB Netherlands AMEV Bishopgate Insurance PLC 
75 Banco Americano Spain Hispano Americano 
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APPENDIX: IV 
List of sample firms for Bancassurance Test 
A. European Banks 
1 Abbey National PLC 24 Halifax PLC 
2 ABN-AMRO Holdings 25 Hambros 
3 Allied Irish Banks PLC 26 Istituto Mobiliare Italiano 
4 Bancaire, CIE 27 Kreditbank 
5 Bancop Bilbao Vizaya 28 LaCaixa 
6 Banco Central Hispanoamericano 29 Lloyds Bank 
7 Banco Commercial Portugues 30 Lloyds TSB Group 
8 Bank of Scotland 31 Midland Bank 
9 Banque Paribas 32 Montei di Paschie Siena 
10 Banque Populaires 33 National Westminister Bank 
11 Barclays Bank 34 National & Provincial Building 
Society 
12 Banca Nazionale del Lavaro 35 Paribas, CIE Financiere 
13 Britannia Building Society 36 Rabobank 
14 Caripolo 37 Royal Bank of Scotland 
15 Credit Communial de France 38 San Paolo 
16 Clydesdale Bank 39 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken 
17 Co-operative Bank (UK) 40 Societe Generale 
18 Credit Agricole 41 Svenska Handelsbanken 
19 Credit Lyonnais 42 SG Warburg 
20 Credit Suisse 43 TSB Group 
21 Deutsche Bank 44 Woolwich PLC 
22 First National Finance Corp 45 Yorkshire Bank 
23 Fleming, Robert 
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B. Bank's Own Life Underwriting 
Companies 
1 Abbey Life 21 Gisbome Life 
2 Abbey Life Pension 22 Hambro Assured 
3 Abbey National Life 23 Handelsbanken Liv 
4 Ambassador Life 24 Hill Samuel Life 
5 Assurances Federals Vie 25 Interpolis 
6 Barclays Life 26 La Estrella 
7 Black Horse Life 27 Lloyds Bowmaker 
8 BNL Vita (Lavaro Vita) 28 Mercury Life 
9 Britannia Life 29 Midland Life 
10 Caixa Vida 30 Monte di Paschi Vita 
11 Carl Vita 31 N & P Life 
12 CS Life 32 Ocidental 
13 DB Leben 33 Omniver Vie 
14 Erisa 34 Predica Life 
15 Euroseguros 35 Royal Scott Assurance 
16 Fideuram Vita 36 San Paolo Vita 
17 First National 37 S-E Banken Life 
18 Fleming Life 38 Sogecap 
19 Fructi Vie 39 TSB Life 
20 Generali 40 Woolwich Life 
C. Bank's Own General D. Bank's own Insurance Broking Co 
Insurance Underwriting Co 
1 Aurora Polar 1 Agencaixa 
2 Direct Line Insurance Co Ltd 2 Bank of Scotland Insurance Services 
3 Fideuram Assicurazioni 3 Barclays Insurance Services Ltd 
4 GAN 4 BBV Brokers 
5 NCM Insurance 5 Clydesle Bank Insurance Brokers Ltd 
6 Pacifica 6 Co-operative Bank Financial Advisers Ltd 
7 Pinnacle Insurance 7 Halifax Mortgage (Insurance Brokers) Services 
Ltd 
8 Segurocaixa 8 Lloyds Bank Insurance Services Ltd 
9 Ticino 9 Luiz Megre Beca 
10 TSB General Insurance Ltd 10 National Westminister Insurance Services Ltd 
11 Omniver lard 11 Yorkshire Bank Financial Services Ltd 
12 UAF 
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APPENDIX: V 
List of sample firms for Assurancebank Test 
European Large Insurance 
Company 
1 Aegon NV 
2 Allianz AG 
3 Assurances Generale de France 
4 AXAUAPSA 
5 Commercial Union PLC 
6 FINAXA 
7 GAN, STE Centrale DU 
8 Generali 
9 ING Group 
10 Legal & General Group 
11 Munchener Ruckversich 
12 Prudential Corporation 
13 Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance 
PLC 
14 Schweizerische Leben 
15 Suez, CIE DE 
16 UAP, CIE 
17 Winterthur ste Suiss 
18 Zurich Insurance Co 
European Medium Insurance Company 
1 Allied Dunbar Assurance Co 
2 AMB 
3 AXA Colonia Konzern 
4 Baloise Holding 
5 Commercial Union France 
6 Eagle Star Holdings 
7 General Accident PLC 
8 GRE 
9 Lloyds Abbey Life 
10 Royal BeIge 
11 RSA 
12 Skndia Insurance Co 
13 Sun Life Corporation 
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European Medium Banks 
1 Allied Irish Bank 
2 Baden Wurttembergisch 
3 Banca Intesa 
4 Banco Commercial Portugues 
5 Banco di Sardegna 
6 Banco Espirito Santo 
7 Banco Popular Espanol 
8 Banco Portugues 
9 Banque Cantonale Vaudc 
10 Banque Generale du Luxembourg 
11 Banque Nationale de Belgiuque 
12 BG Bank 
13 BHF Bank 
14 BNA Banca Nazionale del 
15 BPI Sgps 
16 Den Norske Bank 
17 Erste Bank der Osterren 
18 Espirito Santo Financial 
19 Istituto Mobiliare Italano 
20 Mediobanca 
21 Merita PLC 
22 Natexis 
23 Nordbanken Holdings 
24 Schweizerische National 
14 Swiss Reinsurance Co 
15 Victoria Holding 
European Small Banks 
1 Anglo Irish Bank Corporation 
2 Banca Agricola Milanese 
3 Banca Fideuram 19 Gitthard Bank 
4 Banca Toscana 20 Graubundner Kantonalbank 
5 Banco Atlantico 21 Household International 
6 Banco de Andalucia 22 ICC Bank 
7 Banco Pastor 23 lyske Bank 
8 Banco Zaragozano 24 Liechtensteinische Landes 
9 Bank fur Kamten und Ste 25 Neue Aargauer Bank 
10 Bank Slaski 26 Okobank 
11 Bankinter 27 Robert Fleming 
12 Banque Cantonale du Jura 28 Rothschilds Continuation 
13 Basellandschaftliche Kan 29 Vereins und Westbank 
14 Basler Kantonalbank 30 Verwaltungs und Privat Bank 
15 Berner Kantonalbank 31 Yorkshire Bank 
16 Cetelem 32 Zuger Kantonalbank 
17 Credit General 
18 Clydesdale Bank 
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Appendix. VI. (Cont.) 
List of Insurance (bancassurance) Companies, Italy 
Insurance companies Parent Banks 
1. Lavoro Vita Banco Nazionale de Lavoro 
1. Fideuram Vita Istituto Mobiliare Italiano 
2. Fideuram Danni 
1. San Paolo Vita San Paplo 
1. Carl Vita Carlplo 
1. Montepaschi Vita Monte dei Paschi di Siena 
2. Ticino 
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APPENDIX: VIII. 
Sample letter to individual 
subsidiaries 
The President 
La Henin Vie 
14, rue Roquepine 
75379 Paris cedex 08. 
16th February 1998 
CITY 
University 
European banBtJSINESStSCHOOL 
Frobishe r Crescent 
Ba rbican Centre 
London EC2Y 8HB 
Switchboard: 0171-477 8000 
Direct Line: 0171-477". 
Fax: 0171-477 8880 
RE. Consolidated profit and loss account and balance sheet data from 1991 to 1996. 
Dear sir, 
The Department of Investment, Risk Management & Insurance of the City University 
Business School has undertaken a research project on the 'interface of Insurance and 
Banking in European Countries' which will form a PhD thesis. For this research we 
kindly request you to send us La Henin Vie's (Subsidiary of Banque Indosuez) 
consolidated profit and loss accounts as well as balance sheets from 1991 to 1996. 
We have already got the Banque Indosuez's data. No individual company's name will be 
mentioned in the research but at the end of the results in the thesis we would like to 
mention the name of all the participant companies. 
As you are well aware that banking - insurance interface is currently an issue of intense 
concern, we believe the out put of this research will be a great help for the decision 
makers of these industries and the relevant regulators. 
If you are interested we will send you a copy of our results as a complimentary. 
Thank you in advance for your co-operation in this research. 
We are waiting for your reply. 
Yours sincerely 
Signature 
(M. Nurullah) 
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APPENDIX: IX 
Sample banks initially interviewed personally (March-April 1996) 
l. Abbey National PIc 
11. Barclays PIc 
iii. Halifax PIc 
IV. Lloyds Bank PIc 
v. TSB Group 
VI. National Westminister Bank 
Vll. Woolwich PIc 
260 
APPENDIX: X 
Number of Financial C 
Banks, investment undertakings Insurance companies owned by a I Banks, investment undertakings and insurance I Others 
owned by an insurance company bank or investment undertaking companies subsidiaries of a common parent undertaking 
Belgium There are no Belgian statistics on the number of financial conglomerates. The OCA is trying to collect some. 
Germany Approximately 5 I Approximately 4 Approximately 2 Exact number unknown 
Denmark I (AIm. Brand) I 2 (den Danske Bank, Bikuben) 0 3 (Baltica, Hafuia, Top) 
Spain There are 28 groups or conglomerates 
Group Mapfre (2nd in 7: BBY, Central-Hispano, La 
Spain per premium Caixa, Banesto, Santander, 
income and own funds) Argentaria and Caxia de 
Catalana + Caser (parent 
company= an insurance 
company controlled by savings 
banks) 
France 12 banks owned by 9 32 insurance groups owned by 3 insurance groups owned by parent companies with other financial or industrial 
insurance groups 12 banking groups participation. 
Greece I 12 insurance companies owned 3 insurance companies owned by a holding I information not available 
by6 banks 
UK 17 groups where the 26 groups where the principal Insurance undertakings and banks are never ,generally speaking, members of a 
principal activity is activity is of the banking type group also containing industrial undertakings. One exceptional: BAT, which 
insurance controls Eagle Star and Allied Dunbar. Similarly, it is rare for a group to include an 
insurance company and a broking company. There are however, notable 
exceptions. 
Italy 80r9 Some 20 
Ireland 2 2 
Luxembourg Generally speaking, there are 4 conglomerates (banks/insurance) meeting the participation criterion. NB. Not covered are foreign conglomerates 
including Luxembourg subsidiaries of foreign insurance companies. 
Netherlands 7 mixed fmancial groups 2 mixed fmancial groups principally 3 general mixed 
princiPally engaged in insurance. engaged in the banking sector. fmancial groups. 
Portugal I (Bonanca - 19.17% - VBP 12 0 One case where a banking group has 
(bank) participation in three insurance companies and 
two broking companies. 
Source: Comitte de European Assurance, Paris, 1993 
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